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THE  
HISTORY  
OF THE  
SEVEN YEARS WAR.

PART II.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY

THOMAS HOLCROFT.

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# C O N T E N T S

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## P A R T II.

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### C H A P. X.

**T**H E Campaign of 1759. page 1

### C H A P. XI.

The Winter of 1759 to 1760. p. 58

### C H A P. XII.

The Campaign of 1760. p. 70

### C H A P. XIII.

The Winter of 1760 to 1761. p. 165

C H A P.

# C O N T E N T S.

## C H A P. XIV.

Campaign of 1761. p. 176

## C H A P. XV.

The Winter of 1761 to 1762. p. 242

## C H A P. XVI.

The Campaign of 1762. p. 269

## C H A P. XVII.

Of the Peace. p. 345

THE  
HISTORY  
OF THE  
SEVEN YEARS WAR.

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CHAP. X.

*The Campaign of 1759.*

THE armies of prince Ferdinand of Brunswic and of his royal highness prince Henry began the campaign. The army of the king, confined on the frontiers of the March and of Silesia by the near neighbourhood of the Russians who were in Poland, dared not undertake expeditions which would have drawn it from a line of defence, that must have been dangerous to desert; and the Austrians deferred their operations that they might give the Rus-

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fians time to take the field. These considerations usually retarded the motion of the troops till the end of July.

The French acted without allies: the army of prince Ferdinand had but one enemy to face; they might therefore begin to act whenever they should have made their arrangements, and should think proper. The command of the French army was this year given to marshal de Contades; and M. de Broglio who commanded under him remained at Frankfort, where he took charge of the safety of the troops till the arrival of the marshal.

A combined corps of Austrians and of troops of the circles, under the command of M. d'Arberg, advanced into Thuringia; where it excited inquietude both in prince Henry and prince Ferdinand. The two princes mutually concerted an enterprize to dislodge these troublesome troops from their neighbourhood. M. von Knobloch commanded a Prussian detachment, and M. von Urf a corps of the allies, for the execution of this design. Knobloch took Erfurt, and some hundreds of prisoners in these environs. Urf drove the enemy beyond Vach, and recovered Hersfeld. Scarcely however had the allies and Prussians retired before the Austrians, and the troops of the circles, returned to their former position (March 24th). This  
motion

motion displeased prince Ferdinand; and, that he might expel them from the neighbourhood of Hesse, he caused the left of his army to incline for Cassel, and thence advanced through Melfungen to Hersfeld. The hereditary prince entered the principality of Fulda, from which he penetrated into Franconia, took Meinungen, Wafungen, and defeated three Austrian regiments, which he found in the vicinage. M. d'Arberg approached and attacked him in his camp of Wafungen. After a contest of six hours, the Austrians and the troops of the circles were repulsed, and obliged to fly as far as Thuringia.

April. Prince Ferdinand now assembled all his detachments at Fulda. His intention was to destroy the magazines of the French at Fritzlar, Hanau, and in those parts; that he might retard, or perhaps prevent, the operations they intended in Hesse. On his march to Frankfort, he surpris'd several French detachments, that, unable to escape, surrendered themselves prisoners. Approaching Bergen (on the 13th) he imagined he should find there only some battalions that, too feeble to resist, would be obliged to retreat, or to lay down their arms, if they were rash enough to wait his coming. While he was charging them, M. de Broglie appeared

on the height behind the village, with the brigades he had assembled from the nearest quarters. The attack of the allies was unsuccessful: the prince of Ysenburg who commanded lost his life. Prince Ferdinand was obliged to support the action that was begun; he took indeed the lower part of the village of Bergen, but the upper part, well fortified, opposed insurmountable impediments. The French troops charged the allies at a proper moment, and obliged them to relinquish their conquest. The Saxons, who were in the army commanded by de Broglie, were desirous of pursuit. Prince Ferdinand saw this, attacked them with his cavalry, destroyed them in part, and took some hundreds of prisoners: the remainder of the day was spent in a reciprocal cannonade.

Perceiving his intention had failed, prince Ferdinand retired the same night toward Hesse, without suffering any disturbance from M. de Broglie. M. du Blaisel followed him, and during his retreat attacked the rear-guard of one of the columns of the army, which attack he conducted so well that he took two hundred Prussian dragoons of the Finckenstein regiment prisoners.

Prince Henry in the mean time executed a similar design, which he had formed on Bohemia,

hemia, with more success. He entered this kingdom by Peterfwald without meeting any great opposition. Hulfen, who penetrated with the second column by the Basberg, there found the enemy entrenched. His cavalry took the road to Priefnitz, which brought it on the back of the Austrians, who thus were attacked by infantry in front, and by the cavalry in the rear. The whole Austrian corps under M. Renard, consisting of the regiments of Andlau, Königseck, and a thousand croats, in all two thousand five hundred men, was taken. After this brave action Hulfen advanced to Saatz, where he ruined one of the most considerable of the enemy's magazines. His royal highness inclined toward Buden, and destroyed all the provisions and stores the Austrians had assembled in those parts.—After having accomplished the full purport of his operations, he led his troops back into Saxony.

Soon after (in May) the prince resolved to act in like manner by the troops of the empire, that he might drive them from the frontiers of Saxony. This project was taken in concert with the allies. He assembled his corps at Zwickau, whence Finck was detached to Adorf, that the enemy might have apprehensions for the town of Eger. His royal highness, march-



ing to Hof, detached Knobloch through Saalbourg toward Cronach. Disconcerted by this motion, the troops of the circles quitted their advantageous camp of Munchsberg, which the Prussians seized, and made a number of prisoners in different rencounters. Finck then inclined toward Weifstadt, that he might cut off the communication between Maquire and the troops of the circles, by which this Austrian general was obliged to retire into the Upper Palatinate, whence he afterward marched to join the army of the empire at Nuremberg. He was followed by Finck, who on various occasions took four hundred prisoners.

The Prussian army encamped near Bareuth: M. von Meinecke forced general Riedesel to surrender himself prisoner, with nine hundred men under his command, near Cronach. This misfortune hastened the retreat of the troops of the circles, and they were led back to Nuremberg by the prince de Deuxponts.

His royal highness, having no enemy to face, sent Knobloch next into the bishoprick of Bamberg, where he destroyed all the magazines that had been formed for the army of the empire. Having executed his intention, his royal highness returned with his troops into Saxony, toward the beginning of June. The Austrians  
during



during this month had profited by the absence of the Prussians to make an incursion into Saxony. General Gemmingen, who had taken up his post near Wolkenstein, was attacked and beaten there by M. von Schenkendorf. M. de Brentano came to the aid of the Austrians; but, meeting with as ill a reception as that given to Gemmingen, he precipitately retired into Bohemia. This expedition of his royal highness cost the troops of the empire, in one month, all their magazines, sixty officers, and three thousand men. On the part of the allies, the hereditary prince had advanced into the bishoprick of Wurzburg, at the head of twelve thousand men; during which incursion he made three hundred Austrians prisoners, and returned to rejoin the prince his uncle in Hesse.

The French did not begin their operations till toward the end of May. M. de Contades passed the Rhine at Cologne. On the second of June he joined M. de Broglie near Gießen, and left M. d'Armentières in the neighbourhood of Wesel, with a detachment of twenty thousand men. At the approach of these troops, prince Ferdinand retreated, first to Lippstadt, afterward to Hamm, where he assembled all the regiments that had wintered in the bishoprick of Munster, the garrison of that city excepted. Imhof had

hitherto remained at Fritzlar; but, when he heard that de Contades from one part, de Broglie from another, and the Saxons from a third, were advancing upon him, he fell back to Lippstadt.

Finding Hesse void of troops, the French seized on Cassel, Münden, and Beverungen; where they took the greatest part of the magazines of the allies. Contades having pushed forward to Paderborn, prince Ferdinand advanced upon him, and encamped at Rittberg. The loss of all his magazines obliged him to collect new, and he chose Osnabruck as the principal place of his deposit. The design of the French was to cut the Germans off from the Weser. Contades marched and encamped beside the sources of the Ems, whence he repaired to Bielefeld and Herford, and placed the corps of de Broglie at Örlinghausen, from which place the latter approached Minden; which he surprised in open day (July 20th), and took fifteen hundred prisoners. This disaster obliged prince Ferdinand, who was at Ravensberg, to fall back to Osnabruck, where on the 8th he was joined by the corps of M. von Wangenheim, that till then had made head against M. d'Armentières. The latter general, meeting with no enemy, endeavoured to carry Munster, sword in hand: failing in the attempt  
he

he proceeded regularly, opened his trenches, and the city surrendered on the 25th.

Marshal de Contades marched and encamped with his whole army near Minden, occupying the left shore of the Weser himself, and placing M. de Broglie on the right. Prince Ferdinand, having arrived on the banks of the river, immediately marched up the stream to oppose the enemy. On the 29th he appeared in the plains of Minden, extending his army between Hille and Fredewalde, where he was joined by general Dreves, who returned after recovering Bremen from the French. He fortified the village of Tonhausen, a quarter of a mile to the left of his army. This was a kind of snare for de Contades, who was too well posted to be attacked in his camp, and whom the prince could not vanquish but by some stratagem. In order to inspire the French with fears, he sent the hereditary prince behind them, who approaching Gohfeld found the duke de Brissac there with a detachment of six thousand men.

Marshal Contades, eager to accomplish the wishes of prince Ferdinand, acted as if he had received his orders from the prince himself. De Broglie passed the Weser with his detachment, and joined the army. Roads were prepared over the marshes that covered the allied

army, which at length was attacked, on the first of August. The village of Tonhausen, which prince Ferdinand had caused to be entrenched, was garnished with twelve battalions, defended by two heavy batteries, and supported by twenty squadrons, that encamped at a small distance in the rear of the infantry. The main body of the allied army encamped at the distance of a small half mile, as we have said, behind the wood of Hille. Sagely precautions, the prince had prepared his roads and communications in such a manner as to be able, on the first motion of the French, to march and meet them without impediment, and to charge them in his turn, while they should attack the village.

M. de Contades marched into the plain at day-break. M. de Broglie commanded the van-guard destined for the attack of the village. The French army assumed a position too distant to be ready to succour its van-guard. Its right wing was supported by the Weser; and its left, in an angular form, fell elbowing back to the marsh which it had passed. Approaching Tonhausen, M. de Broglie saw the twelve battalions of Wangenheim formed in order of battle: these he supposed to be the entire army of prince Ferdinand. He remained for a time hesitating, and at length sent for new orders from marshal de

de Contades. The opportunity was past, time was lost, and prince Ferdinand came up with the army. Instead of going to the aid of Wangenheim, he formed in face of the angle which the French army composed. M. de Contades opposed a corps of cavalry; but the ardour and determined bravery of the English infantry were victorious. They attacked the French and put them to the rout, after which they immediately fell on the French infantry. Prince Ferdinand only had time to support them by other brigades before the French took to flight, and the allies formed on the ground they had abandoned.

While victory declared in favour of the prince, M. de Broglio feebly attacked the village of Tonhausen: two charges were made by the cavalry, which both ended in favour of the allies. The rout of the left of the French, the flight of the cavalry, added to the ill success of the attacks on the village, determined the enemy to quit the field of battle, which was performed with great disorder and confusion.

On the same day the hereditary prince beat the duke de Brissac at Gohfeld, and in the pursuit occupied a passage near the Weser, which cut off the French from the roads of the countries of Waldeck and Paderborn. This was a



stroke as decisive as the battle; for the French army, furrounded by the allies, near Minden, on the left of the Weser, was obliged to pass that river, and took the road to Cassel, the only one which was open. M. d'Armentières, who till then had laid close siege to Lippstadt, raised the blockade, and detached ten battalions for Wesel. With twelve others he speedily marched to Cassel, where he joined the beaten army.

The day after the battle, Minden surrendered to the conqueror. The French lost more than six thousand men, three thousand of whom were made prisoners. Prince Ferdinand, to profit by this fortunate event, advanced toward Munden, while the hereditary prince passed the Weser at Rinteln, at the head of twenty thousand men. There was a serious action with the rear-guard at Munden, where M. de St. Germain by his good conduct saved the baggage of the French army. Prince Ferdinand then turned toward Paderborn. and M. von Urf, on the 17th, took at Detmold the moveable hospital of the French, with an escort of eight hundred men.

The duke de Chevreuse and M. d'Armentières, as the allies approached Stadtberg, retreated to Cassel; and, the allies having turned toward the principality of Waldeck, de Contades

rades imagined this indicated an intention in prince Ferdinand to cut off the French from the Maine. On this supposition he hastily quitted Cassel, where he left a feeble garrison, and encamped at Marbourg. A partisan of the allies, named Freytag, approached Cassel and took it by capitulation. Prince Ferdinand was then at Corbach, and ordered the hereditary prince to advance to Wolffshagen, while he detached the prince of Holstein to Fritzlar. Marshal de Conrades, totally confused by these motions, believing himself lost, evacuated Hesse. Prince Ferdinand, on the 24th, pursued him to Ernsthausen, and on the same day one of his detachments took three hundred French in the fortress of Ziegenhain. On the 28th the enemy was posted at Amönebourg, on the Ohm, and had the corps of Fischer behind the Lahn: this the hereditary prince beat. His uncle having in the interim advanced to Wetter, with the army, the young hero came behind the enemy at Niederweymar (September).

M. de Broglio was now so disconcerted that he retreated to Gießen, and abandoned Marbourg, which was taken by the prince of Bevern, with its garrison, consisting of nine hundred men. Success so continued empowered prince Ferdinand to advance to Crodorf. Here  
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the allies and the French were only separated by the Lahn. The latter entrenched themselves in their camp, and sent M. de Broglio to Wetzlar; who, according to the orders of prince Ferdinand, was opposed and observed by Wangenheim. The misfortunes of marshal de Contades were very dissatisfactory to his court; he was recalled, and the command of the army given to M. de Broglio, who was appointed a marshal of France.

While the Germans and the French obstinately encamped in face of each other on the banks of the Lahn, prince Ferdinand was endeavouring in the rear to expel the enemy from the bishoprick of Munster (October). He had sent Imhof into Westphalia, to besiege the city of Munster, which he was obliged to raise almost as soon as he had opened the trenches. M. d'Armentières on the 12th hastily quitted the French army, passed the Rhine at Wesel, and flew to the relief of Munster. Imhof was joined by reinforcements, and, finding himself in force, again began the siege. D'Armentières once more approached, intending to attack the Germans; but, whether he imagined the enterprise was too difficult, or whether he was discouraged by a check given to one of his detachments, he retired



retired behind the Lippe, and the city surrendered to Imhof by capitulation.

The vanity of the French nation caused it to attribute the disadvantages it had sustained, in the German war, to the small superiority of the French army, in numbers, over that of the allies. The court, being nearly of the same opinion, to obviate this difficulty, engaged the duke of Wurtemberg to furnish twelve thousand men, for which he was to receive a subsidy to be paid by France in salt. The duke commanded his forces himself; having reserved the command that he might not be confounded in the crowd of generals of a grand army, or serve under a marshal of France, which he supposed derogatory to his dignity. For this purpose he stipulated that his person and his troops should be employed only in detachments.

This prince arrived in Franconia in the month of October; marshal de Broglio, who could not afford him such employment as he wished, sent him into the country of Fulda, whence the allies drew a part of their subsistence. The approach of the duke deranged the delivery of the quotas; but this corps, unsupported by any other, gave the allies too handsome an opportunity to be passed unnoticed. The hereditary prince departed like an arrow from the army,  
and

and appeared before the gates of Fulda, at the very moment when he was least expected. The duke had prepared a ball for the day, but this quite spoiled his pleasure. Astonished at the presence of so vigilant a foe, who did not give him time to collect his men, he and his cavalry retired toward the Main. The rear-guard of the infantry, preparing for retreat, was hotly charged by the hereditary prince, and twelve hundred men were made prisoners. This was not the last act of the youthful hero; we shall again have occasion to speak of him in our narrative of the Saxon campaign.

The French had this year kept the field longer than usual; the season, little favourable to the operations of war, obliged them to quit their camp on the 8th of December, whence they retired to Frankfort. Prince Ferdinand, after having blockaded Gießen, sent his troops into quarters, having by his valour and ability repaired the wrongs fortune had done him in the commencement of the campaign. The allies found themselves, at the close of the year, in possession of all the places and provinces they had occupied, previous to the declaration of war.

We now come to the campaign of the king, which was far from being equally fortunate; perhaps of all others it was the most fatal; perhaps

haps the glory of Prussia would have expired, had its enemies known as well how to profit by their victories as they did to vanquish. The reasons which obliged the king to act on the defensive have been given. Restrained by the army of marshal Daun, who kept in Bohemia on the frontiers of Silesia, the king meditated an attack on the magazines which the Russians formed in the vicinity of Posen. Had his plan succeeded he would have retarded the operations of the enemy; he would have gained the greatest of advantages, time.

Toward the middle of March, the army of the king approached the hills of Schweidnitz, and was sent into cantonments among those long villages which extend from Landshut to Friedland. General Fouquet remained with his corps at Neustadt, in Upper Silesia. M. von Wobersnow, who had been sent with a detachment into the Palatinate of Posenia, there ruined some magazines which the Russians had begun to form. This expedition, having been made too soon, was of little detriment to the measures the enemy meant to take.

Nothing of importance happened on the frontiers of Bohemia. Laudon who remained at Trautenau was continually in motion, and alarming the advanced posts, but without success; the

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strians were fortunate in one only enterprize. M. von Beck attacked the battalion of Düringhofen, at Greiffenberg, cut off its retreat with his cavalry, and after a vigorous defence the battalion was obliged to lay down its arms.

Toward the end of the month, M. de Ville, who commanded in Moravia, entered Silesia with a strong detachment. Fouquet, finding himself too feeble for opposition, abandoned Neustadt, and took a more advantageous post at Oppersdorf. The king hoped this motion of de Ville would give him the means of beating the enemy in detail, and wholly destroying this corps. Troops secretly filed off to Neiss, whither the king in person repaired; but all precautions to conceal this manœuvre from the enemy were vain. The monks and catholic clergy, secret enemies of the Prussians, whom they treated as heretics, found occasion to inform de Ville of the march of the troops, and on the very day (May 1st) the king arrived at Oppersdorf, the Austrian general retired to Ziegenhals. All that could be done was to skirmish with the rear-guard and the pandours, who still were on their march: the cavalry surrounded the latter, among steep rocks very improper for the manœuvring of horse. The pandours, however, amounting to eight hundred  
men,

men, were taken or put to the sword. Far from remaining at Ziegenhals, the Austrians continued their retreat as far as Moravia; and the king, no longer finding an enemy worthy of notice in these parts, returned to join his army at Landshut.

Marshal Daun had lately arrived in Bohemia (June), and fixed his head quarters at Munchengraetz. The two armies remained peaceably in their posts, till the 28th of June, when the Austrians took the camp at Jaromirs, whence they afterward passed into Lusatia, and established themselves at Marckliffa. The king, who was in the camp of Landshut (July the 6th), detached some battalions that penetrated into Bohemia through Schatzlar. They approached Trautenau, and Major Quintus defeated a corps of pandours in the vicinity of Prausnitz. Seidlitz was sent to Löhn to observe the motions of marshal Daun.

General Fouquet received orders to quit Upper Silesia, to relieve the army of the king from the post of Landshut; for to have left this vacant would have been dangerous. On his arrival, the king by two marches gained the camp of Schmuckseiffen, one of the strongest in Silesia. Seidlitz had been attacked on the eve by Laudon: the partisan was beaten, lost a



hundred and fifty men, and was in danger of being taken. The court of Vienna however confided the command of a body of twenty thousand men to him, destined to join the Russians whenever opportunity should serve. Marshal Daun ordered him to take post on the heights of Lauban, precisely where he had met with so ill a reception, the preceding year, from the rear-guard of the king. This position was chosen that he might be in advance with the Prussians, when he should receive orders to join the Russians. It was not difficult to penetrate the views of the Austrians; the king sent two detachments of cavalry to observe the partisan; one under Lentulus was placed at Löwenberg, and the other under the prince of Wurtemberg at Bunzlau.

While these measures were taken to oppose the Austrians, the Russians were not forgotten. They had been observed during winter by detachments, which, under von Schlabrendorf and von Hordt, had extended along the frontiers of Poland. Toward the spring, count Dohna quitted Mecklenbourg, and Pomerania, where he left Mauteufel with a small corps to make head against the Swedes. The count marched his troops to Stargard, and from thence to Landsberg. Here he was joined by a reinforcement  
under

under the command of Itzenplitz and Hulfen, sent out of Saxony by prince Henry.

The Russians were observed to march through Poland by detachments ; this gave birth to the idea of meeting and beating them in detail. The plan was of very possible execution, should they be attacked while divided on their march, and before other divisions could come up ; but activity and resolution were requisite, and neither were employed. The troops were ill conducted ; the generals were deficient in vigilance ; every measure was taken too late ; error was added to error, and this unhappy expedition became the source of the misfortunes which accumulated on the Prussians during the campaign.

Count Dohna departed from Landsberg on the 23d of June, and passed the Warta on the 5th of July, at Obernich. His tardiness gave the Russians time to assemble at Posen, and the two armies amused themselves in making reconnoitres, which ended in indolence. On the 14th, the Russians made a movement in advance, and filed off near the Prussian army ; but in such disorder that it remained only with count Dohna to have profited by the occasion, had he possessed fortitude. His general measures were so ill taken that he lost a part of his bread and

provisions through negligence, which obliged him to fall back to Zullichau.

Informed of the confusion which reigned in this army, and the disunion of its generals, the king sent M. von Wedel to take the command as dictator, though he could not claim rank from length of service. The same evening that Wedel arrived at Zullichau, Soltikow encamped at Babimost, from which he so well turned the position of the Prussians, during the night, that a party of Russians were in possession of the defile of Kay in their rear, and precisely between their camp and the road of Croffen, without the event coming to the knowledge of any one person. So highly was the service neglected, when Wedel came to take the command of the army !

Wedel went himself to the camp of Babimost to reconnoitre this march, where he saw only the ends of columns and the rear-guard that took the road to Croffen. Wedel struck his tents (June the 23d\*) began his march, and attacked the troops that had encamped at Kay, hoping to beat them before they could be joined by their army ; but he was deceived ; the Russians were well posted ; they could only be at-

\* There is some mistake of dates between this and those last mentioned which there is danger of additional error in attempting to correct. T.



attacked by a front of seven battalions in extent, enclosed on each side by marshes. The Russians were in a kind of half-moon on three lines, and occupied hillocks, covered with firs. Wedel broke their first line; but, attacking the second, his infantry was exposed to so hot a fire of case shot, from various cross batteries, that it could not stand its ground. Three repeated but ineffectual efforts were made. The great misfortune was the Prussians had not cannon sufficient to oppose the artillery of the enemy. Perceiving the slaughter, and what little hope there was of success, the general chose not to sacrifice any more of his men. He determined on retreat, and the next day the troops passed the Oder at Tzicherzig, to encamp at Sawade. Soltikow marched the Russians to Crossen.

Wedel lost on that day between four and five thousand men; nor is it probable that the loss of the enemy was considerable, the ground being so greatly in their favour. This affair quite deranged the previous measures of the king. After the check he had met with, Wedel could not oppose the progress of Soltikow, without strong reinforcements. Frankfort and Kustrin were in danger from the position the latter had taken at Crossen; and, if a Prussian army should

not soon approach Frankfort, to defend the Oder, Berlin itself would be exposed to the greatest perils. The army of Silesia was not in sufficient force to be enfeebled by still more detachments. Fouquet defended the passes of Landshut against de Ville, with ten thousand men; the Austrian had twenty thousand. The army of the king, encamped at Schmuckseiffen, amounted to forty thousand; that of marshal Daun to seventy thousand.

Be circumstances what they might, necessity was urgent; an army must be assembled to cover the March of Brandenburg. There was every reason to suppose the chief attack would either be made there or in Silesia. The Austrians paid some respect to the city of Dresden, that being the residence of the royal family. It was therefore to be presumed that a determined governor would maintain the place, and protract the siege, so as to give time to march to its relief, should it be attacked during the absence.

After mature reflections on this subject, it was resolved that prince Henry should march to Sagan, with sixteen battalions and twenty-five squadrons, which should be joined by the detachments of the prince of Wurtemberg, consisting of fifteen squadrons and six battalions; that

that the prince should take the command of the royal army, being the only general to whom it might be confided, and that the king should head the corps assembled at Sagan, and lead it immediately to defend his states. He depended on being joined there by M. von Wedel. On the 28th prince Henry arrived at Schmuckseiffen, and on the 29th the king repaired to Sagan.

Laudon had in those parts extended along the frontiers of Silesia; and, though the king had sent detachments of observation, the Prussian officers were deceived in the following manner. Haddick had watched prince Henry, and joined Laudon at Sorau. Laudon continued his route, and a regiment of hussars, that had always been attached to his corps, remained with Haddick. The reconnoitring officers were thus induced to believe that the whole corps of Laudon was there: but the king, marching to Christianstadt, here was informed they had been deceived, and that Laudon had that very day arrived at Guben. This obliged the king to continue his march, and he came the same day to Sommerfeld. The Prussian cavalry attacked that of Haddick, which followed Laudon, and which was pursued as far as Guben. Laudon the same  
day

day departed to gain Frankfort : the king encamped at Nimes, on the banks of the Neisse.

About break of day two columns were seen, coming from Guben, and filing along the road of Cottbus. The cavalry first passed the river, and a hasty skirmish ensued with the rear-guard, in which the Imperial regiment of Wurzburg, containing thirteen hundred men, was entirely taken. The hussars pursued the enemy, and carried off six hundred chests of provisions, the escort of which was totally dispersed.

Advantages like these may be productive of good consequences on general occasions ; on the present they were totally useless, for the design of the expedition was frustrated ; it being no longer possible to prevent the junction of the Russians and Austrians at Frankfort.

The king began his march on the morrow. Wedel had orders to join the army at Mulrose, which were easy to execute, since the Russians had quitted Crossen, and he had no enemy to face. The king's troops took the road of Beeskow, whence the infantry immediately marched to Mulrose, while with his cavalry he passed by Neubruck, on the canal of communication between the Oder and the Spree. He found the bridges broken, and the dragoons of Löwenstein on the opposite side, preparing to dispute the  
the

the passage. These obstacles were not so great as they appeared to be; the canal is in many places fordable; the Prussian cavalry passed it immediately, and fell on the Austrian dragoons posted in the woods, who were defeated and pursued to the very suburbs of Frankfort. The king then rejoined his infantry at Mulrose, bringing with him three hundred prisoners of the regiment of Löwenstein.

Here Wedel arrived on the 4th. Finck, who had remained in the vicinage of Torgau, after the departure of prince Henry, being of no use in those parts, for the ten thousand men he commanded were insufficient to cover Saxony, also received orders to join the army. The king assembled all the forces he was able, for dispatch was indispensable. It was necessary to beat the Russians as soon as possible, that he might have time to fly to the defence of Saxony; which, the fortresses excepted, being void of troops, the roads were left open to the army of the empire, which, if it pleased, might even penetrate to Berlin.

To be in readiness therefore to attack the Russians, the army quitted the environs of Mulrose, and encamped between Lebus and Wulkow. Subsistence was drawn from Kustrin, and Finck was waited for, whose arrival happened



pened on the 10th. Necessary preparations were made to pass the Oder between Lebus and Kufrin. The more haste was made in executing this project because that Haddick had marched and occupied the camp of Mulrose, which the Prussians had left. From this place Haddick might join Butturlin, and Berlin was open to attack. Thus every thing pressed the king to act with promptitude. The army passed the Oder, on the 11th, and formed in face of the Russians, extending from Tretin, where the right was placed, to Bischofsee, by which the left was supported. The reserve under Finck encamped before the lines on the heights, which deprived the Russians of knowing what motions the Prussians made. A muddy rivulet separated the two armies. Soltikow was encamped at Kemersdorf; with his right wing supported by a small elevation, where the Russians had constructed a kind of star-fort. Two branches of entrenchment on a rising ground departed thence, and ended in the Jews burial place, which is a considerable eminence near Frankfort. The right of his camp, where was this star redoubt, was overlooked by the height that Finck occupied; and, beyond the rivulet, by a hill which the country people call the Pechstange.

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In the present position of the army of the king, it was impossible to attack the enemy: two narrow causeways must have been passed, covered by several abatis, of which the Russians were masters. The brigades must have been formed while exposed to the fire of small arms, and must have attacked an entrenchment defended by cross batteries. It was thought more prudent to ascend the rivulet: after a circuit of half a mile, the troops would come to the bridge on the road to Reppen, where is another road that leads through the wood to the height of the Pechstange. This local knowledge served as the basis of the dispositions that were made for the battle of the morrow. The corps under Finck was to support, from the heights where it was encamped, the batteries that were erected during the night, and which were to play directly on the star redoubt of the Russians.

The next day (the 12th) the army took the road of Reppen, and formed in the wood, near the Pechstange, in five lines; the three first of infantry, the two last of cavalry. Finck, in the mean time, kept up a heavy fire with his batteries, feigning to pass the causeways in his front; which so fixed the attention of Soltikow, that the army of the king gained the skirts of the wood, without being perceived. Grand bat-

teries were immediately raised on two small hills that overlooked the right of the Russians. This part of their intrenchments was surrounded by the batteries of the Prussians, as a polygon may be in a regular siege. Every thing being thus prepared, Schenkendorf advanced, under the protection of sixty cannon, against this fort, and carried it almost immediately. The army followed. The two branches of the entrenchment which ended at this angle were taken in flank, and the battle was one dreadful massacre of the Russian infantry, as far as the burial place of Kunerldorf, which the left of the Prussians found it difficult to carry. Finck, whom the attacking troops had passed, then levelled his mounds, and joined the other troops. Seven redoubts, the burial ground, and a hundred and eighty cannon, had already been taken; the enemy was in the utmost confusion, and had lost a prodigious number of men. The prince of Wurtemberg however, impatient at the inaction of the cavalry, made an ill-timed charge on the Russian infantry, stationed in the entrenchments of the Jews burial ground. It is true he was repulsed, but the enemy at the same time abandoned a grand battery they had near this burial ground. On this the Prussian infantry, which was only eight hundred paces distant, made an attempt



attempt to seize. Who can but remark the slender thread by which victory is suspended! As they came up, within a hundred and fifty paces, Laudon, perceiving the error of the Russians in forsaking their battery, arrived with his reserve some minutes sooner than the Prussians. He immediately caused the artillery to be loaded with case shot, which played upon and deranged the assailants: The attack was several times renewed, but it was impossible to carry this battery, which commanded the whole ground. Laudon, perceiving the countenance of the Prussians less firm, attacked them on the right and left with cavalry; the confusion became general and the troops fled in disorder. The king protected their retreat by a battery, which the regiment of Lestwitz sustained. Here he received a contusion. The regiment of pioneers was taken in his rear: the infantry had besides repassed the mounds, and regained the camp they had possessed the day before, on which the king retreated the last, and would have been taken, had not M. von Prittwitz attacked the enemy with a hundred hussars to give him time to pass the defile. The main body of the cavalry retired by the road they had marched in the morning. The first consternation of the troops was so great that at the noise only, which  
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the Cossacks made, the infantry, which had formed on the ground of its late camp, fled above a thousand paces before it could be brought to halt.

The Russians it is true gained the victory, but it was dearly purchased. According to their own account, they lost twenty-four thousand men. Their artillery they recovered, and took eighty cannon from the Prussians, with three thousand prisoners. Prussia on that day lost ten thousand men; dead, wounded and taken. The king, flattering himself he should win the battle, had ordered Wunsch to seize on Frankfort during the action, to cut off the retreat of the enemy. This brave officer accomplished his purpose, and made four hundred prisoners; but the misfortunes of the day obliged him to abandon the city and return to Reitwein, where the army encamped, after having repassed the Oder.

It was with difficulty ten thousand men could be collected the evening after the battle. Had the Russians known how to profit by victory, and pursued the disheartened troops, Prussia had been ruined beyond redemption, but they gave the king time to recover his losses. On the morrow the army was eighteen thousand strong, and in a few days amounted to twenty-eight thousand.

thousand. Cannon was obtained from the fortified towns; the corps was sent for that had amused the Swedes on the banks of the Peene. Most of the generals were wounded, bruised, or maimed; it depended only on the enemy to terminate the war; they had but to give the expiring blow: but they stopped short, and, instead of acting vigorously, as the case required, applauded themselves for their success, and blessed their good fortune. The king gained breath, and leisure was given him to provide for the most immediate wants of his army.

Not to be unjust in our judgment, we think ourselves obliged to state the reasons alleged by general Soltikow to colour his inactivity. When pressed by marshal Daun to pursue his operations with ardour, he replied—"I have done enough, Sir, for one year; I have gained two victories, which have cost Russia twenty-seven thousand men. I only wait till you shall in like manner have gained two battles, and I will then begin anew. It is not just that the troops of my sovereign should act singly."

The Austrians had some difficulty to prevail on him to pass the Oder at Frankfort, which he did only on condition that Haddick should remain in his post at Mulrose. This motion of the Russians made the king change his position.

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He marched first to Madelitz, and then to Furstenwalde, where he was master of the passage of the Spree, which was an important object under the present circumstances. The troops of the circles had lately taken Torgau and Wittenberg; it was to be feared they would march for Berlin; and the same was to be apprehended from general Haddick: he need but proceed along the Spree, by which river his march would be covered, while Soltikow might have kept the army of the king from advancing, or affording him any impediment.

The affairs of Prussia were so desperate that it would have been difficult to have acted with wisdom, and conformable to rule; but, as it was necessary to be prepared for whatever might happen, the king determined to sacrifice the last man rather than suffer the enemy to seize on Berlin with impunity. He proposed to attack the first who should approach, better pleased to perish, sword in hand, than to be consumed by a slow fire. The king's embarrassment was increased by the approach of marshal Daun. He marched and encamped at Triebel, and had a conference with general Soltikow at Guben. Prince Henry could not prevent the junction of the Austrians and Russians, nor could he impede the detachments they should please to send  
against

against the king; it remained with marshal Daun to choose which of these modes he should pursue; they were alike fatal. Affairs however took a more favourable turn than could have been hoped: neither all the good nor all the evil that may be imagined happens.

No sooner had the king quitted Silesia than affairs there assumed a new face. De Ville was persuaded Fouquet could not prevent him from penetrating into Silesia. He did not indeed attempt to force the passes of Landshut, but he took the road to Friedland, where, as we shall immediately see, it was not thought proper to throw any impediments in his way. De Ville peaceably descended into the plains of Schweidnitz. On this Fouquet sent detachments to Friedland and Conradswalde, through which the Austrians were obliged to obtain provisions. They soon wanted subsistence, and de Ville was under the necessity of returning into Bohemia, and of attacking the post of Conradswalde, where he was repulsed with the loss of thirteen hundred men and all his baggage. He thought himself happy after this, by marching through by-roads, to regain Braunau.

Marshal Daun had quitted Marckliffa and marched to Priebus. Prince Henry, not willing to lose sight of him, repaired to Sagan, and



thence detached Ziethen to Sorau, the more closely to observe the enemy. Pressed by the Russians to act, the marshal proposed to take this corps. For this purpose he marched two columns to the right and left of the Prussians. These columns were covered by great woods, and were to join at a defile between Sorau and Sagan, and cut off the retreat of Ziethen. The project failed: Ziethen made a timely retreat to the army of his royal highness, without suffering any loss. Prince Henry was not in a situation of making any attempts upon the Austrians; to hazard a battle was more than ever dangerous, after the loss of two in the same year. His constant efforts were to keep marshal Daun and the Russians as far as possible from the electorate of Brandenburg; to effect which he thought the best expedient would be to destroy the magazines that the enemy had in their rear. This he executed with all possible ability and celerity. He left Sagan, and marched through Lauban to Görlitz. Hither de Ville had hastily repaired, whom the prince feigning to attack, the Austrian general, become timid after the affair of Conradswalde, retired to Reichenbach. This was what the prince wished, and he immediately sent a detachment into Bohemia, that ruined the magazine, appertaining to the enemy,



at Böhmischfriedland. Another corps marched through Zittau to Gabel, there took six hundred men who had been left in garrison, and destroyed the most considerable magazine of the Austrians.

This fortunate expedition occasioned marshal Daun to take a retrograde motion; and, had not the city of Dresden previously surrendered, the Imperialists would have been obliged to return into Bohemia; but the reduction of that capital put them in possession of the grand magazines collected there by the Prussians, and enabled them to establish themselves at Bautzen.

The departure of the Austrian army, and the want of forage among the Russians, occasioned the latter to abandon Frankfort, march into Lusatia, and encamp at Lieberose. The army of the king followed them through Beeskow, and thence advanced to Waldau. General Had-dick, on his march for that city, fell back on the approach of the Prussians, which permitted the king to take an advantageous position behind the marshes, by which he cut off the subsistence that the Russians were to receive from Lubben, and other neighbouring places. Dresden was at this time besieged, although the trenches were not opened. Thither his majesty

sent a detachment under general Wunsch. This able officer surprised Torgau on his march, and arrived before Dresden the very day that the governor Schmettau signed the capitulation. It would be superfluous to criticise the conduct of a man who surrendered a city in which no breach had been made, and before which no trenches had been opened.

Finding his presence useless here, Wunsch returned to Torgau, whither the troops of the empire had marched to retake the town. Wunsch passed the Elbe with a handful of men, glided among the vineyards, and thence fell on the troops of the circles, beat them, carried the whole camp, and put them to flight. On receiving this news the king sent Finck thither, with a reinforcement of ten battalions and twenty squadrons; and the generals jointly advanced as far as Meissen.

These trifling checks occasioned general Had-dick to be recalled from the army of the Russians, who traversed Lusatia, passed the Elbe at Dresden, and in conjunction with the troops of the circles immediately marched to attack general Finck. A party of Austrians assailed Wunsch, who was posted at Siebeneichen, near Meissen. Their main body passed the Tripsche at Münzich, and presented themselves before  
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the right flank of Finck. The latter did not hesitate; he attacked the enemy, was victorious, and took some cannon with six hundred prisoners. Nor was Wunsch less vigilant, but in like manner repulsed the assailants with loss, and Haddick was obliged to fly to Dresden.

While general Finck made this progress in Saxony (September) Soltikow was marching for Silesia, through Sommerfeld and Christianstadt. This it was necessary to prevent, that the open country might not be ruined, nor any place of strength besieged. For this reason the king inclined to Sagan, where he was near coming up with four Austrian regiments, that Campitelli was leading to the succour of the Russians. At Sagan (the 21st) he regained a communication with prince Henry, to whom he imparted the advantages lately obtained by Finck, and of whom he demanded reinforcements to reinstate in part the detachments he had sent into Saxony, and against the Swedes; charging him at the same time to gain the Elbe, and join Finck, that he might attempt by all possible means to recover Dresden.

The king marched to Neustædtel, and anticipated the Russians. General Soltikow then thought of Glogau, and proposed to occupy the heights of Baune. The king outmarched him

once more. The columns of the enemy's army, seeing the place occupied, halted at Beuthen, but without erecting their tents. This made it imagined they intended to attack the Prussians on the day following, and the night was passed under arms. The generals of the enemy were seen reconnoitring at day-break. The king scarcely had twenty thousand men in his camp; they were it is true well posted, but the memory of having been twice beaten by the Russians was recent. These were considerations into which the generals of the enemy did not enter; they retired to their army, and their tents were soon after erected.

Prince Henry and general Fouquet having each sent a reinforcement to the king, these troops arrived on the morrow after his camp had thus been reconnoitred, and were posted and entrenched at Linkersdorf, on the banks of the Oder. The two armies tranquilly remained in their camps. The Austrian corps however was encamped at the distance of half a mile from the Russian army; and it was perhaps the more easy to beat these troops, before general Soltikow could send them any succour, because they were wholly unsupported. Accordingly this project took birth. Thither the king marched during the night of the first of October.



ber. He found an empty camp, and took only some stragglers, who related that the whole army had passed the Oder at Carolath that very night. On approaching this river, a heavy cannonading was heard; and it was with extreme surprise perceived that the rear-guard of the Russians was with their artillery destroying the bridge they had crossed.

By this motion the left shore of the Oder was in safety; but, as it was necessary to cover the right, the king marched the army to Glogau. Here ten battalions and thirty squadrons passed the Oder, and took post on a height to cover the place: the main army encamped near the works. Soltikow chose a position at Kutlau. There were daily skirmishes between the hussars and cossacks, in which the Prussians had the advantage. Still it continued to happen that the rapid marches of the king occasioned the premeditated measures of the Russians to fail; they forsook the vicinage of Glogau, and took the road to Gurau, which leads to Freystadt. One of their columns, which passed near the Prussians retrenchments, was cannonaded, and their rear-guard was harassed, while the main army of the king decamped and marched (on the 7th) for Köben. As pontoons were wanting to pass the Oder, these were supplied by chev-  
valets,

valets, and the army of the king, having gained the opposite shore, took a position behind the Bartsch, the banks of which are marshy, by which it covered all the Lower Silesia. Dierecke, on the left, occupied a mound of the Oder, and the mill which Schulenburg formerly rendered so famous by his retreat in the presence of Charles XII. The main of the army extended among the woods of Sophienthal. On the right a detachment held the post upon the Bartsch, where it was ready to anticipate the enemy, should he march for Herrenstadt. This position was excellent and sure, though very extensive. Two mounds, which were the only passages \* over the Bartsch, were occupied by the Prussians, and well entrenched. Enraged that all their designs were frustrated, the Russians burnt the town of Gurau, and the neighbouring villages, and, having sacked the whole country, marched for Herrenstadt; where they once again arrived too late. To revenge themselves they reduced the place to ashes, by throwing royal grenades. As they were extremely confined on the ground they occupied, and as they wanted water, they were obliged to abandon Silesia.

\* It is probably meant that, where these mounds were, the only places were to be found where bridges could be thrown over the river. T.



The king at this time was attacked with a severe fit of the gout; and, as his operations against the Russians were ended, he caused himself to be removed to Glogau. But, though he had disincumbered himself of the Russians for the present year, it was still to be feared Laudon, on his return, might form some project against Silesia. To watch his motions, the king ordered general Fouquet to quit his post at Landshut, and keep pace with the Austrians from Trautenberg to Ratibor, which obliged Laudon to pass through Cracovia, and from thence through the principality of Teschen, to regain Olmutz.

The army of the king, no longer being necessary to protect Silesia, was led by general Hulsen into Saxony. To connect a narrative of so many various events, we shall at present pursue the operations of prince Henry in Lusatia. We left his royal highness at Görlitz. Marshal Daun (September the 24th) approached his camp, intending to attack him, but the prince departed during the night, passed through Rothenburg, and fell the next day on the corps of general Vehla, posted at Hoyerwerda. Imagining himself secure from all assault, this general suddenly saw himself surrounded by the Prussian cavalry; his infantry was broken, and

himself and fifteen hundred croats, in whom the principal strength of his detachment consisted, were taken. On the eve of his misfortune, he received a letter from marshal Daun, which informed him he might rest without fear, assured that the marshal would give a good account of prince Henry.

After this expedition, his royal highness directed his march to Elsterwerda. The situation of affairs required the Prussians should form an immediate junction at Meissen; but the bridge over the Elbe was destroyed, and there were no means of rebuilding it with sufficient haste. This occasioned the prince to cross the Elbe at Torgau, which in the mean time was passed by marshal Daun at Dresden (October). The latter advanced toward Meissen. Finck, too feeble to resist him, retired to Torgau, where he joined prince Henry. On the 4th, the Prussians took the position of Strehla; the Austrians advanced upon them, and encamped between Riefla and Oschatz, extending by detachments to Dahlen, Hubertsburg, and Grimma. The prince had placed a corps at the hill of Schilda, which was obliged to retreat into the forest of Torgau. This occasioned apprehensions for the rear; and he marched his army to Torgau (the 16th) to cover the deposit of his subsistence.

Marshal

Marſhal Daun immediately followed as far as Belgern. Though the prince had little to fear for his poſition, which was ſufficiently good, he ſtill had reaſon to be attentive to what was paſſing on his right. To this effect he ſent Rebentſch to Duben, that he might obſerve any attempt of the enemy in that quarter. In effect, the purpoſe of marſhal Daun was to turn the camp of his royal highneſs ; and he therefore detached the duke d'Aremberg to Domiſch, with twenty-fix battalions, and fix regiments of cavalry. The prince cauſed this new camp of the enemy to be examined ; and, as it was judged difficult of approach, he ſent Wunſch with a detachment to reinforce Rebentſch. Wunſch paſſed the Elbe at Torgau, repaſſed it at Wittenberg, and joined Rebentſch at Bitterfeld, whither he had returned.

Diſſatisfied with the vicinity of the duke d'Aremberg, who was upon his flank, the prince left his camp at the head of fifteen battalions and as many ſquadrons. He arrived at Pretſch, preciſely when the enemy was on the march for Duben. The duke d'Aremberg was at once attacked by Rebentſch and his royal highneſs. The rear-guard of the Imperialiſts, fifteen hundred ſtrong, was taken ; with general Gemmingen, the commander.

This

This check having shaken the resolution of the Austrians, marshal Daun fell back, on the fourth of November, behind the Ketzerbach, where he took a position between Zehren and Lomatsch; and prince Henry advanced to Hernstein, where he was joined by general Hulfen.

The illness of the king, which had detained him some time at Glogau, prevented his arrival in the camp before the 13th. He had crossed Lusatia with an escort of eight hundred men; his weakness however, which still was great, did not permit him to act. The prince had detached Finck to Nossen, by which he turned the position of the enemy. Marshal Daun did not stand his ground, but quitted the Ketzerbach, and encamped near Dresden, from the Windberg to the bottom of Plauen. Wedel immediately advanced, seized on Meissen, and highly insulted the rear-guard of the Imperialists on its retreat. The king's army encamped on the same day at Schlettau; and Dierecke, who held the other shore of the Elbe, marched with his detachment for Zehaila. The Prussians on the morrow moved to Wilddrus; and Ziethen, advancing to Kesselsdorf, was enabled more nearly to observe the foe.

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The misfortunes of the king, during this campaign, might in part have been repaired, by recovering Dresden; which was an object the more at heart because that the possession of Dresden secured winter quarters, and gave the Austrians perpetual apprehensions for Bohemia. The position of marshal Daun being impregnable, as well from the steep rocks that defended his left as from the inundations that covered his right, there was no expedient but that of turning the enemy by detachments; which, by throwing obstacles in the way of the convoys of provisions, and facilitating incursions into Bohemia, might oblige him to abandon Dresden.

To attain this end, Finck was detached to Freyberg; from which he advanced to Dippoldiswalda, and afterward took post at Maxen. He even sent Wunsch as far as the defile of Dohna. A column of the troops of the empire, apparently ignorant that the Prussians were in these countries, imprudently advanced, was beaten, and lost four hundred men. Kleist at the same time entered Bohemia with his hussars, and committed ravages toward Töplitz, Dux, and Auffs, whence he brought numerous prisoners.

Marshal Daun impatiently suffered insults like these, and especially the position taken by general Finck. Brentano was dispatched by  
him



him to Dippoldiswalda, and this was the signal on which Finck ought to have retired. His orders were to attack every feeble corps he should find, but to retreat at the approach of superior force. He very unseasonably confided in the strength of his post, which would have been tolerable, had his numbers been sufficient to fill it; but his security was his destruction; for he had only garnished some hills with his infantry, and had confided one of the principal of these hills to the Gerisdorf hussars, as if cavalry was capable of defending posts. Marshal Daun, safe on his escarpment of the Windberg, and behind his inundation of Friederichstadt, detached forty thousand men to attack the corps of Prussians, so ill posted at Maxen.

The king received no information of this manœuvre; but, having learnt that the corps of Brentano had marched to Dippoldiswalda, he sent general Hulsén with eight thousand men to dislodge the enemy, and to maintain the communication between the army and the corps at Maxen. Scarcely was Hulsén arrived at Dippoldiswalda before he learnt the event that so lately had happened. Finck, on the morning of the 20th, had been attacked by the Austrians. Some discharges of artillery dislodged Gerisdorf from the post he defended, which was seized by the infantry of the enemy, and



and supplied with cannon that played on the flank of Finck, while the main army attacked him in front. Some regiments of Prussian infantry were deficient in their duty; the foe carried a height they occupied; the Prussian cavalry made some ill-timed and ill-directed charges, and were as frequently repulsed. The Austrians set fire to the village of Maxen, which divided the line of Finck. This threw the troops into disorder: confusion was communicated to the remainder, and the field of battle was precipitately abandoned. During their panic, they hastened to Dohna, where Wunsch had repulsed the army of the empire, in despite of all its efforts. Had the Prussian generals preserved but the least shadow of understanding, after their late disaster, they might have retrieved their ill conduct with honour. They had only to take the road to Glaschutte, which led through Frauenberg to Freyberg; or should this road, which they knew, appear to be too near the enemy, they had but to pass through Gieshubel in Bohemia, by which they might regain Saxony, either through Einsiedel, Asch, or by the Basberg; but so great was their consternation at defeat that, Wunsch excepted, they lost all recollection.

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On the morrow they were turned by marshal Daun. Wunsch endeavoured to force his way with the cavalry. Finck and his colleagues, having a greater affection for their baggage than their fame, forbade him all hostilities. These generals had the weakness to capitulate with the enemy and to lay down their arms. The corps that so shamefully surrendered was sixteen battalions and thirty-five squadrons strong.

On the news of this humiliating, this fatal, affair, general Hulsen retired from Dippoldiswalda to Freyberg, where he was joined by the hussars of Kleist, returning from their expedition into Bohemia. Proud of his success, marshal Daun, some days after, at the head of his vanguard, approached the advanced posts of the army of the king. By this he intended to put the countenance of the Prussians to the test : he saw them in order of battle, well posted, and disposed to give him a proper reception, should he wish to bring on an action. This reconnoitring occasioned a hot cannonade, after which the Austrians returned to their camp.

Some time after, the king repaired to Freyberg, taking thither a reinforcement for general Hulsen, where he made arrangements for the protection of the troops. He found a good position for the corps that was to remain at that place.

place. The Mulde, which runs between cragged rocks, covered its front: there were only three paffes over that river, all of which were ftone bridges, and behind thefe ftiong bodies of infantry were placed. To increafe difficulty the bridges were heaped with faggots, leaving a paffage for a horfeman to pafs on the fcout; thefe faggots were mingled with combuftibles, that were to be fet in flames on the approach of the enemy, fo that paffage was impoffible.

Inflated by fuccefs, the Auftrians began to imagine themfelves invincible. Maquire (or Macguire), who commanded at Dippoldifwalda (December), approached with fixteen thoufand men, with baggage and whatever follows a corps that in times of peace fhould march to change a garrifon, to eftablifh himfelf at Freyberg. He imagined the Pruffians would not wait till he came up, but immediately retire.

He grounded this fuppoftion on fome motions which Beck was ordered to make toward Torgau; but the king had been provident: he had fent troops for the defence of the town. Neither could this motion caufe any great inquietude, fince general Beck appeared on the right fhore of the Elbe, and Torgau is on the left, confequently could not be taken by a fieve begun on that fide. The only gain of Maquire

was the fatigue of a march; he found the Prussians in order of battle, on the banks of the Mulde; and, after some volleys of artillery, returned to Dippoldiswalda, where he fixed his quarters.

Severe as the season was, the two armies remained encamped. They were barracked, and took the best accommodations possible, under such circumstances, to resist the cold; so inflexibly obstinate were both parties not to cede a foot of ground. The Prussians as we have said had a post at Zehaila. Hitherto this detachment had been in security, by a bridge of communication over the Elbe; a sudden frost came on, and obliged the Prussians to retire: the ice covered the river in flakes, but it was not yet set and compact. Beck seized the moment (the 3d) to attack the Prussians with a numerous corps. General Dierecke caused his cavalry to cross at Meissen and the half of his infantry, but wanted time to save the rest. Beck fell on him with his whole force, and after a bloody resistance the brave Dierecke and his three battalions were made prisoners by the Austrians. This was the last misfortune the Prussians suffered during the present year.

Not all these losses could prevent the king from making new attempts to drive the Austrians  
out

out of Saxony. He demanded some succours from prince Ferdinand of Brunswick; and, toward the end of December, the hereditary prince arrived at Freyberg, with a corps of twelve thousand men. The king left these troops behind the Mulde (January 1760), to defend his rear, and marched immediately to Dippoldiswalda. All the detachments of the enemy beside the Wilde-Weifritz, Pretschendorf, and Frauenberg, were dislodged, and his own troops were there cantoned. Marshal Daun on this sent succour to Dippoldiswalda, where Maquire threw up entrenchments, and erected batteries. To attack this post in front, it was necessary to march by a narrow road, hollowed in the rock, and to file off beside two batteries of the enemy. This therefore was abandoned as impracticable. There still were two roads to turn the post, the one leading through Ramnau to Poffendorf; and this certainly would have been the best, had not the enemy cautiously placed eight battalions at the defile which must be freed to gain the height: the latter, that which leads through Glashutte. This was a defile of a mile long, through passes between hills, and ending at the foot of a rock where Maquire had placed his left. The road was filled by the snow which, falling from the steeps, had there accumulated. Artillery could not



pass, and the infantry itself with difficulty, even had there been no foe for its defence. After well examining the ground, and discussing probabilities, it appeared evident that to attempt any thing further against the Austrians, in a season so rigorous, was impossible. The environs therefore were stripped of forage and subsistence (the 12th) that the enemy might not keep any considerable corps there during winter, after which the king repaired to Freyberg.

The army of Wilsdruf entered into close cantonments in the villages nearest the camp; the tents however were left standing, and six battalions, that were relieved daily, there kept guard. The Austrians did the same in their camp at Plauen; and perhaps this is the first example, among the moderns, of two armies, so near each other, keeping the field during so hard a winter. Toward the end of January, the hereditary prince, finding no laurels to reap in Saxony, returned into Westphalia to rejoin the army of the allies.

After having related the principal events of this disastrous campaign, we have just to notice the conduct of the Swedes in Pomerania, and the Uckerane March. While there were troops to oppose them their progress was easily restrained. So imperfectly were their measures  
taken



taken that they had neither ovens nor chests for the bread and flour, and only subsisted by the quotas they exacted from the countries where they were in force. From this negligence to what was indispensable in war the greatest inconveniences resulted; for the only care of the Prussian generals who opposed the Swedes was to impede their quotas, and thus the enemy, who only subsisted from day to day, was immediately obliged to retreat, and approach their frontiers, when such subsistence failed.

In the beginning of the year, immediately after the departure of count Dohna, Manteufel had the command against the Swedes; and though he had very few troops he maintained his ground till the month of September, when the unfortunate battle of Kunersdorf obliged the king to recal him, that he might rejoin the army. The retreat of this detachment was the epocha of the progress of the Swedes. They directly proceeded to Anclam, Demmin, and Uckermunde. Count Fersen, their commander for that year, embarking at Stralsund, passed at the head of three thousand men into the isle of Usedom, and attacked the city of Swinemunde, defended by militia. The garrison retired into the isle of Wollin, and the town was taken. Swinemunder-Schanze soon after surrendered to

the Swedes. A few provincial hussars, who happened to be at Stetin, were sent by the prince of Bevern to Pasewalk, where the Swedes had a post. The officer who led these hussars, named Stulpnagel, surprised the Swedes, and took two hundred prisoners, a greater number than that of which he was the leader.

Fersen immediately passed into the isle of Wollin, and took the town of that name, with the six hundred militia by whom it was defended. The Swedes again took possession of Prenzlau; but, as at this period the king had entered Lusatia, he detached Manteufel with the men who after the battle of Kunersdorf had lately left the hospitals of Stetin; adding the volunteers of Hordt, the dragoons of Meinicke, and the hussars of Belling. This formidable corps immediately changed the face of affairs. Manteufel detached some few hundreds to the rear of the enemy, who took the garrison of the Swedes at Demmin, and their military chest. The Swedish army instantly retired, repassed the Peene at Anclam, and took up its quarters in Swedish Pomerania; whither, to give them the alarm, Manteufel several times sent the hussars of Belling, who enacted a capital part on this small theatre.

Weary of the frequent disturbance they met from the Prussians, the Swedes attempted to fur-

surprise the town of Anclam. They attacked the suburb by night, and a free battalion which was there for its defence was thrown into disorder. Manteufel hastened from the town, but the darkness was so great that, instead of the free battalion which he meant to join, he fell among a party of Swedes, who made him prisoner: but the Prussian garrison, not satisfied with repulsing, took a hundred and fifty of the Swedes. This was the last action that happened during that year in Pomerania.

Thus, after a campaign so fatal to the arms of the king, he still found himself in possession of all the ground he had occupied during the preceding winter; Dresden and the fort of Peenamunde excepted. Fouquet, who had escorted Laudon into Moravia, had returned to Landshut. The Prussian army in Saxony extended from Wilsdruf to Zwickau. A corps of cavalry remained at Cosdorf, to cover Torgau and the electorate of Brandenburg; and, after a succession of misfortunes so continued, affairs were still in a much better state than could have been expected. The regiment of carabineers at Zeitz indeed lost a hundred and fifty men by surprise, but winter gave time to repair this loss; and, in the position we have described, the armies mutually waited the approach of spring, to decide the fortune of war.

## C H A P. XI.

*The Winter of 1759 to 1760.*

AN event this year happened which well might have been productive of great changes in Europe, but which was not. The king of Spain died without leaving issue. The kingdom by right descended to his brother don Carlos, king of Naples; concerning this therefore there could be no dispute, but contest might reasonably be expected for the throne of Naples. At the peace of Aix la Chapelle, it had been stipulated by France, Austria, and England, without consulting the kings of Spain and Naples, that, when don Carlos should succeed his brother on the throne of Spain, the youngest of the brothers, don Philip duke of Parma, should become king of the two Sicilies. The king of Naples paid no respect to this treaty, against which he had formally protested, but regulated the succession as he thought proper. His eldest son, who was an idiot, was declared incapable of government; the second was announced prince of Asturias; and the third king of the two Sicilies. By this arrangement don Philip remained duke of Parma, which duchy did not revert to the empress queen.

Less

Less subjects have caused a hundred wars in Europe; and though it did not then occasion any, this must not be attributed to the moderation of the empress queen, for that is a virtue seldom possessed by sovereigns, but to present circumstances, to the war already kindled, to violent hatred, and the most ardent desire of recovering Silesia, a province of much greater importance than the dutchies of Parma and Placenza. The empress queen and the king of Sardinia, who also lost some advantages, dissembled their discontent. France negotiated a marriage between the archduke Joseph and the daughter of the duke of Parma. It was agreed to leave the affairs of Italy in suspense, till Germany should be at peace, and France as mediatrix promised that all claims should then be satisfied.

The king was attentive to the revolutions of Italy: nothing could be more advantageous to him than a diversion in Lombardy, either against the king of France or the empress queen. That he might know what he had to expect, he sent Cocceji, his aid du camp, to the court of Turin, to sound the king of Sardinia. This aged and now superstitious prince had lost that warlike instinct which had inspired his youth, and had neither the wish nor the will again to become active.



active. He was still more restrained by the present state of his affairs than by age and devotion. Deprived of allies, especially since a union had taken place between France and Austria, he would have had to combat the Austrians, French, Spaniards, Neapolitans, and the troops of Parma. This was what he dreaded. The want of harmony between these princes, and the little prospect of uniting them, occasioned all hopes from that quarter to vanish.

This fruitless attempt did not prevent many offers being made. War daily became more difficult to sustain, and danger more apparent. However favourable to the Prussians fortune might be, it was impossible but that, being obliged so often to confide in her, they must sometimes be betrayed. Nothing was to be expected from Italy. The Porte had not hitherto shewn any inclination to break with the house of Austria. The only remaining resource was in those means which might be found to separate the powers that form the grand alliance. This occasioned negotiations to be attempted in France and Russia; that either of them might be detached from the court of Vienna. In conjunction with the king of Great Britain, Prussia declared to every power a desire of conciliation, and the general re-establishment of peace. Prince  
Louis

Louis of Brunfwick was ſent to make overtures, at the Hague, to the miniſters of the belligerent powers, and England gave France assurances of her deſire to begin negotiations that might lead to this ſalutary end. France would apparently be diſpoſed to peace, for ſhe had reaſon to be diſcouraged by her late conſiderable loſſes. The Engliſh had that year taken from her Guadeloupe, Quebec, and Niagara in Canada. The ſquadron of de la Clue had been defeated off the heights of Lagos, and the fleet of Conſlans by admiral Hawke, who burnt ſeveral French ſhips ſtranded in the Vilaine. The ſquadron of Mr. le Fort\* gained a complete victory over them near Maſulipatan: they loſt the fort of St. David, and were vanquiſhed in the Eaſt, where the Engliſh conquered their chief eſtabliſhments in the vicinity of Pondichery.

Ill ſucceſs ſo continued might well diſguſt the French with a war from which they had nothing to hope. The two nations were however very far from agreeing concerning the articles that were

\* Admiral Pococke commanded in the Indian ſeas, and twice vanquiſhed the French admiral d'Ache. The Engliſh had no officer that we can find of the name of le Fort. Colonel Ford gained a victory over the French commander Conſlans at Maſulipatan; and perhaps the names of Ford and Conſlans occaſioned the miſtake. T.

to form the basis of peace. The king was sensible how necessary it was to render them more amicable; for could this be effected France would, by a separate peace, be detached from Austria. This was laboured with the greater ardour, because the enemy had lately declared, after much delay, that they accepted the proposals made them for the re-establishment of peace, provided it should be agreed to hold a congress at Augsbourg, where each power might superintend its respective interests. Of all the modes which the enemies of Prussia could have imagined, this was the most tedious; for the princes concerned were so numerous, required so many discussions, and would occasion a conflict so great, that pretences for prolonging the negotiation as long as they should please could never be wanting. The congress of Munster is an example of the truth of this, where eight years were consumed before the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia was effected.

Such a method was little suitable to the king. He wished a quick conclusion to the reigning troubles: he had too many enemies to encounter. The court of Vienna desired they should be prolonged, for she had many allies whose assistance promised conquest. Under this situa-

tion of affairs, the king sent an emissary to France to sound the inclinations of the court of Versailles, and to remit intelligence of what he should learn as well to the king of England as to the king of Prussia. To execute this commission he made choice of a young gentleman of the name of Edelsheim, whose father had estates in the vicinage of Frankfort on the Maine; an unconnected person, who had been recommended by the court of Gotha; consequently who might acquit himself better of this office than another, because he was unknown, and could excite no suspicion by his appearance at Versailles. This young gentleman departed without assuming any public character; but was recommended to the bailli de Froulay, ambassador of the order of Malta, in France. Edelsheim was well received at Paris, and was given to understand, in vague terms, that his negotiation depended on the manner in which France might with greater or less facility come to an accommodation with England; but the ministry, being informed that the king of Prussia proposed to indemnify the king of Poland at the expence of the ecclesiastical princes of Germany, by secularization, declared the most Christian king would never give his consent. Edelsheim returned with this answer to the king, who was then at Freyberg, and  
 departed

departed thence for London, to communicate the intelligence to the British ministry.

Just on his arrival, there appeared at that court another political phenomenon, that never could be deciphered, who called himself the count de St. Germain. He had been in the service of France, and so highly in the favour of Louis XV. that the monarch wished to give him the palace of Chambord. This person enacted the part of an ambassador, began to negotiate without credentials, and spoke injuriously of madame de Pompadour, and the duke de Choiseul. The English dismissed and treated him as an adventurer.

Whether or not the English ministry suspected the count de St. Germain, whether conquest had or had not inflated their hopes, or whether they were or were not dissatisfied with the declaration of the French ministry respecting the congress, still they ordered the British ambassador at the Hague, Sir Joseph Yorke, to inform M. d'Affaires, the French minister, that the king of Great Britain was inclined to peace, and would agree to assemble a particular congress, provided France would accept, as a fundamental article in the preliminaries, that the states of his Prussian majesty should be preserved entire. France replied she had no other wish than to  
treat



treat with England; but, not having been at war with Prussia, she could not confound the interests of that nation with those of England. With this answer ended those small hopes which had been entertained from this negotiation.

M. von Edelsheim, who had left some trunks at Paris, returned through Holland into France. Far from disguising himself, he went immediately to the Bailli de Froulay, on his arrival at Paris. This ambassador, persuaded of the sincerity of the intentions of the king of France for the re-establishment of peace, prevailed on Edelsheim to defer his departure for some days, that his interrupted negotiation might be renewed. How great was the surprise of M. von Edelsheim, on the morrow, to find himself arrested by a *lettre de cachet*, and conducted to the Bastille!

Hither the duke de Choiseul came the same day, and assured the prisoner he could find no better expedient to converse freely with him, without giving umbrage to the Austrian ambassador, by whom he was closely watched: he added that, this place being proper for secret negotiation, he should willingly detain him there for the benefit of more frequent conference, and that he would supply him with the means of sending his dispatches to the king with safety and speed.

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He afterward vented many complaints against the Austrians, who so closely attended his steps; for, added he, Stahremberg obtains intelligence concerning all persons who have been employed in this negotiation by the king of Prussia: a courier from Vienna has just informed him of every thing that passes here.

The purport of this indecent farce was to seize the papers of Edellheim, among which the duke hoped to find the king's instructions and projects. He found nothing but a letter of credit, of which the king's emissary had made no use. From this barren discovery, the minister gained nothing but blushes for his unjustifiable conduct. M. von Edellheim was released on the morrow, with orders to take the route to Turin, and quit the kingdom.

Perhaps it will be thought we have been too circumstantial in describing this incident. To this we have in part been induced by its singularity, but more so by the manner in which it characterizes the court of Versailles, at that time. We cannot but observe with what precaution it avoided giving suspicion to the court of Vienna; and we are easily persuaded of the subjection in which it was held by Austria.

The king's efforts at Petersburg had no better success. A gentleman of Holstein was there employed,

employed, who had not so much as an occasion to explain himself concerning the business with which he was charged. He was however treated with more mildness by the Russians than Edelsheim had been by the French. The mind of the empress Elizabeth was too much prejudiced and embittered against the king to be disabused with facility. She was governed by her favourite, who was governed by the court of Vienna. All those who surrounded her were at the devotion of France and Austria. Flattered beside with the acquisition of the kingdom of Prussia, which she considered as annexed to Russia, she would have imagined she had lost every advantage, had she entered into the least negotiation with the king. For these reasons every canal was closed, by which any insinuations might reach her ear.

While all possible means were attempted, Denmark testified a propensity to second the king. The king of Denmark dreaded the increase of Russian power, and its neighbourhood still more. It was known the Russians were preparing to besiege Colberg; which, should they take, would render them masters of the whole Baltic. Opposite as the present designs of Russia were to the interests of Denmark, the future presented dangers still greater, because

of the pretensions of the grand duke of Russia to Schleswic, which this prince might enforce when he should become emperor, and to which the before-mentioned neighbourhood would add facility; while if a power, like that of Prussia, were established between Russia and Denmark, the project of a war in Holstein would become almost impossible, to a Russian emperor, however puissant. Considerations so grave induced the ministry at Copenhagen to make some overtures to the envoy of the king at that court. They began by offering aid for the defence of Pomerania, of which offer timidity and incertitude soon made them repent. Terrified at the step they had taken, and thinking only how to retreat, and break off the negotiation, without giving the king cause of offence, they set so high a price on the proffered aid that they were morally certain it would not be accepted.

So many essays at negotiation, with so much ill success, convinced the king that, in the present conjuncture, he had nothing to hope from the courts of Europe. Passion was still too impetuous, and the agitation it excited in the minds of men was too violent yet to be calmed. The king therefore only had two allies, valour  
and

and perseverance, by the aid of which he might honourably retire from a war so disastrous.

These cabinet intrigues had no relation to armies, nor did they prevent the enemy from forming different enterprises during the winter. The Russians, a part of whom were quartered in the environs of Neustetin, planned the surprise of the town of Schwedt, where were prince Ferdinand, brother of the king, the margrave of Schwedt, and the prince of Wurtemberg. Prince Ferdinand had been gone some days when the citizens who mounted guard forgot to raise the bridge of the Oder, and suffered the Cossacks to pass and take the margrave and the prince of Wurtemberg in the palace, whom they carried with them for the space of a mile. These princes gave them an acknowledgement of being their prisoners. The empress of Russia however disapproved this act, and would not hear of ransom.

The war continued in Lusatia in despite of winter. We have related that the king detached a corps of cavalry to Cossdorf, under the command of Czetteritz, to observe the motions of Beck. The latter general attempted to surprise the Prussians. Czetteritz was informed of his intention, and hastened to his advanced posts, where he arrived just as Beck came up



to the attack. The guards retreated to the main body, and were pursued by the enemy. The horse of Czetteritz fell, and he had the misfortune to be taken by the Austrians. The cuirassiers of Schmettau however fell on the forces of Beck, beat them, and made two hundred prisoners. I shall spare the reader the relation of numerous partisan actions; which were the consequence of the fury with which this war was carried on, and of the eagerness of the petty officers to gain reputation. They were but preludes to the great events which were meditated by the Imperialists and Prussians for the ensuing campaign.

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## C H A P. XII.

### *The Campaign of 1760.*

THE king assumed the command of the army in Saxony in the spring. The misfortunes his troops had sustained, during the last campaign, obliged him to recall two regiments of dragoons from the army of the allies, to reinforce his cavalry. Prince Henry was opposed to the Russians; the passes of Landshut were committed to the protection of general

ral Fouquet; and the prince of Wurtemberg commanded against the Swedes. The ruinous state of his troops obliged him to employ them with great circumspection. Detachments were little proper at present: a close war was especially necessary. The regiments lost at the battle of Maxen and the action fought by Diercke had indeed been replaced, during winter; but these were neither veterans nor troops fit for service: they were but for shew. What might be effected with a cluster of men, the one half Saxon peasants, the other deserters, who were headed by officers engaged from necessity, and because no better were to be obtained? The regiments of infantry were indeed so deficient in officers that their numbers were but as twelve to fifty-two, which last was the number of ordinance. Still did not these inconveniences prevent action, for action was requisite. Instead of complaining of the bad state of the troops, means were taken to resist the foe with additional vigour.

Laudon had received the command of the army destined for Silesia, by order of the court of Vienna. This army was forty thousand strong, and was to be seconded in its operations by the Russians, who were to incline along the Oder, as had been agreed by the two empresses.

Marshal Daun, who had been continued in the command of the principal army, was to assemble his troops in Saxony. This perhaps was to return into Silesia and conclude the conquest of that province, while the prince de Deuxponts, whom he meant to leave at Dresden, was to clear Saxony with the troops of the circles, and expel the few Prussians that might still remain.

The great number of enemies who pressed the king on every side, the plan they had formed to close and concentrate their forces during the campaign, the feeble state of his own army after the recent losses he had suffered, all led him to apprehend the coming year would be more fatal than the preceding one had been. Attempts however were made to restore courage and confidence to the soldiers by imaginary diversions, news of which they should soon hear, by publishing favourable predictions, and by every other means admissible for the abuse of the vulgar.

On the 25th of April, the king entered the camps of Schlettau and the Katzenhæuser. The numerous villages found in this country permitted him to put the greatest part of the army into cantonments, and this was the first repose the men enjoyed. General Laudon, whom we left at Olmutz, entered Upper Silesia about  
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the same time. His cavalry attacked general Goltz, who retired to Neustadt, that he might further retreat to Neifs. The Manteufel regiment of infantry fought during the whole march against four regiments of Austrian cavalry, who vainly endeavoured to make an impression on them. Laudon failed in his attempt: he left Draskowitz with six thousand men at Neustadt, and took the road to Bohemia with the remainder of his troops. Draskowitz finding himself chief, was desirous of acquiring undivided fame. He had intelligence that a battalion of the regiment of Mosel was on the march from Landshut to Neifs. This he attacked with all his cavalry. The battalion defended itself courageously, sustained no loss, killed many of his men, and entered the fortress of Neifs triumphant. General Forcade, detached into Pomerania against the Russians, had advanced with three corps to observe them; that of Platen at Schievelbein, that of Grabow at Cœßlin, and that of Gablenz at Greifenberg. Prince Henry, who was commander in chief of all these forces, was then at Sagan, where he had assembled the detachments of Goltz and Schmettau. He then found it convenient to assume a position which might better enable him to oppose the plans of the Russians. Marching  
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to Frankfort, he sent orders to Forcade to repair to Landsberg, which was the general rendezvous of that army.

During the junction of these troops (May), Laudon traversed the county of Glatz, and penetrated into Silesia with two corps; passing with one by Silberberg to Reichenbach, where he was joined by the other, that took the road of Patschkau. Fouquet, informed of this motion, imagined the enemy meant to attack Breslau; he therefore quitted the passes of Landshut, and inclined to Canth. The Austrians immediately profited by his absence, and sent detachments to take possession of the posts of Griffau and Landshut. Laudon himself returned with his army into the county of Glatz (June) and blockaded the town of that name.

Fouquet, perceiving by the sudden return of the Austrian troops that he had been deceived, marched back to Landshut, where he had little trouble in dislodging the foe. His intention was to preserve the passes of Bohemia, and wait a reinforcement to enter the county of Glatz through Braunau, and oblige the enemy to raise the siege of the capital. He encamped on the hills: his right occupied that of Blaffdorf, his left the Doctorberg. This ground so well guarded required thrice his number  
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of troops, and he was less than ever enabled to occupy it after having detached general Ziethen, with four battalions, to secure his communication with Schweidnitz, at the Zeiffenberg.

No sooner was Laudon informed of the position of the Prussians, near Landshut, than he left twelve thousand men at Glatz, to continue the blockade, and with the main body passed through Johannesberg and Wustengiersdorf, and encamped at Schwarzwalde, whence he dislodged the hussars of Malachowsky, who there held a post of information. It was a fine opportunity of acquiring fame at small expence. Laudon, opposed by eight thousand Prussians, came to the attack with twenty-eight thousand Austrians ; but, to make security doubly secure, he was determined to add stratagem to strength.

On the night of the 23d he seized on two heights, on which was the right of general Fouquet. These important hills empowered him to establish batteries which should take the Prussians in flank and rear. Fouquet valiantly defended his remaining posts. After suffering great loss, he perceived a column of Austrian cavalry in full march to cut off his retreat. On this he abandoned his hills, and formed his infantry into a square, with which he marched to gain the road of Bolkenhayn. His troops had  
consumed

consumed almost all their powder. The Austrian cavalry attacked, and was several times repulsed. After a noble and generous defence, the square was broken by the enemy. Fouquet received two wounds; and, with the greatest part of his troops, was taken. He had defended himself from two in the morning to ten in the forenoon; and, far from suffering in his reputation, so long and so well established, it was increased by this act of bravery, which furnished an example of what valour and fortitude may effect against numbers, be their superiority what it may. This battle may best be compared to that of Leonidas at the streights of Thermopylæ; the fate of both was nearly the same.

The whole corps was not taken: the Gersdorf hussars and the dragoons of Platen cut their way through the enemy, and escaped with fifteen hundred foot, whom they brought to Breslau. General Ziethen after this misfortune quitted the Zeissenberg, and threw himself into Schweidnitz, to avoid a fate similar to that of Fouquet. The Austrians made a barbarous use of victory, and pillaged the town of Landshut, by order of the generals, who applauded their excesses and cruelties. The savage and furious  
2 soldier,

foldier, encouraged in crimes and robberies, spared none but the ugly and the poor.

The first news the king received in Saxony was that of the blockade of Glatz. This but added to his present embarrassment. It was as painful to abandon that place, which is a kind of key to Silesia, as it was impossible to afford it aid. After the loss of that fortress, it might be expected that the defiles of Silesia and Bohemia no more could be held; for the Austrians, once masters of the passes of Silberberg and Wartha, might fall upon the rear of the troops that should occupy the hills; and no position proper to cover that province would any longer remain. To quit Saxony would be equally dangerous. Should the king repair to Silesia, with a part of his forces, those that should remain in Saxony would risk destruction, from the great superiority of numbers among the Imperialists.

It therefore appeared that nothing better could be imagined than to act so as, by undertaking to march into Silesia, the king might draw after him marshal Daun. Yet this expedient was attended with danger; since it necessarily exposed the king to put himself between Laudon, who was already in Silesia, and the army of marshal Daun, which as it might be supposed

supposed would keep pace with him. The defeat of Fouquet was not known; and the king, imagining he might join him, preferred marching into Silesia to any other project. To this effect he caused that part of the army which he destined for this expedition to cross the Elbe. A bridge was constructed at Zehren, and the river was crossed on the 15th of June. The troops were joined on the opposite shore by the prince of Holstein, who brought the two regiments of dragoons that had served in the army of the allies. The detachments of general Laschy all retreated toward Reichenberg at the approach of the Prussians, who took the camp of Zehaila, opposite general Hulsen, whose corps had remained at Meissen; and bridges were diligently thrown over the Elbe for the communication of the two corps. From Zehaila the king marched to Radeberg. On his march he came to the camp of general Laschy, covered by four regiments of Saxon dragoons, annexed to the detachment he commanded. The Prussian van-guard pursued, and took four hundred men; the remainder fled in confusion to take refuge with the main body, under Laschy, who had halted at the foot of the heights of Bocksdorf and Reichenberg, near a village named Berbigsdorf.

The Prussian army made dispositions to attack Laschy on the morrow. The arrival of general Hulsen was waited for, whom the king had ordered to join him with a part of his forces, and who could not be at the camp of Radeberg before evening. On the morrow the face of affairs had changed. Marshal Daun had passed the Elbe at Dresden, with his army, which occupied the camp of Bocksdorf and Reichenberg. Laschy, during the night, had quitted Berbigsdorf, to cover the right of marshal Daun, in the position of Lausa. The king occupied the ground the enemy had left, and placed Krockow, with three regiments of hussars, two of dragoons, and two free battalions, round Berbigsdorf. Laschy attacked them, on the following night, without success. The Prussians in return made some attempts upon him, but these were productive only of reciprocal alarms.

Here the intelligence was received of the disaster that had happened to general Fouquet. This misfortune rendered the affairs of Silesia desperate. The army of the king, which no longer had any forage at Radeberg, assumed the camp of Gros Dobritz. Krockow took three hundred prisoners, that formed part of a detachment, coming by the road of Moritzbourg, with



with an intent to fall on the baggage of the army; but what were three hundred prisoners compared to so many entire corps which the king had lost? The calamity of Landshut was so unexpected that it deranged the measures the king wished to take, at a moment so critical. He was now less than ever able to quit Saxony, at least unless accompanied by marshal Daun, if he would not lose his few remaining troops in detail.

The Imperialists could not begin their motions before the arrival of the troops of the circles, the march of whom was retarded by the dilatoriness of the prince de Deuxponts. At length they came (July), and were left by marshal Daun at Windberg. Hulsén remained at Meissen, and both armies began their march, for Silesia, on the same day. The Imperialists passed through Bischofswerder, whence they detached Laschy to the Keulenberg, to cover their left flank. The king directed his route through Crakau, resolving to make an attempt on Laschy, who did not expect him there. The Prussians occupied Königsberg: and the same evening the army began its march, in four columns, two on each side of the rivulet of Pulsnitz. The van-guard fell on the light troops of the enemy. This roused general Laschy,

Lascy, who escaped too hastily to be overtaken. Scarcely two hundred men of his rear-guard were made prisoners. The army passed the night on the Keulenberg, and on the morrow the Austrians and Prussians kept pace with each other. The former passed Bautzen, and encamped near Jurck; and the latter at the convent of Marienschein. On the 6th, marshal Daun gained Görlitz, and the Prussians Niederrunck. There was a skirmish between the rear-guard and the Austrians, in the environs of Bautzen, at the passage of the Spree. Major Zetmar, of the hussars, imprudently crossed a bridge where he must have sustained loss, had he not been timely supported by the king. The river was afterward passed according to rule, and some captures made on the enemy.

The heat on that day was so excessive that eighty men dropped dead on the march. The loss of the Austrians was equal, if not greater; for they made a longer march. Lascy had found time to recover from his consternation after the affair of the Keulenberg. He had collected his troops, and proposed to retard the march of the king, by continually harassing his rear-guard. His scouts, imagining the Imperialists had encamped at Bautzen, were taken

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by the Prussian patrols. This gave birth to the project of falling suddenly on the Ulans, and intimidating them so far as to make them no longer desirous of approaching the army of the king. They were posted at Salzförstien, a mile from the camp. Two regiments of hussars, and two of dragoons, were commanded to put this plan in execution. Misfortune would have it that the horse were gone to forage, and instead of four thousand scarcely fifteen hundred could be collected; this however did not prevent the king from prosecuting his plan. The Ulans were charged, and at the first shock lost four hundred men. They were hotly pursued to Göthau. Zetmar, who was not always the master of his own valour, passed this defile: the king was obliged to support him, because that the whole cavalry of Lascy, who encamped at Rothen-Naußlitz, was already come up by parties. Zetmar however was retrieved from danger. The Prussian cavalry began to retreat toward Bautzen, but they retreated slowly. The king, apprehending the superiority of the enemy might gain some advantage over the Prussians, sent a battalion from the garrison of Bautzen with cannon. This order was very seasonably executed, for the enemy began to pursue the squadrons, which were in confusion,  
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till relieved by the artillery. Laschy then returned with his men to Rothen-Naufnitz, as did the Prussian cavalry to the camp.

It now became necessary to determine either to follow marshal Daun into Silesia, or, in full force, to fall on Laschy, to be rid of him at once; for the rear-guard would have been more embarrassed, on its march into Silesia, by him than by the enemy that faced the army. This was therefore resolved on as the most certain step; for should it be successful it might lead to things more important.

On the evening of the 8th, the army assembled at Schmolen. Instead of taking the road to Görlitz, as was given out, it suddenly turned on Rothen-Naufnitz, and every where met with the stragglers of Laschy. Approaching Bischofswerder, his rear-guard became more closely pressed; and, in despite of all his vigilance and the quickness of his motions, he was driven beyond the defiles of Harta, where the army of the king passed the night. On the morrow he was pursued to the heights of Weiffig, where batteries were placed to dislodge him from the White Stag. The artillery had not made two discharges before the infantry gained this post; from which the corps of Laschy was seen in full flight, which repassed the Elbe at Dresden.

The situation of the king was such that it was necessary to undertake every thing, and to run every risk, that he might obtain some superiority over the enemy. The first idea that struck him was to pass the Elbe at Caditz. This operation must be combined with various indispensable preparatives to ensure success; and, as in such a case it was best to inspire the enemy with numerous fears, the king extended his left toward Pilnitz, feigning to construct a bridge there, while a detachment of the army seized on the post of Fischhaus, and on that of Reichenberg; mean while general Hulsen, according to orders, advanced to Brislitz, sending his bridge before him from Meissen.

Not however totally to lose sight of marshal Daun, five hundred hussars were detached to the Weissenberg, and toward Reichenbach, to observe his motions and send intelligence. The different measures taken were not perfectly arranged before the 13th. Hulsen on his march had made four hundred prisoners. The king, after passing the Elbe, joined him, leaving the duke of Holstein with about ten thousand men on the Drachenberg, near Caditz. These manœuvres gave the alarm to the army of the circles, as well as to that of general Laschy: they feared lest a corps should pass the Elbe at  
Pilnitz,



Pilnitz, and fall on their rear, while the king should attack them in front ; for which reason they hastily quitted their camp at Plauen by night, and retreated, Laschy to Groß-Sedelitz, and the prince de Deuxponts to Dohna. The king immediately formed lines of circumvallation round Dresden, determining to besiege the city. This was a sudden thought ; and, as such an enterprize had not been supposed possible, no preparations had been made. He posted the troops from Grünau to Racknitz. The pandours proposed to maintain their ground in the grand garden ; but they were expelled, and the suburb of Pirna was carried, where the enemy made but a feeble and effeminate defence. All the artillery and ammunition, that could be hastily collected for the siege, consisted in twelve mortars, twelve hundred bombs, twenty twelve-pounders, and four thousand balls. Every thing proceeded with so much expedition that fascines, madriers, and whatever was necessary for a siege were prepared. The greater hopes of success were entertained because the first batteries might be erected in the chief moat of the city, and because that, near the garden of the countess Moscinska, an old intrenchment seemed made expressly for a parallel, and on which to erect a ricochet battery. The prince of Hol-

stein, on the other side of the Elbe, was obliged to make a false attack on the new town, where he could only employ field pieces, and some howitzers. Though the governor Maquire had a garrison of six thousand men in Dresden, it was still hoped that he would rather surrender than suffer this capital to be reduced to ashes. He was summoned and refused. The city was then attacked on the side of the gate of Pirna. Had the king been well served, on this occasion, Dresden must have been taken; but the officers, engineers, and gunners were emulous who should commit the most faults. The batteries however were completed. Some chafseurs were placed in the old houses of the suburb which overlooked the rampart, and this they presently freed from those who appeared in its defence. The artillery began to effect a breach. A bomb set the roof of the church of the holy cross on fire: it fell and laid the whole quarter in ruins. Another bomb set the street of Pirna in flames, which was nearly consumed: others fell in the street of the palace, and did no less damage. A thousand additional bombs, and a thousand more quintals of powder, must have terminated the siege with glory.

It was apparently written in the book of fate that the Prussians should not recover Dresden,  
Advice

Advice was soon received that marshal Daun had suddenly quitted Silesia, and was hastily advancing to the succour of Dresden. On his approach the post of the White Stag was abandoned; but, before they quitted this height, the light troops very unseasonably amused themselves, and were attacked in the forest, beside the Fischhaus, where they lost about five hundred men. The prince of Holstein was ordered to pass the Elbe, the same night; and a position was marked out for him between Lepta and Uckerisdorf. As soon as marshal Daun drew near the other shore of the Elbe, it was absolutely necessary to have a corps in the vicinage of Uckerisdorf, to preserve the pass of Plauen free, and deprive the enemy of any wish to dispute this defile.

The king at the same time changed his camp. One part of the army encamped opposite general Laschy, and the prince de Deuxponts; the other took post on the side of the grand garden (where abatis were thrown up) and extended beyond Racknitz, near Plauen. Marshal Daun soon appeared on the White Stag, and covered with his army the opposite shore of the Elbe, behind, and on the sides of Dresden. The night of the 22d he sent sixteen battalions to make a sally on the Prussians, in the suburb

of Pirna. For this the king was prepared; he had disposed of the troops so as to give the enemy a proper reception. The sally was made, and the Austrians were repulsed; they lost three hundred men, with general Nugent their commander. A battalion of Bernburg, that had not done its duty at this siege, was punished by the disgrace of not being allowed to wear the sabre. A shame like this is felt by every soldier who has any sense of honour, and the impression was favourable to the army; it gave the disgraced troop a desire to repair its error, which it found occasion to do at the battle of Lignitz, as we shall relate in its place.

It seemed to be singularly destined that the small advantages the Prussians should gain, during this campaign, were to be counter-balanced by heavy losses. General Nugent, who had been taken at the sally, informed the king that the town of Glatz had surrendered to general Harsch. However incredible the news might appear, confirmation of its truth was soon received from Silesia. On the night between the 21st and 22d Harsch had opened the trenches before that place. The governor D'O had a garrison of five battalions, with every kind of ammunition, and provisions to maintain a long siege. The enemy had supported his first parallel

parallel at Scherlendorf, near the Neisse, whence, making the tour of the lower town and castle, it extended and supported its left by the house of baron Pilatti. Harfch prepared to make two attacks; the one on the lower town, near the Bohemian gate, and the other on the castle, upon the Field-Thor. Scarcely were some cannon erected into batteries before the besiegers wished to dislodge the besieged, from an arrow that had been named the Crane, because of its long form and narrow neck. This work, dug in the rock, required only to be defended to impede the enemy for weeks. But no sooner did the Austrians shew themselves for the attack than the besieged gave ground, and fled through the barrier. The enemy hotly pursued: those who defended the covert way, instead of firing, escaped over the bridge into the ravelin. The Austrians entered with them pell-mell. Harfch, perceiving what passed, sent some battalions from his trenches to support the first corps. In fine, the Austrians took the place, without well knowing how, and almost without resistance. The governor, who was in the low town, hearing the noise hastened to the castle; but it was already taken; and, as by its situation it overlooks the works of the Schæferberg and the low town, the Prussians had no longer any asy-  
lum



lum for defence. This shameful event, most dishonourable to the Prussian arms, was the consequence of a secret negotiation which Laudon had long been preparing, through the intervention of the Jesuits, monks, and the whole Catholic tribe of priests. By their means, he had corrupted some officers and many soldiers of the garrison; among whom were those on guard at the place where Harsch made his attack.

An incident so fatal happened at a conjuncture which was of itself sufficiently embarrassing and afflicting. The approach of marshal Daun, his position near new Dresden, and the want of ammunition for a siege, obliged the king to renounce the design he had of seizing that city, and to take serious measures hastily to repair to Silesia; that he might, if possible, impede catastrophes still more destructive than those we have related, which else might happen in that province. On the 30th, the king forsook the bottom of Plauen, without being disturbed by the enemy, and recalled Hulsén to the camp of Meissen. The army passed the Elbe, on the 1st of August, at Zehren; and took its position at Dallwitz. Marshal Daun fearing after what had happened that, should he quit Dresden, the Prussians would again commence the siege, so  
ably

ably conducted his march and motions, according to those of the king, that the two armies were almost continually in the presence of each other. The Austrians took the grand road to Görlitz. The Prussians kept pace; they passed the Reder at Roitsch, and the Spree at Radibor; and, as the enemy had advanced to Reichenbach, to make the shortest cut, they passed near the Schönberg and the Rothkretschau. A stranger perceiving the motions of the two armies might have been deceived; he certainly would have judged they both were under one commander. The army of marshal Daun would seem to him to be the van-guard, that of the Prussians the main battle, and the corps of Laschy the rear. The latter, become more circumspect, and fearing some vexatious accident, was careful not to approach the Prussians within a distance of three miles.

This journey had its utility; for, as the army was immediately stationed between Daun and Laschy, an aid du camp of the marshal bringing him letters was taken. News was obtained from the packet of all that had passed in Silesia. The designs of the marshal for the campaign were clearly developed, concerning which he in these dispatches consulted general Laschy. The intelligence from Silesia indicated that Laudon  
had

had attacked Breslau, and that prince Henry had obliged him to raise the siege. The affair happened thus :

His royal highness had marched to Landfberg, where observing that the motions of the Russians were all directed toward Silesia, he quitted the new March, and inclined, by the road of Zullichau, to the environs of Glogau, in consequence of advice which he had received that the Austrians and Russians were to meet on an appointed day at Breslau, at once to invest the capital on each side of the Oder. The execution of this project was for two reasons altered ; first the tardiness of the Russians, who scarcely had arrived at Posen ; and in the next place, by the success of Laudon, as well against Fouquet as at the siege of Glatz. Laudon, having no more enemies to face, imagined himself in sufficient force to reduce Breslau, without the aid of the Russians. Thither he marched, and bombarded the city, a part of which was reduced to ashes.

Prince Henry, informed of this attack, hastily marched on the two sides of the Oder. Werner, at the head of the van-guard of one of his columns, beat a corps of observation, which the enemy had sent forward toward Parchwitz, and ruined the regiment of dragoons of the arch-  
duke

duke Joseph. This accident, added to the approach of his royal highness, disposed Laudon to raise the siege of Breslau, which had been defended by the governor Tauenzien with fortitude and sagacity. A part of the suburbs was sacrificed in the defence, and obliged to be burnt. Here prince Henry arrived on the same day that Laudon had retired to Canth, and the Russians had marched to Hundsfeld. The prince detached Platen and Thadden to Freywalde, where they intrenched themselves, in a position which they assumed, to cover the Polish suburb of Breslau against the attempts of the Cossacks.

The other part of the letter of marshal Daun, which contained his plans for the campaign, related to the question whether it would be most advantageous to undertake the siege of Schweidnitz or of Neiss. He concluded by informing general Laschy that there was no need to hurry himself, or to fatigue his troops; since his arrival a day sooner or later was of no importance.

After having intercepted this courier, the army of the king continued its march to Arnsdorf, and arrived on the morrow at Rothwasser, and at Bunzlau on the 7th of August; while marshal Daun, in the mean time, had gained Löwenberg. The two armies, which in five days had passed over a tract extending from the

Elbe to the Bober, were obliged to take some repose: They continued their march on the 9th, with very different intentions. The king was obliged to renew his subsistence. For this purpose he wished to gain Breslau or Schweidnitz, in which were the grand magazines of the army. The supplies he had with him were not more than sufficient for ten days. The design of the marshal was to take a position, behind the Katzbach, by which he might at once cut off the king from Breslau and Schweidnitz. This would oblige the latter either to engage with disadvantage, against superiour powers; or to fall back toward Glogau, by which he would have afforded an opportunity to the Austrians and Russians to destroy the army of prince Henry, and take Breslau and Schweidnitz.

Views so opposite must necessarily produce strange contrasts in the operations of the two armies, as we soon shall perceive. The king, past contradiction, was guilty of a mistake in inclining toward Goldberg, whither marshal Daun intended to march with his whole army. The Prussians ought to have sent a detachment to that side, and to have hastened with their forces by Löwenberg, to Hirschberg, to ruin the bakery and the very considerable magazine of provisions, established there by the Austrians.

Hence



Hence they had only to pass through Landshut, and gain Schweidnitz. This manœuvre would have obliged the enemy, without a battle, to retreat among the mountains of Bohemia, there to obtain bread and subsistence. The true reason why this attempt was not made was a total ignorance that the Imperialists had magazines at Hirschberg; which was not known till afterward.

The king departed with his van-guard for Goldberg. The hussars and free battalions that were to join him did not come up; whether it happened from mistake, indolence, or other reasons. The corps that the king conducted, approaching Goldberg, perceived a body of the enemy, which might amount to ten thousand men. A skirmish insensibly began, which stopped the van-guard; for in this situation it would have been imprudent to pass the Katzbach, because that the margrave Charles, who led the army, was still distant, and there was no certainty of the place where general Laudon then was. Beside that marshal Daun was in full march. The latter was seen descending the heights of Löwenberg, precisely when the van of the margrave Charles joined the van-guard. The Austrians immediately extended behind the Katzbach, from Seiferdau, through Prausnitz,

nitz, toward Zofnitz. This motion obliged the Prussians to keep the rivulet in their front, and they encamped at Hohendorf. From this village the corps of Laudon was discovered, which had joined the right of the army of Daun. Reconnoitring parties were sent on all sides, to examine whether the passages lower down the Katzbach were in like manner guarded. The officer, ordered to execute this commission, reported they had discovered a corps of the enemy at Hochkirch, another on the height of Wahlstadt, and a third behind Parchwitz.

On the morrow, marshal Daun began to march; and filled the ground with his whole army, which had only been indicated, or traced out, by these detachments, the principal posts of which they had but occupied. This army was thus distributed. Nauendorf encamped at Parchwitz; Laudon between Jeschendorf and Koschwitz; the marshal between Wahlstadt and Jeschendorf; and Beck, who formed the left, extended even beyond Cossendau. This advantageous position of the enemy, past all doubt, forbade the passage of the Katzbach to the Prussians. The king nevertheless followed, and encamped his right at Schimmelwitz, and his left at Lignitz. He well understood that with thirty thousand men, who constituted the chief strength  
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Of his army, it was but little proper to combat ninety thousand ; to which number the force of the enemy, at least, amounted. In this situation he could imagine no better expedient than that of imitating the conduct of a partisan, who nightly varies his position that he may escape the misfortunes an army might bring on him, should he want activity and vigilance. This became a necessary and important attention, from the quantity of combined difficulties which, to obtain success, must be surmounted. The safety of the army required a change of posts; yet the progress of an enemy thrice its strength must be stopped; and this superior army must be continually faced, that it might not turn on prince Henry, who already had to make head against an army of eighty thousand Russians. So many purposes could only be effected by frequent change of position; without, at any time, being at too great a distance from the enemy. Thus was the marshal deluded; the camp assumed was reconnoitred; his dispositions were made; but, when they were to be put into execution, he no longer found his foe, and these formalities were again to recommence. In a word, time was thus gained; and, as force was found to be wanting, address and vigilance must supply the deficiency.

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In consequence of this plan, the army of the king began its march on the night of the 10th. His intention was to turn the enemy by Jauer, to gain Schweidnitz. When the troops were in the vicinity of Hohendorf, information was received that Laschy had arrived at Prausnitz, and this was confirmed by some prisoners. As it was impossible to pass the Katzbach, in presence of this corps, and of the batteries the enemy had established on the banks of the rivulet, the army was obliged to recede as far as Goldberg. This circuit gave Laschy sufficient time to retire, and to inform Daun of the Prussian manœuvre. The unevenness of the country was useful to general Laschy, on that occasion, ably to escape the meditated attack. He lost his baggage indeed, but marshal Daun with the grand army arrived in time for his support. Taking post at Hennerdorf, he could cover Jauer, and cut off the Prussians from the road of Schweidnitz. Generals Laudon and Nauendorf still remained in their former camp; as if marshal Daun had confided to them the defence of the Katzbach.

The Prussian army, impeded by four or five defiles, that it had to pass, arrived late in face of the enemy. Wied was obliged to take post at Prausnitz, to guard the defile that was in the rear of the left of the king, and the army encamped

camped at Seichau. This false position was expressly taken to deceive the enemy: the one really chosen was a hundred paces in the rear. There was no risk in taking post at Seichau, because that the other strong camp might be instantly assumed. On the morrow some troops were detached to Pomsen, to attempt to turn the enemy, by taking the route of Jaegerndorf, among the mountains; but Beck was there already, with a considerable corps, so that it was thought improper to undertake this march. The cross roads among these mountains are so narrow that the provision waggons, which were loaded, and the heavy artillery, never could have passed.

The king, on the morrow, occupied the tops of the hills, notwithstanding, and posted his troops. A body of deserters, that came in, unanimously affirmed orders had been given in their camp for the men to hold themselves in readiness to attack the Prussians, toward noon. Accordingly the Austrians were seen in order of battle, before their place of arms; and, in consequence of the motion the king made with his troops, the enemy was not only observed to return to the camp, but the generals presently appeared, who seemed till the close of night very attentively to observe the Prussians. Had



the king remained in his position all night, he would indubitably have been attacked by break of day, on the morrow. Though his position was good, it would have been too hazardous to remain there; and he had to dread falling by the number of his enemies. He departed by night; the troops returned on the road to Lignitz, to occupy the camp they had left the day before. Marshal Daun had no information of this march, and made no motion. The prince of Holstein, who led the left of the cavalry, lost his road in the dark, and confused the march of the other columns, which were not restored to order till day-light appeared. Had the Austrians attacked the king in this moment of confusion, they must have been successful; but concerning this they did not trouble themselves. The troops peaceably passed the Katzbach (the 13th) and the army encountered no other danger but that of a warm cannonade, as they skirted the detachments of Laudon, at Cossendau and Dohna.

Some few hours after the Prussians had erected their tents, Daun and his army appeared followed by the corps under Beck, Janus, and Laschy. He encamped on the same ground that he had occupied two days before. The king received secret advice that Czernichef, at the  
head

head of twenty thousand Russians, had passed the Oder, at Auras, and that the Austrians only waited his junction to overwhelm the Prussians. Marshal Daun had more than troops sufficient; it was not numbers that he wanted, but the talent to employ them with timely promptitude. The situation of the king was such, at this time, that he had only bread and biscuits sufficient for three days; he was encumbered by two thousand baggage waggons of ammunition and subsistence, which prodigiously embarrassed his marches, and of which he endeavoured to rid himself, that he might impart more celerity to his motions. He no longer could remain near Lignitz, because that his right was not sufficiently supported at Schimmelwitz, nor could he prevent its being turned by the enemy. The Katzbach therefore must be repassed at Lignitz; the useless waggons sent to Glogau, to obtain provisions; the army must march to Parchwitz, to push past this place, or beyond the Oder, in order, by one means or another, to gain the army of prince Henry, which must necessarily be joined; because that these two separate corps were each too feeble to oppose the Austrians and Russians; and because there was danger that, by continuing them separate, they must

finally be crushed; after which destruction would have been inevitable.

Two enemies, who for a succession of years make war on each other, acquire intelligence so perfect of their reciprocal manner of thinking, acting, and projecting, that they mutually divine each other's intents. That of the Austrians was positively to attack the king. It might be judged, by the position of the enemy's corps, that Lascy was destined to turn the right of the Prussians; that Daun was to present himself in front; and that Laudon would probably occupy the heights of Pfaffendorf, behind Lignitz, to cut off the road of Glogau, and retreat. These considerations caused it to be determined on to quit the camp of Lignitz, the same night, and repass the Katzbach, according to the project above stated.

This could not have been executed by day; the proximity of the Austrian camp was too great. The enemy would not have failed to attack the rear-guard, which must have been disadvantageous to the Prussians, because that the ground of their right overlooked that of their left, by which they were obliged to retire. The baggage was all sent away, under an escort of two free battalions, and a hundred horse, which conducted it to Glogau. The king and  
his

his generals went to reconnoitre the height of Pfaffendorf. Here he intended to form his army, after having passed the Katzbach, at Lignitz, that he might direct his march to Parchwitz. At the decline of day (15th) the army was in motion. During the march an Austrian officer, by birth an Irishman, who had deserted, was brought to the king. He was so intoxicated that he could only stammer out he had a secret of importance to reveal. After making him swallow some basons of warm water, to relieve his stomach, he affirmed what had been divined, that Daun meant to attack the king that very day. But the Prussians had nothing to fear; they had left the scene, and consequently had deranged the plan of the enemy, which had been formed according to the ground they had quitted. When the king attained the heights of Pfaffendorf, he sent Hund to reconnoitre beside Binowitz and Polnischildern. The army mean time was formed in order of battle, on the ground that had been assigned. Hund hastily returned, and informed the king he had fallen in with two columns of infantry, and two of cavalry, belonging to Laudon, who was on the full march, and not far distant. To make head against these, not a moment must be lost. The king divided his

army into two corps; his right, under the command of Ziethen and Wedel, remained stationary on the place where it had formed, and quickly erected batteries to sweep the two roads of Lignitz, which were the only ones by which Daun could march to the attack; at the same time he changed his position to the left, where he formed the right toward the Katzbach, and the left toward a pond. This whole corps consisted but of sixteen battalions and thirty squadrons. While the infantry took this direction, the cavalry, which had advanced to cover it, skirmished hotly with the enemy, which continued till a heavy battery had been raised on an eminence that overlooked the whole vicinity.

These arrangements made, the cavalry received orders to retire, which were well executed. Most of them were distributed in the rear, to support the infantry; the regiment of Krockow and some hussars excepted, which were thrown on the left to observe the foe on that side. Laudon however expected nothing less than a battle: he well imagined he had some troops in his presence, but it was so dark that he could neither discern the Prussians nor their position. He was not preceded by a van-guard, because he intended to surprise some free battalions, that had the day before encamped at Pfaffendorf,



Pfaffendorf, with the park of provisions, which he imagined he still should find there. The grand battery, constructed on the heights, then played upon the enemy. The head of the Austrian columns was not more than eight hundred paces distant, and the artillery made a great impression on these close bodies. Laudon now perceived his calculation was erroneous. Desirous of forming his troops, he could only present a front of five battalions. This line the Prussians attacked, and it was immediately overthrown; he instantly advanced with his cavalry to take those in flank and rear by whom he was attacked; but he neither knew the ground, nor could find his way in the dark. His cavalry routed the dragoons of Krockow; but, taken in flank by the cuirassiers of Frederick, it was repulsed in turn, and driven into the marshes, from which it was with difficulty relieved. At dawn of day the infantry charged the second line of the Austrians. As this was remarked to be deranged, some squadrons of cavalry were let loose upon it, which penetrated and took most of the line prisoners. The scattered bushes upon this ground were extraordinarily useful to conceal the bodies of cavalry, that fell unexpectedly on the enemy, and put him to the rout. This Laudon attempted to practise

tise likewise; his cavalry attacked the Prussian infantry; but it was presently repulsed by the cavalry of the king. In fine, after five successive attacks on the five lines of the Austrians, each of five battalions, the confusion of the enemy became so general that the whole corps was put to the rout, and fled toward Binowitz, to repass the Katzbach, in the utmost disorder. Some small parties were sent in pursuit of the fugitives. Möllendorf set fire to the village of Binowitz, where he took many prisoners.

The king would not pursue Laudon more hotly, because he might stand in need of the troops, by whose aid he had gained the victory, to join them to his right, and give battle to marshal Daun. The marshal had passed the whole night with his troops in columns, near the rivulet which separated his army from the former Prussian camp. The king had the precaution to leave some hussars; who, giving the word like patroles and centinels, kept the enemy in persuasion that the Prussians still were there. On the first appearance of light, Daun and Laschy put themselves in motion to attack the Prussians. How great was their surprise to find an empty camp, and to gain no intelligence of what was become of the Prussian army! It may be said that fortune was determined

nothing should succeed with the Austrians, on that day; the very wind was against them. Neither the marshal nor Laschy heard the firing of the artillery, behind Pfaffendorf, at the distance of half a mile, although there were at least two hundred cannon playing in the two armies.

The marshal long remained uncertain how to act. After much council and many opinions he resolved to pass the Katzbach, at Lignitz, and attack the corps of Ziethen, which he saw in order of battle. He sent Laschy higher up to pass the Schwarzwasser. This was impossible, at least without making a circuit of a mile and a half to find a bridge, for the banks of the rivulet were marshy, and pontoons were insufficient; causeways must be thrown up, to pass beyond Lignitz. The battle was won, and the king came at the very moment to his right when the van-guard of marshal Daun was perceived leaving Lignitz; but this body had been so disturbed by the Prussian artillery that its countenance predicted it was on the point of quitting the ground. To finish the affair, and to confirm marshal Daun in the defeat of Laudon, which he already suspected, in fine to accelerate Daun's retreat, the king made a rejoicing in his army. Scarcely was the second discharge

charge of running fire ended before the columns of the enemy fell back, and once more passed the Katzbach, near Lignitz.

A skirmish the same day was fought in the forest. Mitchel the English ambassador with some secretaries, and the baggage of the quarters of the court, had been sent there, under an escort of a company of grenadier guards. This corps was attacked by three hundred dragoons and hussars. Prittwitz, the commander, defended himself so well that he lost not the least article of the baggage given to his charge.

The battle of Pfaffendorf cost Laudon ten thousand men: the field was heaped with Austrians. The Prussians occupied ground which extended like a glacis, continually lowering on the side where the enemy made the attack; this gave them the superiority of fire, and advantages over their assailants. They took two generals, eighty officers, six thousand soldiers, twenty three pair of colours, and eighty two cannon.

The fruits of victory would still have perished, had not the Katzbach been immediately passed at Parchwitz; the enemy was in confusion and dispersed. On one side, the shattered corps of Laudon fled at random, toward Wahlstadt; on the other was marshal Daun, in the camp the  
Prussian

Prussians had held the day before, indetermined how to act; while Lascy wandered a mile distant, in fruitless search of a ford over the Schwarzwasser. This, beyond doubt, was the moment by which to profit, that the enemy might not have time to recollect himself. The king immediately marched with his left, which had been in the battle, to Parchwitz. Nauendorf, stationed on the other side of the rivulet, finding himself too feeble to resist the Prussians, abandoned the passage so long and so obstinately disputed. A camp was marked out for the army, beyond Parchwitz: hither Ziethen was, in like manner, to repair, waiting on the field of battle only so long as was necessary to collect the wounded Prussians, amounting to eleven hundred men. Information was received, at Parchwitz, that Czernichef had been encamped some days at Lissa: this afforded new cause of apprehension. He might be joined by the Austrians; or he might take a position at Neumarck; and it would have been vexatious to have had the question again disputed which had so lately been decided by a battle. Every means must be attempted to get free from an enemy whom there was no wish to combat. Stratagem was employed: the king wrote to the prince his brother that he had entirely defeated  
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the Austrians; that he was constructing a bridge over the Oder, in order to treat the Russians with equal complacency; that he intended to attack Soltikow, and intreated the prince to make such motions on his part as had been concerted. This letter was given to a peasant, and very large rewards were promised him, that he should immediately depart, and suffer himself to be taken by the advanced posts of Czernichef, to whom he should remit this letter, as if from the fear of chastisement.

Though it might not be divined how effectually the peasant should acquit himself of his part, nor what impression the reading of this letter might make on Czernichef, still the army of the king departed on the morrow, and proceeded on its march, in three columns, rather in the order of an escort of a convoy than that of a customary march. The king led the column of the right, and covered the march, toward the Austrians. Krockow led a strong van-guard before the second column, followed by the prisoners, the artillery taken from the enemy, and the wounded Prussians. The prince of Holstein conducted the third column, composed of light horse, and supported by some battalions, to cover the convoy against the Cossacks, who might pass the Oder from Leubus, where they  
were

were posted, over certain fords, because that the waters were low. Ziethen, with all the troops that had not been engaged, brought up the rear. The king presently found Nauendorf on the road, who was posted at Möticht, whence he was dislodged by some volleys from the artillery. The Prussian hussars perceived a column of the enemy's baggage on the route, feebly escorted; this they fell upon, and made a considerable booty. The prisoners said this baggage belonged to the corps of the prince of Löwenstein, and general Beck, who were on the full march for Neumarck, where they were to be joined by the Russians; beside which, about three quarters of a mile distant, on the right of the king, the whole army of Daun was discovered on its march, though it could not be distinguished whether its route was directed toward Neumarck, Canth, or Schweidnitz. This situation was perhaps the most ungracious, most disquieting, of the whole campaign. The army had only bread for one day: had the Russians prevented it drawing any from Breslau, and marshal Daun from the fortrefs of Schweidnitz, the late victory would have become ineffectual. For how might the enemy be encountered, when six thousand prisoners, and eleven hundred wounded, were to be guarded? How  
cruel

cruel must it have been to have fallen back to Glogau !

When the van of the columns however had gained Blumerode, the king hastened forward, with some hussars ; and, gliding through the forest, he approached sufficiently near to Neumarck, to discover that there were neither troops nor camp on the other side. An officer was sent on the scout, who presently returned to the king with an Austrian lieutenant-colonel, whom he had taken in Neumarck itself, and who, become desperate at being taken, told every thing he knew, to prove that his misfortune was not his fault. He was very angry with the Russians ; said he had been charged with a message to Czernichef ; that he had not only not found him but that, the very bridge having been broken down, he could not join him, for he could not pass the Oder.

All fears now vanished, and the army tranquilly assumed its camp at Neumarck. As a communication with Breslau was regained, and subsistence secured, some repose was given to the men, who for nine successive days, perpetually in action, had with heroic constancy supported excessive fatigue, and had surmounted every difficulty they were obliged to encounter.

The

The peasant who had been sent with a letter to prince Henry very excellently performed his commission. Scarcely had Czernichef read it before he repassed the Oder, the very same night, and hastened with all possible speed to Soltikow, apprehensive he should arrive too late.

The Austrian army had taken a position on the Pitschenberg: Laudon kept at Striegau, and the prince of Löwenstein had been ordered to advance upon the hill of Wurben, where his corps laid a small restraint on the fortress of Schweidnitz.

During all these manœuvres of the Austrians and Prussians, prince Henry had passed the Oder, and encamped at Hunern, that he might approach the Russians. Soltikow soon after retired through Trachenberg and Herrenstadt into Poland. The prince followed him as far as Vinzig; but as the two Prussian armies could undertake nothing of importance, while they should remain separate, it was determined that Goltz should observe the Russians, with a detachment of twelve thousand men, and should establish himself in the vicinage of Glogau. The rest of the army of the prince repassed the Oder, on the 29th, and joined the king, who encamped in the environs of Breslau, between

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Arnoldsf-

Arnoldsmühle and Groß Mochber. It was time to speed to the succour of Schweidnitz, the siege of which they were about to commence.

The king began his march on the 30th, and from Wernersdorf discovered the camp of Daun, at the Pitschenberg, and that of Laschy on the hill of Zobten. A heavy body of Austrian cavalry, that had a rencontre with the vanguard, was repulsed and pursued under the very cannon of the marshal. Still it was not expedient to file off the army between two corps of the enemy. The king with his left turned to Rogau, and took a position in face of the hill of Zobten, near Ptschiderwitz: some tents were erected to make an appearance, while Ziethen filed off among the bushes, and silently gained the defile of Mühlendorf, which ended at the plain of Reichenbach and Schweidnitz. In the evening, the army in two columns pursued this road. The vanguard at Pfaffendorf met with two hundred dragoons of St. Ignon; who, going on the scout, suddenly fell upon the Prussian hussars. The advanced troops of the king were thrown into confusion, but the regiment of Ziethen gave chase to the enemy, and made forty prisoners.

The



The army, having by this march regained its communication with Schweidnitz, encamped at Költſchen, a ſhort mile from the fortrefs. At break of day marſhal Daun learnt that he was turned, and inceſſantly abandoned the hill of Zobten, and the Piſſchenberg, and aſſumed the camp of Kunzendorf. His right was ſupported by the hill of Bürkerſdorf, and his left extended as far as Hohenfriedberg. The corps of Janus occupied the ſtreights of Wartha and Silberberg; and Nauendorf held the poſts of the Spitzberg, and the Streitberg, near Striegau.

On the morrow (September 1ſt) the army took the camp of Palz, where it remained; but, as this was not a favourable poſition to diſlodge the enemy from the hills, on the 3d it encamped at Bunzelwitz. The whole march was ſpent in combating, firſt with the corps of Ried, at Schönbrunn, and afterward with that of Beck, at Jauernick; and, as Nauendorf muſt not be ſuffered to remain at Striegau, Ziethen was ſent to attack him, and he was driven as far as Hohenfriedberg, under the batteries of Laudon. Ziethen having taken four hundred priſoners aſſumed the camp of Striegau himſelf, from which he had expelled the enemy. The king wiſhed to oblige the Auſtrians to quit Sileſia, that he might be

enabled to send more heavy detachments against the Russians. The best means of effecting this was to turn the position of the Austrians; either by ruining their magazines or intercepting the convoys that came from Bohemia. The plan was not easy of execution, for the enemy occupied a vast space, the circuit of which was difficult to make, since marshal Daun might anticipate the Prussians by a small motion from his centre: he had but the chord, the king the arch of the circle, to describe. Be the obstacles what they might the necessity of acting was not the less; and this necessity was superior to all other considerations; success was therefore committed to chance.

On the night of the 11th of September, the army was on the march to turn the heights of Friedberg. The van-guard gained the pass of Kauder. Laudon, when he saw this corps, comprehended that it was intended to turn him, abandoned his position, and retreated toward the village of Reichenau. Marshal Daun, not less attentive to the motion of the Prussians, presented himself, at the same time, on the opposite shore of the ravine that intersects Reichenau. By this march he saved Laudon, who escaped the danger with which he was menaced by the Prussians. The army arrived in its camp at the

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close

close of day; the foldier scarcely had time to erect his tent. The project of the king was to send a detachment against Landshut, where the enemy had a magazine; but the execution of this was obliged to be deferred till the morrow. Ziethen was ordered on this service by break of day. He was to follow the road of Harta and Ruhbank; but an unexpected accident occasioned the expedition to fail. Beck had received orders, on the eve, when the army decamped, to cover the right of Laudon. On his march from Hohenfriedberg to Reichenau, performed in the dark, he discovered the camp of the king, which he supposed to be that of the Austrians, and placed himself on the left flank, by which he turned his back on the Prussian army. The king was informed of this, the same night. The Prussians remained under arms, and by dawn of day began the attack. Some discharges of artillery threw the troops of Beck into disorder; the cavalry charged them at the same moment, and took a battalion of pandours of eight hundred men. The corps of Beck was pursued, and escaped to Hohenfriedberg, whence it was repulsed to Ronstock. He would have been still worse treated, had not the prince of Löwenstein speeded to his succour, with fresh troops, who collected the fugi-

tives and covered the retreat. The cannonade and fire of the infantry made Ziethen suppose there was some serious engagement on the left of the king, and he would not venture to quit the army, at the moment his presence might become necessary. He therefore deferred his departure till noon; but opportunity was past, he could advance no further than Harta, where he encamped, because that Laudon had garrisoned all the defiles that lead to Landshut; and Laschy, with twenty thousand men, had assumed the position of Ruhbank. Nauendorf, whose corps had remained encamped at Zirlau, near Freybourg, in the mean time covered the plain, and advanced with his parties as far as Jauer and Lignitz. The king sent Krockow to Wahlstadt, and he surprised a detachment of Nauendorf, of more than three hundred men, whom he brought prisoners to the army.

Marshal Daun however was not so tranquil as he appeared; he prepared the roads from Landshut to Bolkenhayn, caused troops to file off to Ruhbank, and, by combining these previous measures, it was easy to suppose his intention was to surprise the army of the king, by a circuitous march, and take it in the rear, from the road of Bolkenhayn, which was repairing. This risk might be avoided, to remain exposed  
to

to which would have been temerity ; beside that the Prussians act better on the offensive than the defensive. The neighbouring forage too was consumed ; so that, instead of remaining under the incertainty of such an event, the king projected to turn the right of marshal Daun with his left, in contradiction to the motion that he had executed with his right, against Laudon. The army quitted the camp of Reichenau and Baumgarten, on the evening of the 16th. The first attempt was to be made on the height of Kunzendorf ; but the enemy, being enabled to repair thither in less time, prevented the Prussians ; and as the village of Cider was to be passed, the prince of Löwenstein, who encamped near it, first engaged in a skirmish, and next kept up a hot cannonade. The direction of the army of the king was three thousand paces from the foot of these mountains, that it might be less exposed to the Austrian artillery ; but the enemy, descending from his heights, somewhat deranged the measures that had been taken. Ziethen, who led the rear-guard, had no sooner quitted the camp than he was continually harassed during his route. As this slackened his march, the van of the army was more than once obliged to halt, that the dis-



tances might be kept, and that the power of mutual succour might thus be preserved.

When the van-guard approached Kunzendorf, hussars and dragoons were sent to occupy that height. The infantry could not follow sufficiently fast to sustain the horse. The van of marshal Daun appeared, at the same time, coming from Furstenstein. Too feeble to maintain this important post, it was obliged to be abandoned by the hussars and dragoons. The rear-guard, which had greatly retarded the march of the king, occasioned a new halt beside Schönbunn, to give it time to join the rear of the columns. The generals of the enemy, hoping to profit by the occasion, attacked the Prussian infantry with thirty squadrons; but they were received by the artillery, mingled with a heavy fire of small arms, and afterward driven back to their lines by the cuirassiers of Henry and Seidlitz.

At length the king gained the village of Bögendorf, but still paced by the Imperialists. His van-guard proceeded to the heights of Hohenhengiersdorf. An abatis was obliged to be opened that the enemy had thrown up to defend the road among the mountains. Daun nearly divined the intention of the king, and placed himself near Hoch Bogendorf, five or

fix lines deep, that by the aid of a neighbouring road he might occupy the eminence of Hohengiersdorf before the Prussians. He was cannonaded by Ziethen with so much success that the confusion became almost general in his corps; and Wied first gained the heights of Hohengiersdorf, with a battalion of prince Henry, and another of young Brunswick. Here he found ten Austrian squadrons, that had dismounted, and that were presently repulsed by a few discharges of the artillery. Hence he advanced to post himself so as to cut off the enemy from the road to this eminence, and came up with the van of ten battalions of grenadiers, sent with the same intention by marshal Daun. These Wied attacked: the action was warm but short; the Austrians were beaten, and lost six hundred grenadiers, and fourteen pieces of artillery. The van-guard, and the left of the king's army, followed Wied; and took post from this eminence to the Blaueranzen. The heights of Seitendorf, which the enemy had diligently garnished, were reconnoitred. The cannonade that had begun by day-break, did not end till half past nine in the evening, and it seemed so considerable to the officers of the garrison of Breslau, by whom it was heard, that they imagined there had been a battle,

battle. It was in reality nothing but a march: in former times battles were fought without so many discharges from the artillery as on that day.

Wahlenburg was wished to be gained, where the enemy had a bakery, but the delay occasioned by continually fighting had been so great that it was impossible for the Prussians, at this time, further to push their advantages. On the morrow, the 18th, the army of the king, except the cuirassiers, occupied the heights of Giersdorf. An attempt was made to penetrate through Neu Reufendorf, and by the Kohlberg to Wahlenburg. Laudon had, during night, prevented this, by occupying the defiles that defended this pass. He was further joined by Laschy; so that the attempt of the Prussians ended only in a cannonade. The king mean time made himself master of the heights of Beersdorf. The left of his camp was supported at Kunaft, whence the line turned through Beersdorf and Dittmansdorf, where the head quarters were. It passed thence by the Blaueranzen; and the eminence of Hohen-giersdorf, at the extremity of the right, was occupied by the reserve under the command of Forcade.

The army of Daun extended over ground  
more

more ample. The corps of Laudon and Laschy proceeded to Jauernick and Tanhausen, through Neu Reufendorf, as far as Seitendorf. The marshal's army here began, and filled the whole ridge that extends to Bögendorf. Löwenstein and Beck covered his left flank, with a front toward Schweidnitz, and Nauendorf covered his rear at Furstenstein. The two armies were so cooped up among the mountains that they could neither of them advance, and their camps were mutually impregnable. They were beside so near each other that it only depended on the generals to make a reciprocal and efficacious cannonade; but, as this could effect no good purpose, tranquillity was preserved. The horse patrols might shake hands, but all tilting was forbidden; it might have been affirmed that an armistice was agreed on. So far was this carried that the Austrians and Prussians restored the patrols who had lost themselves in the dark, on such roads as led to their posts. To add to security, though nature had been pleased to make of these mountains a species of fortresses, they mutually threw up intrenchments.

Marshal Daun began to be uneasy at his situation. It was insupportable to see how probable it was he should lose the campaign, on the success of which he had placed all his hopes.

The



The forage of the mountains was consumed; small parties only could be sent into the plain; the broken roads rendered the arrival of his convoys from Bohemia more difficult; he was on the point of abandoning Silesia, on which there no longer remained any attack to be made. Amid his chagrin, he could imagine no better resource, to recover affairs, than a diversion of so serious a nature as to force the king to depart. He moved heaven and earth that he might dispose the Russian generals, and especially Soltikow, to make this diversion; which, according to his plan, was that a body of Russians should march to Berlin; and, that he might encourage them to the undertaking, he proposed to add a detachment from his army, persuaded that this would be the only means of obliging the king to hasten to the succour of his hereditary states, and consequently to quit Silesia before he should oblige the Austrians to retire into Bohemia.

He sent a general officer to the Russian camp to negotiate this business. The court of Vienna daily dispatched couriers to Petersburg to support the project. Endeavours were made to allure the Russians by the prospect of pillage and booty; and the moment they had consented Laschy was detached from Seitendorf to aid

in



in the execution. Though the king was informed of these intentions, he did not desist from detaching Wied, with six thousand men, into Upper Silesia. Here Wied met with the corps of Bethlem. At Neustadt, the dragoons of Krockow were sent to reconnoitre, where by their ill address they lost a hundred and twenty men ; but these are trifles.

Generals Czernichef and Tottleben began their march on the 20th of September; they had passed the Oder at Beuthen whence they had proceeded to Christianstadt, while Soltikow directed his march from Schlichtingheim, in Poland, to Frankfort, where he arrived on the 6th of October. The affairs of Saxony were but in an ill state, after the departure of the king. The troops of the circles soon occupied Nossen. Hulsen, too feeble to maintain all the posts that were necessary to prevent the prince de Deuxponts from turning him, could not preserve his position at Schlettau, and retreated to Strehla. He was immediately followed by the enemy. (20th) Luzinsky marched upon his right flank, while the prince of Stolberg attacked the right of the Prussians, on the Durrenberg. M. von Braun, who commanded that brigade, vigorously repulsed the enemy. The dragoons of Schorlemmer, and the hussars of Kleist,

Kleist, fell on them at the same time and completed their rout. They took the prince of Nassau, a colonel in the Austrian service, twenty officers, and four hundred men; upon which the prince de Deuxponts retreated.

But it seemed as if the number of foes Hulsen had to combat was yet insufficient: chance raised him up new enemies. The duke of Wurtemberg again appeared in the field; he hoped better success, serving under the auspices of Austria, than he had found by making war in conjunction with the French. He had stipulated that his troops should be employed as a separate corps, and advanced toward Saxony. As he now appeared in the vicinity of Grimma, Hulsen found it no longer convenient to continue at Strehla. He retired to Torgau, to cover the magazine he had in that town, as well as circumstances would permit.

The prince de Deuxponts followed, and encamped at Belgern. The duke of Wurtemberg advanced from Bitterfeld to Pretsch; Luzinsky inclined to Dommitsch, where he threw a bridge over the Elbe, and crossed on the same day. The prince de Deuxponts, and generals Haddick and Maquire, advanced at the same time on Hulsen, and approached the heights of Suptitz, which they occupied. These combined

bined motions of the enemy, and the passage of the Elbe by Luzinsky, made it apprehended that the siege of Torgau was projected; or perhaps a march to Berlin, where there were but few troops. Hulsén wished to prevent designs so dangerous. (26th) To this effect he passed the Elbe at Torgau, and fixed his camp at Jessen, at the confluence of the Elster and the Elbe. After his departure, the enemy immediately burnt the bridge of Torgau. The governor of the town made no defence; he surrendered the same day. A garrison of eight hundred men, many sick, and a considerable magazine, all were lost, and fell into the hands of the Imperialists. The prince de Deuxponts afterward advanced on the Elster; and Hulsén, unable to resist the enemy in front and rear, retired to Coswig; whence he was called to Berlin, as we shall presently relate. The town of Wittenberg was immediately besieged; the governor Salenmon defended the place with fortitude and valour. It was bombarded by the enemy, and three parts reduced to ashes. Stores at length failed, and he did not surrender till the 14th of October, after having performed every thing that could be expected from a man of honour.

The overthrow of Saxony, and the dangers  
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that menaced the country of Brandenburg and Berlin, were motives sufficient to induce the king to march diligently to the aid of these countries. It was now the month of October, nor was it to be presumed that the enemy, so slow in preparation, would begin a siege at that advanced season; considering that his measures had all been deranged in Silesia. The probabilities all were that the king might, without any risk, quit Silesia. As therefore his presence was become so essential in other parts, he recalled Wied from Upper Silesia, and, on the 7th of October, decamped from Dittmansdorf. He marched through Bunzelwitz, Jauer, Conradsdorf and Primkenau to Sagan, where on the 11th he was joined by Goltz. This general had detached Warner to Colberg, in the month of September, the reason of which we shall presently see. From Sagan the king marched through Guben to Gros Mörau, where he arrived on the 15th. He intended to come on the rear of the Russians, that the whole corps might be destroyed which had adventured as far as Berlin; but, as it happened, this was unnecessary.

Czernichef and Tottleben had marched by the road of Guben and Beeskow, and on the 3d of October had appeared before the gates  
of

of Berlin. The prince of Wurtemberg, who made head against the Swedes, gained intelligence of their march. His war with the Swedes was still what it had been; the enemy passed the Peene, was beat by detachments, and retreated on one side to advance on another. In a word nothing happened in this war that merits the attention of posterity. The prince of Wurtemberg was at Pasewalk when he heard of the march of the Russians. He had sent for Werner out of Pomerania, whose success against the Russians had been great. The singularity of his expedition engages us to relate the manner of it; somewhat to enliven the tragical gravity of this narrative.

The Russians had sent their admiral, Zachary Danielowitz, with twenty-six ships of war, to which were added a Swedish squadron, to lay siege to Colberg. Their trenches were opened on the 26th of August, and their operations continued to the 18th of September. The governor and the garrison strove who should enact most wonders, in the defence and the sallies they made. The news of this siege occasioned the departure of Werner from Silesia, that he might hasten to succour Colberg with four bat-

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talions



talions and nine squadrons. He surprised the enemy at Selnow, seized on the important pass of the Kautzenberg, and threw himself into the town. The enemy raised the siege the same night, embarked on board the ships, and abandoned fifteen cannon, seven mortars, and the war stores.

Werner made six hundred prisoners. On the morrow he presented himself on the shores of the Baltic; and, by an incredible effect of terror, the fleet weighed anchor, set sail, and drove before the wind into the high seas. Fate no doubt had ordered that general Werner, with some squadrons of dragoons, was to put a fleet to the rout. After having expelled the Russians from Pomerania, he repaired to Prenzlau, where he joined the prince of Wurtemberg; and, in conjunction with Belling, remained in those parts to oppose the Swedes; while the prince of Wurtemberg advanced by hasty marches toward Berlin, at which city he arrived on the 4th of October.

Every one stood on the defensive in that capital; invalids, sick, all were up in arms. The fortifications only consisted of some arrows of earth, raised before the gates. These important posts were confided to those army generals

rals who, sick or wounded, happened to be in the city. The prince of Wurtemberg made a sally with his cavalry, from the gate of Silesia, where he met the enemy, and was for six hours attacked by Tottleben, who furrounded him with a corps of between seven and eight thousand Cossacks and dragoons. These the prince not only repulsed but pursued as far as Köpenick. On the morrow the gate was attacked by two thousand Russian foot. Seidlitz, though not yet cured of the wounds he received at Kunersdorf, commanded here, and drove off the enemy. Information had been sent to Hulsén of the present danger of the capital; he had hastened from Coswig and in the interim arrived. Had the Russians only been present they would soon have been forced to retreat; but the city was lost by the coming up of Laschy. This general already had seized on Potsdam and Charlottenbourg, and advanced from the south on the capital. Berlin is three miles in circumference, and it was impossible that sixteen thousand men should defend an inclosure so vast, in which there was neither work nor rampart, against twenty thousand Russians, and eighteen thousand Austrians; who, having no motive for forbearance, might effect whatever destruction they pleased. The enemy had already

thrown some bombs into the city; and, should the besieged hold out to the last extremity, the troops were in danger of being taken, and the capital of total ruin. These essential and serious considerations occasioned the generals to come to a resolution to retire; intimating to the magistrates that they should send deputies to the chiefs of the enemy, that a kind of capitulation might be drawn up. On the night of the 9th, the prince of Wurtemberg and general Hulsen departed, and inclined toward Spandau: the corps of chasseurs only suffered during the retreat.

The Russians entered Berlin the same day. It was agreed the citizens should, by tax, raise the sum of two millions, which should be paid in lieu of pillage. Generals Lascy and Czernichef were nevertheless tempted to burn a part of the city; and something fatal might have happened had it not been for the remonstrances of M. Verelst, the Dutch ambassador. This worthy republican spoke to them of the rights of nations, and depicted their severity in colours so fearful as to excite shame. Their fury and vengeance turned on the royal palaces of Charlottenbourg and Schönhausen, which were pillaged by the Cossacks and Saxons.

The rumour of the march of the king gained credit.

credit. Information was received by Laschy and Czernichef that he intended to cut off their retreat. This hastened their departure, and they retired on the 12th. The Russians repassed the Oder at Frankfort and Schwedt; and, on the 15th, Soltikow marched toward Landsberg on the Wartha. Laschy pillaged whatever he could find on his route; and in three days regained Torgau. The prince of Wurtemberg and Hulsén, embarrassed how to act, had turned toward Cöfwig, and cantoned there for want of knowing where to go.

At Grofs Mörau the king heard these different accounts. As there were no more Russians to combat, he was at liberty to direct all his efforts against Saxony; therefore, instead of taking the route to Köpenick, he took that of Lubben. Marshal Daun however had followed the king into Lusatia. He then approached Torgau, and, as it was known that he had left Laudon at Löwenberg, general Goltz had orders to return into Silesia, to oppose the attempts of the Austrians with his utmost abilities. On the 22d the army of the king arrived at Jessen. The troops of the prince de Deuxponts extended wholly along the left shore of the Elbe. He and the greatest part of his forces were at Prata, opposite Wittenberg; this fortress he evacuated

as soon as the van of the Prussians appeared near the town.

The sudden changes that had happened during this campaign required new measures to be taken, and other dispositions to be made. The Prussians had not a single magazine in all Saxony. The army of the king existed from day to day; he drew some little flour from Spandau, but this began to fail; add to this the enemy occupied all Saxony. Daun had arrived at Torgau; the troops of the circles held the course of the Elbe, and the duke of Wurtemberg occupied the environs of Dessau. To free himself from so many enemies, the king ordered Hulsen and the prince of Wurtemberg to march to Magdebourg, there to pass the Elbe, and escort the boats loaded with flour which were to come to Dessau, where the king resolved to pass the Elbe, with the right of his army, and afterward join Hulsen.

In the principality of Halberstadt the prince of Wurtemberg had a rencontre with a detachment of the duke his brother, which was entirely destroyed. The duke returned with all speed, through Merseburg and Leipzig, to Naumburg. The right of the king passed the Elbe on the 26th, and joined Hulsen and the prince near Dessau. On this movement the  
prince



prince de Deuxponts abandoned the banks of the Elbe, and retired through Duben to Leipzig. He had left Ried in the rear, in a forest between Oranienbaum and Kemberg, where this officer had taken post, with little judgment; having garnished the woods with his hussars, and posted his pandours in the plain.

The van of the Prussians attacked Ried; his scattered troops were beaten in detail, and his corps almost destroyed. Of three thousand six hundred men, he could only assemble seventeen hundred, at Pretsch, to which place he was driven after the action.

When the army of the king had attained Kemberg, Ziethen, who with the left had stopped the enemy at Wittenberg, passed the Elbe, and joined the main army. Marshal Daun however had come up with Laschy, at Torgau. As certain information was received that his van-guard had taken the road to Eulenburg, he could be supposed to have no other intention than that of joining the army of the circles. On this the army marched to Duben, to oppose a junction so prejudicial to the interests of the king. Here arriving, a battalion of Croats was found, who were all either taken or put to the sword. At this place the king formed a magazine: it seemed the most convenient post be-

cause that it is a peninsula and nearly furrounded by the Mulde. Some redoubts were constructed; and ten battalions under Sydow were left for its defence.

The army of the king from thence marched to Eulenburg. The Austrian troops that had encamped in that vicinity retired, through Mochrena to Torgau, with so much precipitate haste that they abandoned a part of their tents. The army encamped with the right at Thalwitz, and the left at Eulenburg. Hulsen was obliged to pass the Mulde with some battalions. He took a position between Belzen and Gostevra, opposite the prince de Deuxponts, whose army was at Taucha. Under the present circumstances, the first thing necessary was to drive the troops of the circles to a distance, as well because they were on the rear of the Prussians, as to prevent their union with the Austrians. This cost but little trouble; Hulsen gave them the alarm, and they decamped the same night, passed the Pleisse, and then the Elster, and retreated to Zeitz. Major Quintus, with his free battalion, vigorously charged their rear-guard; from which he took four hundred prisoners. After so happily terminating this expedition, the Prussians recovered possession of Leipzig, and Hulsen rejoined the army.

Every

Every event (November) hitherto had turned to the advantage of the king. The irruption of the Russians and the taking of Berlin, which might appear to induce consequences so great, ended in a manner less afflicting than could have been expected. Contributions and money only were lost. The enemy was driven from the frontiers of Brandenburg. Wittenberg and Leipzig were recovered; and the troops of the circles were repulsed to a distance too considerable for it to be feared they should join the Imperialists with promptitude; but all was not yet done, and the projects that remained were the most difficult part of the whole.

The Russians kept at Landsberg on the Wartha, and there might remain peaceful spectators of what should pass in Saxony. The king however was informed that other reasons engaged them not to march to too great a distance; for their design was, should the Austrians obtain any advantages over the army of the king, or should marshal Daun maintain Torgau, to re-enter the electorate of Brandenburg; and, conjointly with the Austrians, to take up their quarters on the banks of the Elbe. The consequence of such a project would have been fatally desperate to Prussia. By this position they would cut off the army, not only from Silesia

lesia and Pomerania but, from Berlin itself, that nursing mother which supplied clothing, arms, baggage, and every necessary for the men. Add to which the troops would have no quarters to take, except beyond the Mulde, between the Pleiße, the Saale, the Elster, and the Unstrut. This would have been a space too narrow to supply the army with subsistence, during the winter. And whence should magazines for the spring, uniforms, and recruits be obtained? The army thus pressed, and thrown back upon the allies, would have starved them by starving itself.

Without any profound military knowledge, every rational man would comprehend that, had the king remained quiet during autumn, and formed no new attempts, he would but have delivered himself, tied hand and foot, into the power of the enemy. Let us still further add that the provisions that had been deposited at Duben scarcely would supply the troops for the space of a month; that the frost, which began to be felt, would soon impede the navigation of the Elbe; consequently the boats could no longer bring provisions from Magdebourg; and in fine that the very last distress must have succeeded, had not good measures been taken

to remove the enemy, and gain ground on which the army might encamp and subsist.

After having maturely examined and weighed all these reasons, it was determined to commit the fortune of Prussia to the issue of a battle, if no other means, by manœuvring, could be found, of driving marshal Daun from his post at Torgau. It will be proper to observe that the fears with which he might be inspired could only relate to two objects; the first that of gaining Dresden before him, in which there was but a feeble garrison; and the second of approaching the Elbe, and disturbing him concerning subsistence, which was brought from Dresden by the river. It must be confessed that this last manœuvre could not give him much uneasiness, because that he was entirely master of the right shore of the Elbe, and might bring the provisions he wanted by land, when they could no more be transported by water. The greatest difficulty in executing this plan was that two things, nearly contradictory, were to be reconciled; the march of the army to the Elbe, and the security of the magazine. Not to forget all rule, the army of the king, in advancing, ought not to depart too far from the line of defence by which it covered its subsistence; and the motion it was to make upon the  
Elbe



Elbe threw it entirely to the right, and uncovered its rear. It was still endeavoured to reconcile this enterprize on the enemy with the security of the magazine. The king proposed to incline to Schilda, that he might prove the countenance of Daun, and attack him at Torgau, should he obstinately persist in remaining there. As it was but one march to Schilda, should the marshal retire on this motion, there was no fear that he should attempt Duben; and, if he remained at Torgau, by attacking him on the morrow, it seemed apparent that he would have so many occupations he would have no time to form projects against the magazine.

Every thing conspiring to confirm the king in his resolution, he, on the second of November, marched the army to Schilda. During the whole route he continued with the van-guard of the hussars, that he might observe to which side the advanced posts of the enemy retired, as they were repulsed by the troops of the king. This did not long remain a subject of doubt. The detachments all withdrew to Torgau, except Brentano, who was attacked at Belgern, and taken in such a direction that he could only escape toward Strehla. Kleist took eight hundred prisoners. The army of the king encamped from Schilda through Probsthain to  
Langen-

Langen-Reichenback, and marshal Daun remained firm and motionless at Torgau. There no longer was any doubt but that he had received positive orders from his court to maintain his post at any price.

The following dispositions were made for the attack on the morrow. The right of the Imperialists was supported behind the ponds of Grosrich; their centre covered the hill of Suppitz; the left terminated beyond Zinna, extending toward the ponds of Torgau. Exclusive of this, Ried observed the Prussian army from beside the forest of Torgau. Laschy, with a reserve of twenty thousand men, covered the causeway, and the ponds that lie at the extremity of the place, where the Imperialists had supported their left. Still the ground on which the enemy stood wanted depth; and the lines had not an interval of above three hundred paces. This was a very favourable circumstance for the Prussians; because that, by attacking the centre in front and rear, the foe would be placed between two fires, and could not avoid being beaten.

To produce this effect, the king divided his army into two bodies. The one destined to approach from the Elbe, after having passed the forest of Torgau, was to attack the enemy in  
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the rear, from the hill of Suptitz; while the other, following the route of Eulenburg to Torgau, was to fix a battery on the eminence of Grofwich, and, at the same time, attack the village of Suptitz. These two corps, acting in concert, must necessarily divide the centre of the Austrians; after which it would be easy to drive the remnant toward the Elbe, where the ground was one continued gentle declivity, excellently advantageous to the Prussians, and must have procured them a complete victory.

The king began his march at the dawn of day, on the 3d, and was followed by thirty battalions and fifty squadrons of his left. The troops crossed the forest of Torgau in three columns. The route of the first line of infantry led through Mochrena, Wildenhayn, Grofwich, and Neiden; the route of the second through Pechhutte, Jægerteich, and Bruckendorf, to Elfnich. The cavalry that composed the third column passed the wood of Wildenhayn, to march to Vogelfang. Ziethen at the same time led the right of the army, consisting of thirty battalions and seventy squadrons, and filed off on the road that goes from Eulenburg to Torgau. The corps headed by the king met with general Ried, posted at the skirts of the forest of Torgau, with two regiments of hussars, as many dragoons,

dragoons, and three battalions of pandours. Some vollies of artillery were fired, and he fell back on the right of the Imperialists.

Near Wildenhayn there is a small plain in the forest, where ten battalions of grenadiers were seen, well posted, who affected to dispute the passage of the Prussians. They made some discharges of artillery on the column of the king, which were answered by the Prussians. A line of infantry was formed to charge, but they reclined toward their army. The hussars brought word, at the same time, that the regiment of St. Ignon was in the wood, between the two columns of infantry, and that it had even dismounted. It was incontinently attacked; and, as these dragoons found no outlet for escape, the whole regiment was destroyed. These grenadiers and this regiment were mutually to depart on an expedition against Döbeln, and the commanding officer, St. Ignon, who was taken, bitterly complained that Ried had not informed him of the approach of the Prussians. This trifling affair only cost the troops a few moments; they pursued their road, and the heads of the columns arrived, at one o'clock, on the farther side of the forest, in the small plain of Neiden.

Here

Here were seen some dragoons of Bathiani, and four battalions, who coming from the village of Elfnich made some discharges of artillery, at a venture, and fired with their small arms. This no doubt was a motion of surprise, occasioned perhaps by having seen some Prussian hussars. They retired upon a height behind the defile of Neiden. In this place is a large marsh, which begins at Groswich and goes to the Elbe, and over which there is no other passage but two narrow causeways. Had this corps taken advantage of its ground there certainly would have been no battle. However determined the king might be to attack the Imperialists, such an attack would have become impossible: he must have renounced his project, and returned full speed to regain Eulenburg. But it happened far otherwise; these battalions hastened to rejoin the army, to which they were invited by a heavy cannonade which they heard from the side of Ziethen. The king supposed, as was very probable, that the troops of Ziethen already were in action with the enemy. This induced him to pass the defile of Neiden, with his hussars and infantry; for the cavalry which ought to have proceeded was not yet come up. The king glided into a little wood, and personally reconnoitred the position of the enemy. He  
judged



judged there was no ground on which it was proper to form, in presence of the Austrians, but by passing this small wood, which would in some measure conceal his troops, and whence a considerable ravin might be gained, to protect the soldiers, while they formed, from the enemy's artillery. This ravin was not indeed above eight hundred paces from the Austrian army; but the remainder of the ground, which from Suptitz descended like a glacis to the Elbe, was such that, had the army here been formed, one half must have been cut off, before it could approach the enemy.

Marshal Daun scarcely could credit the report that the Prussians were marching to the attack; nor was it till after reiterated information that he ordered his second line to face about, and that the greatest part of the artillery of the first line was brought to the second. Whatever precaution the king might take to cover the march of his troops, the enemy, who had four hundred pieces of artillery in battery, could not fail to kill many of his men. Eight hundred soldiers fell, and thirty cannon were destroyed, with their horses, train, and gunners, before the columns arrived at the place where they were to be put in order of battle. The

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king formed his infantry in three lines, each of ten battalions, and began the attack. Had his cavalry been present, he would have thrown two regiments of dragoons into a bottom, that was on the right of his infantry, to cover its flank ; but the prince of Holstein, whose phlegm was invincible, did not come up till an hour after the action had begun. According to the regulations that had been agreed on, the attacks were to be made at the same time, and the result ought to have been that either the king or Ziethen should penetrate through the centre of the enemy at Suptitz. But general Ziethen, instead of attacking, amused himself for a considerable time with a body of pandours, whom he encountered in the forest of Torgau. He next cannonaded the corps of Laschy, who as we have said was posted behind the ponds of Torgau. In a word, the orders were not executed; the king attacked singly, without being seconded by Ziethen, and without his cavalry being present. This still did not prevent him from pursuing his purpose. The first line of the king left the ravin, and boldly marched to the enemy ; but the prodigious fire of the Imperial artillery, and the descent of the ground, were too disadvantageous. Most of the Prussian generals, commanders of battalions,

battalions, and soldiers, were killed or wounded. The line fell back, and returned in some disorder. By this the Austrian carabiniers profited, pursued, and did not retreat till they had received some discharges from the second line. This line also approached, was disturbed, and, after a more bloody and obstinate combat than the preceding, was in like manner repulsed. Bulow who led it to the attack was taken.

At length the much expected prince of Holstein and his cavalry arrived. The third line of the Prussians was already in action; the regiment of prince Henry, attacking the enemy, was in turn charged by the Austrian cavalry, and supported by the hussars of Hund, Reitzenstein, and Prittwitz, against all the efforts of the enemy to break its ranks. The dreadful fire of the artillery of the Austrians had too hastily consumed the ammunition. They had left their reserve of cannon on the other side of the Elbe, and their close lines did not admit of ammunition waggons to pass and make proper distribution to the batteries. The king profited by the moment when their fire slackened, and ordered the dragoons of Bareuth to attack their infantry. They were led on with so much valour and impetuosity, by Bulow, that, in less than three minutes, they took prisoners

the regiments of the Emperor, Neuperg, Geisruck, and Imperial-Bareuth. The cuirassiers of Spaen and Frederic at the same time made an assault on that part of the enemy's infantry which was most to the right of the Prussians, put it to the rout, and brought back many prisoners. The prince of Holstein was placed to cover the left flank of the infantry, which his right wing joined, and his left inclined toward the Elbe. The enemy soon presented himself before the prince, with eighty squadrons; the right toward the Elbe, the left toward Zinna. O'Donnel commanded the Imperial cavalry. Had he resolutely attacked the prince, the battle must have been lost without resource: but he was respectful of a ditch of a foot and a half wide, which those who skirmished were forbidden to pass. The enemy believed it to be considerable, because the Prussians made a pretence of fearing to cross it; and the Imperialists remained in the presence of the prince inactive.

The dragoons of Bareuth had just cleared the height of Suptitz. The king sent thither the regiment of Maurice, which had not engaged, and a brave and worthy officer, Lestwitz, brought up a corps of a thousand men, which he had formed from the different regiments that  
had

had been repulsed in previous attacks. With these troops the Prussians seized on the eminence of Suptitz, and there fixed themselves, with all the cannon they could hastily collect. Ziethen, at length, having arrived at his place of destination, attacked on his side. It began to be dark, and to prevent Prussians from combating Prussians, the infantry of Suptitz beat the march. They were presently joined by Ziethen; and scarcely had the Prussians begun to form with order on the ground before Lascey came up, with his corps, to dislodge the king's forces. He came too late: he was twice repulsed. Offended at his ill reception, at half past nine, he retired toward Torgau. The Prussians and Imperialists were so near each other, among the vineyards of Suptitz, that many officers and soldiers, on both parts, wandering in the dark, were made prisoners after the battle was over, and all was tranquil. The king himself, as he was repairing to the village of Neiden, as well to expedite orders relative to the victory as to send intelligence of it through Brandenburg and Silesia, heard the sound of a carriage near the army. The word was demanded, and the reply was *Austrian*. The escort of the king fell on and took two



field pieces and a battalion of pandours, that had lost themselves in the night. A hundred paces further, he came up with a troop of horse, that again gave the word, *Austrian carabiniers*. The king's escort attacked and dispersed them in the forest. Those who were taken related that they had lost their road with Ried in the wood, and that they had imagined the Imperialists remained masters of the field.

The whole forest that had been crossed by the Prussians, before the battle, and beside which the king was then riding, was full of large fires. What these might mean no one could divine, and some hussars were sent to gain information. They returned, and related that soldiers sat round the fires, some in blue uniforms and others in white. As intelligence more exact was necessary, officers were then sent, who learnt a very singular fact; of which I doubt whether any example in history may be found. The soldiers were of both armies, and had sought refuge in the wood, where they had passed an act of neutrality, to wait till fortune had decided in favour of the Prussians or Imperialists; and they had mutually agreed to follow the victorious party.

This

This battle cost the Prussians thirteen thousand men, three thousand of whom were killed, and three thousand fell into the enemy's hands, during the first attacks, while the Austrians were victorious; Bulow and Finck were among these. The breast of the king was grazed by a ball, and the margrave Charles received a contusion: several generals were wounded. The battle was obstinately disputed by both armies; its fury cost the Imperialists twenty thousand men, eight thousand of whom were taken, with four generals. They lost twenty-seven pair of colours, and fifty cannon. Marshal Daun was wounded at the commencement of the battle.

When the enemy saw the first line of the Prussians give ground, with hopes too frivolous, they dispatched couriers to Vienna and Warsaw, to announce their victory; but the same night they abandoned the field of battle, and crossed the Elbe at Torgau. On the morning of the following day, the 4th, Torgau capitulated to general Hulsén. The prince of Wurtemberg was sent over the Elbe to pursue the foe, who fled in disorder: he augmented the number of prisoners already made. The Imperialists would have been totally defeated had

not general Beck, who was not in the engagement, covered their retreat by posting his corps between Arzberg and Triestewitz, behind the Landgraben. It was wholly in the power of Daun to have avoided a battle. Had he placed Lascy behind the defile of Neiden, instead of the ponds of Torgau, which six battalions would have been sufficient to defend, his camp would have been impregnable. So great may the consequences be of the least inadvertency in the difficult trade of war.

When the Russians were informed of the fate of the day of Torgau, they retired to Thorn, where they crossed the Vistula. The army of the king, on the 5th, advanced to Strehla, and on the 6th to Meissen. The Imperialists had left Lascy on that side of the Elbe, that he might cover the bottom of Plauen, before their arrival. He attempted to dispute the defile of Zehren with the van-guard; but, when he saw the cavalry in motion to turn him by Lommatzsch, he fled to Meissen, where he crossed the Tripsche; but, in spite of the celerity of his march, his rear-guard was attacked, and lost four hundred men. The pursuit was continued that an attempt might be made, favoured by  
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the fears and disorder of the foe, to pass the bottom of Plauen with him, and seize on this important post. But no diligence could accomplish this; the troops were two hours too late; for, on arriving at Uckerisdorf, another corps of the enemy was discovered, that had already taken post at the Windberg, the right of which extended to the Trompeter Schlöfgen. This was the corps of Haddick, who, with the prince de Deuxponts, quitting Leipzig, had marched to Zeitz, and afterward to Rosswein. No sooner were they informed of the Imperial defeat at Torgau than they diligently advanced to cover Dresden, before the Prussians could come up.

The progress of the king, and the consequences of the battle of Torgau, ended at Uckerisdorf. As the wound of marshal Daun prevented him from continuing to command, he committed this charge to general O'Donel; who passed the Elbe at Dresden, whence he sent the most injured regiments into Bohemia, into tranquil quarters of recovery. The prince of Wurtemberg, no longer necessary in Saxony, returned to join Werner and Belling in Pomerania; in conjunction with whom he presently cleared the states of the king of the remaining Swedes by whom they were infested; after

which he turned toward Mecklenbourg, where he took up his winter quarters.

Since the king and marshal Daun had quitted Silesia, Laudon, leaving Löwenberg, had advanced to Leobschütz. Proposing to take Cosel, he made two successive attacks on the 24th and 25th of October, and was both times repulsed by the excellent dispositions of the governor, Lattorf. The approach of Goltz (October 26th) obliged the Austrian to raise the siege, who retired to Oberglogau, and thence to the heights of Kunzendorf. He did not rest there, when he saw Goltz advance at the head of twenty-two battalions and thirty-six squadrons, but took the road of Wartha, and retired into the county of Glatz, where he sent his troops into winter quarters, dispersing them over the neighbouring circles of Bohemia. The army of the king extended from Neiß, by Schweidnitz, to Landshut, Löwenberg, and Görlitz. The Saxon troops inclined toward Elsterwerda, Coswig, Torgau, Meissen, Freyberg, Zwickau, and Naumbourg.

The king established his head quarters at Leipzig, that he might be near to concert certain plans, with prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, against the French and Saxons, who had advanced in these parts as far as Muhlhausen and

Duder-



Duderstadt. The better to understand the successive expeditions that were undertaken during the winter, it will be necessary to sketch the campaign of the allies, which was not fortunate this year. Their army was reinforced by seven thousand English, and a nearly equal number of light troops, that were raised during the winter. On the 20th of May, prince Ferdinand of Brunswick took the field, assembled his troops at Fritzlar, and sent generals Imhof and Luckner forward to occupy the important posts of Kirchheim and Amönebourg, while he detached Gilse on their left, who fixed himself at Hersfeld. The hereditary prince (June) was soon obliged to enter the country of Fulda, to protect the quotas of forage that were thence obtained for the allied army.

The French did not assemble till the 10th of June, near Friedberg. De Broglie immediately sent the count de Lusace into the bishoprick of Fulda, to observe the motions of the hereditary prince. These first steps did not sufficiently discover the French plan of the campaign; nor could any positive measures of opposition thence be derived. Prince Ferdinand was persuaded the French would make their utmost efforts this year on the side of the lower Rhine; which supposition deranged the campaign, that perhaps  
would

would have worn another aspect, had he been before the French on the Elbe. The intention of de Broglie was to penetrate into Hesse, and thence into Hanover, as far as the design was practicable. Every operation was to effect this purpose, which all the efforts of prince Ferdinand tended to impede, either by seizing on capital posts, by beating detachments, or, if he could not attack the French because of their strength and advantageous ground, of which they had the good sense to profit, by making a diversion under the hereditary prince on Wesel, to enfeeble the enemy that faced him in Hesse.

The first motion of de Broglie was to Grunberg, the second to the Ohm. Prince Ferdinand turned toward Ziegenhain, and thence to Dietershausen. These manœuvres gave immediate advantage to the French to seize on Marbourg. St. Germain, who was on the lower Rhine, had orders to join marshal de Broglie, to repulse general Spörken, who was his opponent. He advanced to Unna, whence he suddenly turned toward the Ruhr, and thence to the Dimel. The Hanoverian general was not deceived by this artifice, but arrived at the same time on the Dimel. To facilitate his junction (July 8th) with St. Germain, de Broglie marched to Neustadt; and thence to Corbach. Prince Ferdinand,

nand, who was still at Ziegenhain, sent the hereditary prince into the country of Waldeck, and presently followed. The hereditary prince approached Corbach, to cover the march of the allies, who were passing the defile of Sachsenhausen, a mile in his rear. The French army, very superior in numbers to his detachment, attacked him, and he lost some men and artillery. He retreated to Sachsenhausen, where he rejoined the prince his uncle.

As the whole French army was at Corbach, prince Ferdinand was at least desirous to cover the bishoprick of Paderborn, whither he sent Spörken, who scarcely had arrived before he found himself opposed by St. Germain, sent by marshal de Broglie. The hereditary prince painfully supported the repulse he had met with at Corbach, and was not tardy in taking revenge. He secretly left the camp, and carried an entire detachment of three thousand French at Kirchhayn, with their commander, brigadier Glaubitz, and the prince of Cöthen. Nor did de Broglie remain inactive; he endeavoured to take the corps of Spörken; and though the Hanoverian general retired to Volkmarfen, and the army of the allies approached for his support, his rear-guard was very ill treated by the French.

After

After this check, prince Ferdinand took post at Calben, to cover Cassel; the hereditary prince at Oberwellmar; Wangenheim at Munchof, and Spörken at Westoffelen. The French army followed the German beyond Freyenhagen; whence the count de Luface inclined to the Eder, and de Muy to Warbourg. As the latter corps deprived the allies of their communication with the bishoprick of Paderborn, and the town of Lippstadt, the hereditary prince and Spörken were sent into these parts. The allied army immediately followed. The hereditary prince had turned de Muy when prince Ferdinand came up. The action immediately began; and the French having lost twenty pieces of artillery, and four thousand men, retired to Volkmarfen; where perhaps they would not have remained in tranquillity, had not an accident happened which deranged every measure of the allies.

No sooner was prince Ferdinand removed from Cassel than de Broglio sent the count de Luface to besiege this city; and scarcely did he appear before that capital surrendered. It was taken by the French on the same day that de Muy was beaten by the allies at Warbourg. The French army immediately marched to Volkmarfen, on the Dimel. De Muy advanced to  
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Stadtberg; and the count de Luface penetrated by Munden into the electorate of Hanover. Prince Ferdinand remained at Warbourg, opposed Spörken to de Muy, and preserved his communication, to the best of his power, behind the Dimel, while the hereditary prince and Luckner (August 7th) passed the Weser, at Holzmunden. They advanced on the count de Luface, obliged him to abandon Eimbeck, Nordheim, and Göttingen; and made more than six hundred prisoners in this expedition. The count de Luface took the route of Witzenzausen, and used all diligence to regain Munden. The hereditary prince, having left Wangenheim at Uslar to observe the French, returned to join the army of his uncle.

In consequence of the different manœuvres which we have related, the allies only held a slip of Hesse; and as they were entirely cut off from Ziegenhain, that fortress was taken by the French, who made the garrison prisoners of war. Marshal de Broglie having thus cleared his rear, finding himself in possession of the country of Hesse, assembled all his detachments, inclined toward Durrenberg, and made a feint of penetrating the electorate of Hanover, in full force. This appearance caused the allies to fall back on the Weser, encamp at Buhne, and, by detachments,



tachments, occupy the posts of Beverungen, Bodenhagen, and Teiffelberg. The hereditary prince remained at Warbourg, whence he by night surprised a detachment of five hundred French, at Zierenberg. A few days after he marched along the Eder, to support the enterprise of Bulow, on Marbourg. The latter advanced toward the town with the British legion, surprised the French, ruined their bakery, and would have carried his advantages still further but for the misfortune of colonel Ferffen, whose duty it was to support him on the side of Corbie, and to protect his retreat, but who was beaten by de Stainville. Bulow, not receiving timely information of this, retreated with difficulty, and did not regain the corps of the hereditary prince without suffering some loss in his rear-guard (September 14th). De Broglie mean time having returned to Cassel, prince Ferdinand assumed the camp of Geismar. As the French however had not renounced their intention of penetrating into the electorate of Hanover, the marshal reinforced the corps of the count de Lutace with sixteen thousand men. His intention was to surprise Wangenheim, at Uslar; where this general was attacked on the 19th; and, by the superiority of the enemy, compelled to retreat; but without suffering any considerable loss.

Prince

Prince Ferdinand, being informed of what had happened, sent reinforcements to Wangenheim, who returned and occupied his former post.

The count de Lutace inclined to Lutterberg, and recovered Göttingen, while some French detachments seized on Vach, Hersfeld, Eschwege, and Muhlhausen; where they established magazines, the quotas of which the dutchies of Gotha and Eisenach were obliged to furnish. Other detachments extended thence into Thuringia, to assist the troops of the empire, and those of the duke of Wurtemberg, who then advanced toward the Elbe, on the side of Wittenberg and Torgau.

Prince Ferdinand clearly saw, by the different measures of the French, that marshal de Broglie intended to maintain himself, during winter, in Hesse, and in the electorate of Hanover. This design he imagined he could no otherwise frustrate than by a powerful diversion; which, drawing the enemy's force into other parts, would give him leave to form some attempt against the remainder of the French army, by which he should be opposed.

Hastening to execute this project, he sent his nephew to besiege Wesel; and the hereditary prince immediately departed at the head of fifteen thousand men for the Lower Rhine. The

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prince reinforced his corps, on his march, with all the men that could be drawn from the garrisons of Munster and Lippstadt; and, in the beginning of October, invested the town of Wefel, the garrison of which then consisted of two thousand six hundred men. It appeared that this expedition, in order to succeed, must be prompt; and, by hazarding a coup de main, secretly sending troops provided with scaling ladders, on the side of the Rhine, and at the same time making a false attack toward the gate of Berlin, it would have been possible at once to have carried the town and the citadel. Perhaps the attempt might appear too hazardous; and the hereditary prince might have reasons to prefer the usual manner of forming sieges. He passed the Rhine with a part of his forces, seized on the town of Cleves, where he made six hundred prisoners, marched thence to Ruremonde, which was taken without resistance, and afterward turned to Burich, where he intrenched himself between that town and the Rhine, establishing his bridges of communication over this river above and below Wefel. The trenches were opened before the town on the 11th.

Marshal de Bröglie did not remain in indolence. By the route of the hereditary prince he divined what the nature of the expedition might

might be; and incessantly sent de Castries, at the head of twenty thousand men, to the Lower Rhine. This general traversed Wetteravia, and was so expeditious that, on the 14th; he arrived at Nuys. He was joined by ten thousand men, whom he drew some from the country of Cologne, others from the garrisons of the Low Countries. After their arrival, advancing to Rheinberg, he took a position behind the ditch of Eugene, a canal which goes from that place to Guelders, whence he extended his left to Closter Campen.

Ill informed of the force of the foe, and not imagining his corps so strong, the hereditary prince thought proper to meet the French; for, had he been victorious over this detachment, Wesel must have fallen of itself; and, should he leave de Castries time to strengthen his army, he must have raised the siege without a battle. With this intent, the prince approached Rheinberg; and, on the night of the 15th, marched to the enemy, to attack his left, beyond Closter Campen. The prince was ignorant that the corps of Fischer was posted in the van of the French. Obligated to dislodge Fischer, the firing gave the alarm to the corps of de Castries, and the battle immediately began; which was obstinate, and continued from five to nine

o'clock in the morning. The allies carried one of the enemy's lines, but numbers were successful. The French incessantly brought up fresh troops, that had not been in action, and attacked the two wings of the assailants. The allies were unable to resist; and the prince, perceiving his disadvantage, determined to retreat to Burich, with the loss of twelve hundred men. The French did not pursue; but the prince, returning to his camp, found his bridges had been carried away by a swell of the waters. They were not repaired before the 18th, when he passed the Rhine, raised the siege, and encamped at Brunen, which is but a mile from Wesel. Here the prince some time continued to observe the French, who gave no signs of pursuit; after which he returned into the country of Munster; whence, having sent a part of his corps into Lower Saxony, he put the remainder into quarters of cantonment.

Nothing considerable happened during this expedition on the side of prince Ferdinand, except that Wangenheim, reinforced by some troops from the grand army, drove de Stainville from Duderstadt, and established himself there. Marshal de Broglio, having intrenched his camp of Cassel, sent his cavalry into the bishoprick of Fulda. Prince Ferdinand then crossed



crossed the Weser, and reinforced his posts of Uslar, Moringen, and Nordheim. We shall soon see the various manœuvres of these generals, in order to recover and to maintain Hesse. The contest continued during the two succeeding campaigns; nor did the allies become superior till toward the termination of the peace.

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## C H A P. XIII.

*The Winter of 1760 to 1761.*

ON the 8th of December, the army of the king went into winter quarters. It had no fear of being disturbed by the Imperialists, who too retentively kept in mind the battle of Torgau, and were wholly employed in repairing their losses. With the French it was different: they had obtained advantages over prince Ferdinand, by which they approached the states of the king, and the frontiers of Saxony. Marshal de Broglie occupied Hesse, had sent a detachment of Saxons and French to Gotha, held Göttingen, and by his position equally pressed upon the Prussians and allies. That they might be encroached upon in return, the king required prince Ferdinand to take the field as early as possible; for the Prussians had

annually to combat with the same troops, against the Russians, Swedes, Austrians and French. Prince Ferdinand inclined toward Göttingen with his army. The heavy rains made the waters swell, and overflowed the roads. Neither provisions nor ammunition could be transported; the expedition failed, and prince Ferdinand returned to his former position.

Not yet discouraged by the failure of this plan, another was attempted to be put in execution. Prince Ferdinand proposed to enter Hesse by three routes, to fall at the same time on different quarters of the French, by which it might be presumed the enemy would be thrown back on the Maine, and that he might recover the towns of Hesse, and restore the war to a more advantageous state in favour of the allies. Further to encourage the prince in this expedition, the king promised to assist him with a corps of Prussians, which he might employ as far as the banks of the Werra and Vach, and measures were concerted for the performance of this enterprise.

Seven thousand Prussians, in consequence, advanced (February 12th, 1761) to Langensalza, where de Stainville was posted, with a corps of Saxons and French. The little rivulet of the Salza divided the French cavalry and the  
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Saxon infantry. De Stainville kept on the right side of the rivulet, with his corps, and the count of Solms on the left, having a marsh between them. The Prussians on their arrival cannonaded the French cavalry, which immediately took to flight. Seeing themselves abandoned thus by de Stainville, the Saxons thought proper to retreat. Löllhöftel, Anhalt, and Pritzwitz, seized the moment when they put themselves in motion, attacked with the Prussian cavalry, broke them, and took sixty officers, three hundred men, and five pieces of artillery, dividing the honour of so brave an action. Spörken came up with his Hanoverians, and joined the troops of the king, in the pursuit of the foe. Luckner again attacked the Saxons at Eifenach, and afterward at Vach, where he dispersed their whole infantry. Spörken and Luckner advanced thence to Hersfeld.

The hereditary prince in the interim seized on Fritzlar, and the magazine which the French there abandoned. Prince Ferdinand, who kept in the centre of these two corps, with the main army, passed the Fulda, and marched immediately for Cassel. De Broglie, taken thus unexpectedly, did not wait his coming, but retired through the town of Fulda to Hanau and Frankfurt. However unfavourable the season might

be, still the recovery of Cassel from the French was of so much importance that prince Ferdinand determined to undertake the siege. This operation he committed to the count de la Lippe. The place was defended by a garrison of six thousand French, and was invested by the count with fifteen thousand Hanoverians. Not to lose that opportunity which the distance of the French army presented, prince Ferdinand at once undertook to besiege the three towns of Cassel, Ziegenhain and Marbourg. The want of experience in his generals and engineers, the delay of ammunition, and the bad and broken roads, which occasioned the waggons to break down, were the causes of the failure of all the three.

While these sieges were carried on, the hereditary prince advanced to observe the motions of the French toward Frankfort, and on the Maine. The prince his uncle was a little too much in the rear, with the grand army, to afford him prompt succour. De Broglio fell on this detachment with his whole army. The hereditary prince lost three hundred men, and with the remainder joined prince Ferdinand. De Broglio continued to advance in Hesse. A detachment of the allies, which besieged Ziegenhain, was too dilatory in retreat, which was  
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irregularly made in presence of the enemy, and it was totally defeated.

To avoid still heavier misfortunes, prince Ferdinand imagined prudence required he should evacuate Hesse; and his retreat was made with so much precaution that he re-entered the electorate of Hanover, without having suffered the least loss. De Broglie did not venture to pursue, but remained satisfied with re-victualling the city of Cassel, and reinforcing the garrison; as he likewise did the garrisons of Gießen, Marbourg, and Ziegenhain; after which he retreated behind the Maine. The troops of the king, serving against the French and Saxons, now becoming useless on the Werra, were employed to oppose the army of the empire. Scarcely was one enemy vanquished before another rose up. Schenkendorf, in the month of March, led the Prussians against a corps of four thousand men, of the circles, posted near Schwarzbouurg, which he defeated, and brought back twelve hundred prisoners and five cannon.

After narrating the events of a campaign during which no respect was paid to winter or all the rigours of the seasons, it is necessary to take a retrospect of what passed in the cabinets of princes. France began to feel the duration of  
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the war: she was enfeebled by the total interruption of her commerce; by her losses in the East and West Indies; and by the enormous expences which the German war had brought upon her. The Austrian alliance had lost the glare of novelty, and the first raptures of fashion were past. The people, that monster with many tongues and few eyes, complained of the war, the burthen of which they bore, and which was made in defence of the house of Austria, the hereditary foe of France. A more respectable voice, that of the wise, equally exclaimed against a war which ruined the kingdom to aggrandise a reconciled enemy; and this voice began to claim attention. The court had its private views. In all kingdoms there are numerous citizens who, removed from the tumult of the world, and examining free from passion and prejudice, judge with a sane understanding: while those who hold the helm contemplate objects with the eyes of delusion, reason concerning the phantoms imagination raises, and often are involved, in consequence of some false measure, in a succession of errors, which they wanted the power to foresee.

This was nearly the situation of the ministry of Versailles. At the beginning of the year, they sent a written declaration to their allies, informing

ing them that France having for four years, in conjunction with the powers in her friendship, made ineffectual efforts to overwhelm the king of Prussia, they were no longer in a condition to support that enormous expence at which they had hitherto been ; and that, by continuing the war, the devastation and ruin of Germany, which was the theatre of war, would be completed. They concluded by advising the other powers to renounce all present intention of conquest ; and seriously to think on the re-establishment of peace.

The same declaration was made in still stronger terms at Stockholm ; because that, in the states assembled in diet at that capital, the court party had warmly attacked the French faction, and taxed it with having kindled and fomented war, into which Sweden had been dragged to its ruin. The pacific dispositions therefore which this French declaration there displayed were but meant to calm the agitated minds of the people, and to overturn the arguments employed by the party of opposition ; that the creatures of France might be supported in the senate.

The two empresses, and the king of Poland, received this declaration according to the different sensations which their different interests

inspired. The king of Poland was in reality weary of the war : he began to perceive that, as it continued to be carried on in his country, he was equally ruined by those whom he called friends or foes ; he nevertheless hoped he might obtain some indemnification by the way of treaty.

The empress of Russia loved peace, and was desirous these troubles should end ; because she hated business, labour, and the shedding of blood. But, easy of conviction from such as had gained an ascendancy over her mind, and excited by those who surrounded her person, she was persuaded her dignity would not permit her to make peace, till the power of Prussia should first be abased.

The empress queen, who set all the engines in motion that were acting throughout Europe, to humble the great enemy of her house, was desirous of prolonging an enthusiasm so advantageous to herself, and not to lay down arms till all that she had meditated against Prussia should be entirely effected. That she might not however give any offence to the court of Versailles, but might in appearance conciliate interests so incompatible, she proposed that a general congress should be held at Augsbourg ; certain that she thus should flatter France, while,

in the eyes of the world, she should affect a conduct highly moderate. This in reality could in no wise prejudice her intents nor her interests; for it was in her power to lengthen this negotiation to whatever period she should think proper, and in the mean time to carry on the war with vigour, during the approaching campaign, on the success of which all her high hopes were founded.

The proposal for this congress was made at London by prince Gallitzin, the Russian ambassador to Great Britain. The kings of Prussia and England acceded with the less repugnance because that they themselves had proposed a congress, the preceding year, although their enemies had not deigned to answer the overtures they made. Under appearances so pacific, France concealed views more profound. She offered England a suspension of arms, and reciprocally to send envoys that their disputes might terminate in friendship. Her secret purpose was to amuse Great Britain by negotiation, and retard the immense naval armaments of the nation, that the season might be lost, her own fleets restored, and Spain made a party in the war. Or, should England be disposed to peace, France hoped, under the mask of mediatrix, to become the arbitress of the congress of Augsbourg,

bourg, and there to enact a part similar to that he had heretofore played in the congress of the peace of Westphalia.

After some conferences, the British ministry agreed that envoys should be reciprocally sent; but at the same time declined concluding any suspension of arms, till preliminaries first should be stipulated. The king, who knew his enemies, named his ministers for the congress of Augsbourg. Their instructions were to receive every proposition that should be made, but not to return any answer. The king proposed seriously to negotiate peace by his ministers at London, where he found his advantage in treating directly with France, and not with so many princes at once. Under his present circumstances, the king could not oppose a separate peace between the French and English; he could only endeavour to obtain the best possible conditions; and it was in consequence premised that the French should be obliged to restore the provinces belonging to Prussia, which they had invaded during war, and that England should furnish the king with subsidies and troops, that he might oblige his remaining enemies to consent to a proper accommodation. It was further agreed that no ambassador from the emperor should be admitted to this congress; because that war had been  
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made on the empress queen, and not on the chief of the empire; which clause, insignificant as it was in itself, was the cause that this famous congress was never held.

England at this time (November 1760) lost her king, George II. who ended a glorious reign by a mild and hasty death. Before his departure he had the satisfaction to hear that Montreal had been taken, and that the English had completely conquered Canada. Among other virtues this prince possessed heroic fortitude; so that his allies might place an entire confidence in his word. His grandson was his successor, then scarcely of age, and is the present George III.

The negotiation still carried on at Constantinople on the part of Prussia, which has so often been mentioned in this work, began then to assume a kind of consistency. On the 2d of April, the Prussian minister signed a treaty of friendship with the grand vizir, and was admitted to a public audience. The contracting parties mutually reserved the freedom of a closer union, and of converting it into a defensive alliance. How ineffectual soever this treaty might really be, it inspired the court of Vienna, and even that of Russia, with apprehensions. The engagement that the two powers had contracted

tracted was supposed to be of a more intimate kind than such as it was publicly announced. But, as the Ottoman forces were not put in motion, the empress queen imagined no diversion would happen, during this campaign.

The troops remained tranquil in their quarters till the end of March. In the month of April those of Saxony assembled in cantonments, and the king transferred his quarters from Leipzig to Meissen.

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#### C H A P. XIV.

##### *Campaign of 1761.*

THE pacific sentiments, which the two Imperial courts displayed with so much ostentation, did not prevent them from hastening, with extreme ardour, every preparation for the coming campaign. The greatest efforts were intended, and every means were to be employed to reduce the king of Prussia to the last extremity. Marshal Daun took the command of the Imperial army in Saxony; that of Silesia was confided to general Laudon, who on the 6th of April came and encamped at Seitendorf, in the presence of Goltz, who had posted his troops at Kunzendorf. The advantages

tages the king had gained, during the last campaign against the Austrians, had not been sufficiently important totally to incline the balance in his favour. The empress queen had recruited her troops during winter, and the Russian army, which was at her disposal, continually gave her the advantage of numbers, and a facility of making substantial diversions, whenever she should think proper. Exclusive of this aid, she further had that of the troops of the empire, and the Swedish army. Alexander, with not so many soldiers and allies, subjugated the empire of Persia.

The different plans of the campaign formed by the belligerent powers were as follow.

France determined to act with two armies against prince Ferdinand; that of the Lower Rhine, under the command of the prince de Soubise, was to seize on Munster; and that of the Maine, headed by the marshal de Broglio, was to penetrate by Göttingen into the electorate of Hanover. Laudon was destined, by the court of Vienna, to undertake a war of sieges in Silesia, in which he was to be supported by the Russians. The latter were to lead their principal forces on the Wartha, where they had chosen Posen as their central position. From

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this post Butturlin was to act in Silesia, according as it should be agreed between himself and the Austrian generals, while Romanzow, with a heavy detachment, was to besiege Colberg, and to be supported by the Russian and Swedish fleets. Marshal Daun reserved himself for decisive occasions. His army was as the magazine whence every reinforcement was to be sent, into the parts where their presence should be necessary. O'Donel consequently was detached with sixteen thousand men for Zittau, where he was equally ready to march into Saxony or Silesia.

It was impossible for the king and his allies to take measures that should sufficiently and effectually oppose the intentions and efforts of such a host of enemies. The principal arrangements however were these. To the hereditary prince the charge of covering the country of Munster against the attacks of the prince de Soubise was committed, by prince Ferdinand, who assumed Paderborn as his central point, where he was empowered to support the hereditary prince, or to come on the back of de Broglio, should the marshal hazard the passage of the Weser, and adventure into the electorate of Hanover.

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The army of Saxony was confided by the king to the prince his brother, to whom it was recommended to observe marshal Daun; and, should the marshal take the road to Silesia, to follow with a part of the Prussian force; leaving general Hulfen at Meissen, with a detachment, that he might maintain himself in Saxony, as far as circumstances would permit. To himself the king reserved the defence of Silesia. Goltz was chosen to cover Glogau, with a corps of twelve thousand men. The prince of Wurtemberg, who had wintered in Mecklenbourg, was destined with the troops under his command to cover the town of Colberg; and the intrenched camp he was to occupy round that place was laboured at with diligence. It was foreseen that, should the Russians fail in this siege, they might carry their attacks either toward the electoral March or toward Silesia. Should the former happen, it was agreed that the prince of Würtemberg and general Goltz should form a junction at Frankfort, to cover Berlin; where, of the two grand Prussian armies, that which had the least to perform should send them succours; and, if the latter took place, Goltz had instructions to cover Glogau or Breslau, according as the one or the other of these towns should most need support.



The troops having previously assembled in their various places of destination, the king began his march, on the 4th of May, passed the Elbe at Hirschstein, on the same day, and on the 10th arrived at Löwenberg, without meeting with any impediment on his route. Laudon, on the approach of the Prussians, abandoned his camp of Seitendorf, retired into Bohemia, and intrenched himself at Hauptmannsdorf, near Braunau. He further garnished the posts of Silberberg and Wartha with troops sufficient for the defence of these two passes, which lead into the county of Glatz. The king chose his position near Kunzendorf: his right occupied the Zeiskenberg and Fürstenstein; his left extended on the eminence of Bernsdorf. Bulow was beside posted at Nimptsch, with a corps of cavalry, to preserve a free communication with Neiss. Goltz meantime departed with a detachment of ten thousand men for Glogau, whence he detached Thadden, with four battalions, to join the prince of Wurtemberg, who already occupied his intrenched camp near Colberg.

While these preparatives were executing in Silesia, Pomerania, and Saxony, the Austrians and Russians held their deliberations. It was with difficulty that they could agree; and their  
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plan of operations was several times changed. At length they concluded that Romanzow should besiege Colberg; and that Butturlin should immediately march for Breslau. General Goltz, in the interim, fell sick; and in a few days was carried off by an inflammatory fever. Ziethen, his successor, was sent on an expedition into Poland, that had twice been attempted in vain, and which a third time failed. This was to attack some of the Russian columns on their march, when they were too scattered to find any prompt succour. The one marched for Schneidemuhle, the other for Schwerin, and the third for Posen. General Zeithen advanced to Fraustadt, where he beat a corps of Cossacks, but durst adventure no further; the three Russian divisions having, two days before, formed their junction at Posen.

Butturlin then put himself in motion, traversed the palatinate of Posenania by short marches, and slowly continued his road, still approaching Silesia on the side of Militsch, which indicated his designs on Breslau. Ziethen kept pace with him, directing his march toward Trachenberg. No sooner were the Russians in motion than O'Donel, quitting Lusatia, proceeded to join the army of Laudon.

The position the king had taken among the

mountains of Silesia was but precarious. He covered the flat country against the enemy's incursions, as well as circumstances would permit; but since Butturlin had marched toward Militzsch, he soon must have a considerable army in his rear, having already the Austrians in front. The hills therefore must be forsaken, and the army posted in such a manner as, by not being attached to one particular defence, it might hastily turn on any side, to frustrate the attempts of the enemy. The camp of Pulzen was the best for the execution of this project, and was accordingly occupied by the army. The king proposed to keep, as long as possible, a middle line between the Austrians and Russians, that he might oppose their union. He was also determined to give the Austrians battle, should any favourable opportunity offer; but to keep scrupulously on the defensive with the Russians; because that should he gain a victory over the Austrians they would of themselves retire; whereas, should similar advantages attend on attacking the Russians, that would not prevent general Laudon from continuing his operations. The Austrians are the natural and irreconcilable enemies of the Prussians, while circumstances only rendered the Russians foes, who might by some change, or some revolution,

revolution, become friends, nay even allies. Not to conceal the truth, let us add, the Prussian army was not in sufficient force to give battle daily, and the king was obliged to husband his efforts, and his troops, for critical and decisive moments. The king had been but a few days in his camp of Pulzen (July the 21st) when Laudon left the mountains, opposite the Prussians, by the defile of Steinkunzendorf. This weak manœuvre discovered his whole intentions; and he seemed openly to proclaim he meant to attack the fortrefs of Neifs. On the morrow the army of the king departed, and occupied the heights of Siegroth, and, as the Austrians were seen to take the road of Frankenstein, it was determined to anticipate them, by first gaining the heights of Munsterberg. While making this march, Brentano was the next day found posted between Frankenstein and Henrichau, whence he had thrown some pandours into Munsterberg. The volunteers of Courbière, and the grenadiers of Nimschewsky, forced the town; and Brentano, after being exposed to a warm cannonade, retired to some distance from the post he had occupied.

Möring, who was sent forward with his regiment to the heights of Nossen, there took the whole encampment of Laudon, which was only

covered by three hundred hussars. The king, while posting the infantry on these heights, discovered the Austrian army on the side of Frankenstein, which, by its circuitous windings and wavering manœuvres, sufficiently demonstrated that its plans were deranged. The real intention of Laudon had been to assume this camp, that he might cut off the king from Neifs, and to afterward post himself on the heights of Woitz, Giesmansdorf, and Neudorf. By this he would have formed the investiture of the place on this side the river, while the Russians, passing the Oder at Oppeln, would arrive and surround it on the side of Upper Silesia, from Billau as far as the Carclau. The army of the king made but a short stay at Nossen, and advanced the same day to Carlowitz. On the morrow, it extended along a continuation of hills which go from Ottmachau, by Giesmansdorf, as far as Schilde. Laudon (23d) defeated in his attempt encamped at Ober Pomisdorf; and, either from native restlessness or a habit of commanding detachments, he six times in eight days changed his position, for which no possible good reason could be given.

The Russians however advanced to Wartenberg, whence they soon after further extended to Namslau. Ziethen, who observed them,  
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immediately approached Breslau; and afterward proceeded to cover Brieg. Soon after his departure from Breslau, the Polish suburb of that city was insulted by the Russians, which obliged the king to detach Knobloch with ten battalions and as many squadrons.

The Austrian army still continued in perpetual agitation. After having passed and repassed the Neisse, it encamped at the village of Baumgarten, near the Wartha. The king seized the moment, passed the Neisse, and took his position at Oppersdorf; whence he departed with a detachment for Neustadt. Bethlem here encamped with six thousand Austrians; and it was suspected Laudon intended to send him on the side of Oppeln, that he might succour marshal Butturlin, who, as it was believed, proposed to pass the Oder, that he might join the Austrian army. The van-guard of the king, consisting of hussars, attacked a regiment of the enemy, which it repulsed, and pursued under the cannon of Hennerdorf; where the Austrians had constructed redoubts.

Ziethen had passed the Oder at Brieg, and the Neisse at Schurgast. He afterward arrived from Steinau, and turned the right flank of Bethlem; who, hastily retiring to Jægerndorf, was pursued by Loffow, and driven from Jægerndorf,

gerndorf, through Troppau, beyond the Mora in Moravia. The enemy lost, at the assault of Neustadt, and during his retreat, between four and five hundred men. After having thus sent Bethlem to a distance, Ziethen established himself at Schnellwalde, and the king returned to his army; the left of which almost joined the detachment under Ziethen, and the right extended to the heights, fronting Oppersdorf. This expedition having rendered the junction of the enemies in Upper Silesia more difficult, there was but little probability that Butturlin would persevere in his intention of passing the Oder at Oppeln.

The motions of the army of the king threw that of the Austrians into new agitation. Laudon encamped at Weidenau; and on the morrow at Johannesberg, with which he was presently displeased; he finally passed the Neisse, and remained in the environs of Camenz.

During these different marches and counter-marches, the Russians extended themselves on the opposite shore of the Oder, where they pillaged and wasted the country. Intelligence was brought of the cruelties they committed. Their manœuvres were so obscure that it was impossible to divine whether it was their real intention to pass the Oder in Upper Silesia, or toward Ohlau;

Ohlau; or whether they meditated some siege: in a word there was no imagining what attempt it was they meditated.

As certitude could not be obtained (August) the king thought proper to prepare for every accident; and to send a corps between Breslau and Brieg, that might be in readiness to succour either of those places, and at the same time to observe the Oder. Knobloch departed with this intent for Grotkau, whence he might, in a few hours, arrive to the aid of either of these towns; and even, if it so should be necessary, to rejoin the army of the king.

The Russians had advanced to Hundsfeld, which is but a mile from Breslau; and, as this motion indicated they no longer meant to pass the Oder in Upper Silesia, the army of the king and the corps of Ziethen crossed the Neisse; and on the morrow, by a forced march, arrived at Strehlen, that they still might hold the centre between the two opposing armies, and impede their junction as long as possible. Butturlin had been led to hope that, by the aid of four thousand Austrian prisoners, then in Breslau, one of the city gates might be surprised; and that, should the Russians at the same time attack the Polish suburb which lies beyond the Oder, he might seize on this capital by a  
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coup de main. Czernichef was charged with the execution of the enterprize, and entered the suburb, which is unfortified, with some troops; but Tauenzien the governor had so well taken his measures that he overawed the prisoners, and repelled the Russians. Knobloch flew to his succour. The two generals made a vigorous sally on the enemy, and completely dislodged him from the remaining part of the suburb of which he still held possession.

Not yet satisfied with the precautions he had taken, the king further sent Platen with eleven battalions and fifteen squadrons to Rothenfirben; whence he was to pay strict attention to Breslau and the Oder, to speed to the succour of Tauenzien, if necessary, or send information of the part of the river at which the Russians should make preparations to pass.

The parties of the king, in the interim, gained intelligence (the 9th) that the Austrian army had encamped at Hunzendorf; and that the Russians had abandoned the vicinage of Breslau; on which the army quitted its position at Strehlen, and, by a forced march, arrived beyond the Schweidnitzer-Wasser, and Canth, where it was joined by the generals Platen and Knobloch. On the morrow (the 12th) the king changed the position of his army, and encamped

camped at Moys. Confused rumours ran through the camp respecting the Russians, who were said to have passed the Oder beside Auras. Some affirmed that some Cossacks only had passed; others spoke of a detachment from the army; and a third party pretended that Butturlin and the whole army had crossed. As this was intelligence of the utmost importance, every effort was made to learn the truth. Schmettau was detached to Neumarck, whence he expelled a body of Cossacks, and took some prisoners. Möllendorf, in like manner sent to reconnoitre at a village named Rock, also drove off a detachment of the enemy; but little information was obtained from the prisoners that were brought to the camp, for they had three days before passed the Oder by swimming, and had wholly occupied themselves with pillage: they did not so much as know what was become of general Butturlin or his army.

A motion made by Laudon, toward Striegau, occasioned the army of the king to occupy the hill of Leipe, with the right, and Eisdorf with the left. But, as the question whether the Russians had or had not passed the Oder still was undetermined, it was necessary, in order to procure positive intelligence, to detach a corps sufficiently strong to advance, and, by inspecting  
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the place, ascertain truth or falsehood. For this purpose the king sent Platen with forty squadrons and ten battalions, who was charged to reconnoitre toward Parchwitz. The king himself went to the regiment of Ziethen, encamped at the extremity of the right, that he might be a personal spectator, and judge whether it would be necessary to support Platen, whether he ought to retire, or what other measure might be best to take. Scarcely had he arrived before a cloud of Cossacks, to the number of three or four thousand, fell on the regiment of Ziethen, with those customary cries and clamours they send forth when they attack. A messenger was hastily dispatched to the army, with orders for the first regiments encamped on the right to advance, and in the mean time all necessary efforts for defence were made. The squadrons were divided into two parts, the better to guard their front, and cover their flanks. A subaltern officer with ten hussars were stationed in front of each troop, with orders to remain close and firm, and only to defend themselves by skirmishing, and discharging their carabines. Every time that the Cossacks made any pretence of falling on these small detached parties the squadrons in the rear sustained them, sabre in hand, and taking care not to engage.

This skirmish continued an hour and a half; but, as soon as the Cossacks perceived the distant succour advancing, they hastily took to flight, and retired on the side of Gros Wandris.

Whoever preserves a good countenance in presence of the Cossacks runs no great risk; for the regiment of Ziethen, very inferior in numbers, singly maintained itself against them, without having a hussar taken or wounded. Scarcely had the succour from the army joined the king before forty Austrian squadrons were seen in the plains of Jauer, advancing full trot toward Wahlstadt. Platen had repulsed the Russians, beyond Gros Wandris, the king had ordered Ziethen to follow with six battalions and ten squadrons for his support; and at length followed himself. When the troops attained the height of Wurgen, the head of the Austrian cavalry was seen, coming from the side of Wahlstadt. It was received with a tolerable fire from the artillery, and incontinently attacked by Reitzenstein, with the dragoons of Finck, and two squadrons of Czetteritz. After two reiterated charges, it was driven back to the defile it had left, and three hundred prisoners were taken. The Austrians fled in disorder to Jauer, and one single regiment joined But-  
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turlin, because that regiment had been the first to pass.

Chance would have it that the Cossacks themselves should aid on this occasion to vanquish the Austrians. The dragoons of the latter, that were in the van, were in a blue uniform. These the Cossacks supposed to be Prussians, and, while Reitzenstein attacked in front, the Russians took them in flank. Victorious over the Austrians, the Prussian cavalry afterward drove the Cossacks to the very camp in which Butturlin was intrenched. His army occupied the ground that lies between the village of Koschwitz and that of Kunzendorf. It had passed the Oder at Leubus; and had very diligently laboured to fortify itself in this post. The reasons why the king ought not to attack the Russians still continued the same. Their army was posted in a manner not to be forced, except by the sacrifice of great numbers, and the king had not a man too many. He had only been followed by twenty-four battalions and fifty-eight squadrons; the main body had remained with the margrave Charles, at the camp of Leipe, to preserve the rear of the king at liberty, and to more narrowly watch the motions of the Austrians. The distance of the  
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two corps however was so inconsiderable that they could join in less than two hours. Laudon was too distant from Leipe to attack the margrave unexpectedly. Let what would happen, the latter had time to send intelligence, and wait for support; and the tardiness of the Russians would permit the king, in case of necessity, to bring up the margrave Charles.

His majesty encamped between Klein, Wandris, and Wahlstadt; where he carefully intrenched his troops, that they might not suffer surprise, and an old redoubt was repaired at the Wurgenteich, the better to ascertain the communication of the two Prussian armies. On the morrow a new camp presented itself behind Jauer. It was not sufficient to know that this camp was Austrian, it was necessary to be informed with what view it had turned to that side. To effect this, an officer and three hussars, who understood a little Russian, assumed the disguise of Cossacks; and, early in the morning, glided into the camp of Jauer, under a pretence of having lost themselves, while going on the scout, for want of better knowing the roads. The Austrian officer on guard paid them every civility, and related that this was a detachment of six thousand men, under Brentano,

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commanded to cover the Austrian artillery, which Laudon had caused to advance hither, that it might be the more ready, should the Prussians attack the Russians, for the Austrians immediately to aid the latter, and that thus the destruction of the king might be ascertained by the two Imperial armies.

Butturlin decamped on the morrow, and passed near Lignitz, taking a position beside the village of Klein Eicke. Laudon imagined he had furnished the king with an opportunity of attacking the Russians on their march. The movement of Butturlin was made within cannon shot of the army, and over ground that did not appear difficult; but it was necessary not to depart from principles. The Russians passed unmolested; nor was their rear-guard even harassed. After the manœuvre they had made, it was impossible to oppose the junction with the Austrians. The latter kept on their guard; that they might give no advantage, Laudon had never quitted the foot of the hills, and had the address, on all occasions, to expose the allies of Austria to marches, and the most hazardous enterprises.

The most advantageous manner in which the king could act, in this situation, was to gain the heights of Kunzendorf by a forced march; because  
cause



cause that, if he could occupy this post before Laudon, the Austrian army would be cut off from its magazines, and the Russians, who could only subsist on the provisions furnished by the empress queen, would soon be obliged, for want of bread, to approach their own stores left in Poland. This project therefore, if happily executed, might entirely change the face of affairs, in Silesia, for the rest of the campaign.

The army of the king marched first, and the margrave, to gain time, immediately detached Knobloch, that he might seize on the Pitschenberg, at the foot of which the army must necessarily pass. This he occupied the same night; and on the morrow (the 20th) the whole army appeared in the environs of Jauernick and Bunzelwitz. But the proposed plan failed: Laudon had anticipated the king. He had the day before sent some twenty battalions of his army that were encamped at Kunzendorf. The heights of Kunzendorf form a post in which the troops that possess them cannot be forced. No coup de main could be attempted; and the more so because the Austrian army was discovered on the full march for this camp, to fill it in its whole extent.

Unable to act offensively, the army extended itself from the hill of Wurben to the village of

Zechen, where the right ended, a part of which was covered by the Nonnenbusch. Nothing hereafter could throw any impediments in the way of the Russians and Austrians, so as to affect their junction. It was foreseen that these two armies would shortly assemble in the vicinity of Schweidnitz. Under such circumstances the king must provide for the security of his camp, and for that of the fortrefs of Schweidnitz. He might assume a position at Pulzen, where nature seemed to have been at the whole expence of fortifying a camp. But, though the army might there find safety, there was danger that Laudon and Butturlin would besiege Schweidnitz, in the presence of the king and the whole army, which they could not prevent. For this reason the post of Bunzelwitz was preferred; because that it covered the place, and rendered a siege impracticable.

Still it was to be feared that the army of the two empresses would send a detachment for Breslau, which, obliging the king to quit the vicinage of Schweidnitz, would have given the enemy an opportunity to besiege the town. But to oppose all the enterprises that troops so superior might attempt was impossible: something must necessarily be left to chance. To ascertain, however, the position of the Prussian army, the  
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king intrenched his camp, as well in front as in flank and rear. This camp became a kind of place of arms, of which the hill of Wurben was as the citadel. From this height, as far as the village of Bunzelwitz, he was covered by a marsh. The heads of the villages of Bunzelwitz and Jauernick were fortified, and grand batteries erected there, the cross fire of which defended that front by which the king was liable to be attacked by Laudon: the Austrians would have been obliged to carry these two villages before they could have come to an engagement with the army. Between these villages, a little in the rear, the front of the infantry was covered by grand redoubts, supplied with a vast train of artillery. Passages had been made between them to give egress to the cavalry, if that should be found necessary. Beyond Jauernick, and behind the Nonnenbusch, four hills had been intrenched, which overlooked the whole ground, and before which ran a muddy and impracticable ditch, where the fire of the small arms would have prevented the enemy from establishing bridges. More to the right, a grand abatis intersected the Nonnenbusch, and was defended by chasseurs and free battalions. The muddy ditch, of which we have spoken, took a circuit behind the wood, and

to the foot of the hills on which the army was extended. At the extremity of the right the flank commenced, which, forming a parallel line with the rivulet of Striegau, ended at a wood covered by the defile that comes from Peterwitz. In this wood, which was on the back of the army, a masked battery had been erected, which communicated, behind an abatis, with another battery, situated at the extremity of the same wood, on the side of Neudorf; and here an intrenchment began, which joined the rear of the army, at the works that had been made on the height of Wurben. The intrenchments were every where sixteen feet thick, and the ditches twelve feet deep, and sixteen wide. The front was surrounded by strong palisades, and the salient parts of the works were mined. Before the mines pitfalls were dug, and before the pitfalls were chevaux de frise, which, contiguous and sunk in the earth, surrounded the whole exterior. The army of the king was composed of sixty-six battalions and a hundred and forty-three squadrons; four hundred and sixty pieces of artillery were dispersed among the different works, and a hundred and eighty-two loaded mines were ready to be sprung on the first signal given.

Time was not left to complete all these labours  
before

before marshal Butturlin appeared at the head of his Russians. (The 25th) He came and encamped at the foot of the heights of Hohenfriedberg, and two days after changed his position. The main body of these troops occupied the ground which leads from Oels to Striegau. Czernichef extended from Streitberg toward Nicklasdorf; Brentano took post on the left of the Russians, at Preilsdorf; and Berg with his Cossacks encamped at Laffen, whence he passed the rivulet of Striegau, and came on the back of the Prussian army. Beck, recently arrived from Lusatia, was posted between Oels and the Nonnenbusch, to ascertain the communication of the two Imperial armies. The position of the enemy, thus taken, formed a species of line of circumvallation, which surrounded two thirds of the Prussian camp.

Laudon then imagined he might quit the hills with impunity; and, descending into the plain, he extended his Austrians from Camerau, through Arnisdorf, to Cirlau. Between Camerau and Arnisdorf, he threw up an intrenchment, from which he proposed to come to the attack of the Prussians, and which might equally serve him for offence or, should he be obliged to retreat, for defence. This work was often interrupted by the Prussian artillery; however,



demonstrations so serious seemed to announce with certitude the resolution of the enemy to attack the army of the king, be the risk what it might. Laudon, the same day, made an attempt on the head of the village of Jauernick, where the resistance he found greatly surpassed his expectations. He summoned major Favrat, who commanded there, to surrender; and that officer replied in a tone such as might be expected from a man of honour, and such as constrained the general to desist from any obstinate pursuit of his purpose.

In the present expectation of an approaching battle, every necessary disposition was made for vigorous defence. By day little was to be feared, because of the infinite strength of the camp; but much by night, because of the great proximity of the armies. There was little appearance of misfortune to the Prussians; unless Laudon, under the favour of darkness, should surprise a part of the camp, when the troops, overcome by sleep, should want time to march to its defence. To prevent any such catastrophe, the tents were struck every evening; and the army, filling the intrenchments, passed the nights under arms.

Laudon was so much in the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz, by his posts of Camerau, Schönbunn,

brunn, and Böckendorf, that an intermediate detachment was obliged to be made between Schweidnitz and the army, to succour that place, should it be attacked, and to cover the convoys of the army, which drew its bread, forage and subsistence solely from that fortress. With this view, Gablenz proceeded, with a detachment of some battalions, beyond Tunkendorf, where his right was protected by the batteries of the camp, and his left by the artillery of Schweidnitz; and where he still further secured his position by good intrenchments, with which he covered his front.

On the same day the general officers received the disposition of the defence of the camp, and the manner in which each was to act in the quarter he commanded. However extensive the ground on which the Prussian army encamped might be, means were found to reduce it to three points of attack. The first of these lay between the villages of Bunzelwitz and Jauernick. This the king proposed to defend in person against Laudon who had constructed his approach, or his intrenchment, on that side. It was impossible for the Austrians to leave these villages fortified in their rear, and to pierce to the centre, because they must have sustained a heavy fire of artillery on both their flanks. It

was

was therefore to be presumed their first attempt would be to carry one of these two posts. The king resolved to suffer them to labour at effecting this, and not to send his cavalry upon them till they should have sustained some considerable loss. The troops of these villages might likewise be supported by fresh bodies of infantry, as long as it should be thought proper so to do; not to mention that sixty cannon, from lateral works, defended the approach.

The second point of attack was between the village of Zeschén and the wood, on the Prussian right flank: here Ziethen commanded. The Russians, who encamped in his presence; would probably be charged with this attempt. To arrive at the Prussians they must be obliged to pass the rivulet of Striegau, under the fire of the small arms and the cannon of the intrenchments, and must have lost their best infantry at the pass; without enumerating the multifarious obstacles that still remained to be overcome, before they could approach the intrenchments; so that some charges of cavalry, made a propos by general Ziethen, would have been sufficient to disperse them.

The third point of attack was on the side of Peterwitz, and of the defile which covered that part of the Prussian camp. This was defended  
by

by Ramin; and, according to all appearance, the attack must have been made by Czernichef and Brentano, because that their detachments were the nearest. It was determined to suffer the enemy peaceably to advance as far as the defile of Peterwitz, where he must be taken in flank by the masked battery of the wood, which might have played whole vollies of case shot upon him; after which Platen had orders to fall on his rear with forty squadrons; and a road through the wood had for that purpose been made, by which Platen was to advance.

The greatest strength of this camp consisted in depriving the enemy of three species of arms, which were all preserved to the Prussians. The assailants could not employ artillery, because that, all the environs of the intrenchment being infinitely lower than the ground on which it was thrown up, their cannon would have done no execution. Their cavalry was equally useless, for, if it did but make any little advance, it must have been overwhelmed by the fire of the batteries. And how were they effectually to employ their small arms? Were they to fire muskets against great guns? Could they tear up the chevaux de frise, and batter down the palisades with musket balls? It was certain therefore that every advantage of ground, position,  
and

and art, had been taken, in order to give one army a superiority over the other. After these dispositions had been made (September) the Prussians tranquilly waited the attempts of the enemy.

Soon after the arrival of marshal Butturlin, a Russian officer, who had lost himself by night, and imagined he had approached the guards of his camp, found himself in the midst of that of the Prussians. This man, not being artful, ingenuously related that the generals had resolved to attack the intrenchments of the king, on the first of September. True it is that Butturlin and Laudon had agreed on this attack, which would have taken place but for the following circumstances. Butturlin, who sat long at table after dinner, where wine was not spared, had in a moment of gaiety, glass in hand, consented to the proposal made by Laudon. The disposition of the three attacks had been reduced to writing, and sent to the principal officers of the armies who had the command, and Laudon returned to his camp, well satisfied with the Russians. Butturlin slept upon it; and awaking consulted his prudence, and countermanded the orders that had been given; because that he feared, with some reason, the Austrians would sacrifice his army, and would not sustain him;  
and



and that, should the enterprize be unsuccessful, the blame and the shame would remain with the Russians. In lieu of the grand projects that had been imagined at noon, he contented himself with throwing a few bombs toward the Prussian camp, which did not reach it by some hundreds of paces.

Laudon was informed of this sudden change, and became furious. Couriers were dispatched to Vienna, and the generals testified their coldness. Things however remained as they were, except that Laudon made the corps of Draskowitz approach Wartha, and place itself on the heights of Ludwigsdorf. The remainder of the time, till the 10th of September, was employed by the armies in looking at each other, at which time Butturlin decamped, and took the road to Jauer, because that the Austrians had not magazines sufficiently copious, nor herds numerous enough, to supply him with bread and viands. Laudon, who imagined he should expose himself, should he remain on the plain after the departure of the Russians, retreated to the mountains, and resumed his former position of Kunzendorf.

The king, on the same day, detached Platen for Breslau, with the corps that he had continually commanded, under pretence of escorting  
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a convoy to the army. His real destination was to pass the Oder; and, by forced marches, to ruin the grand magazine the Russians possessed, in a small town, in the palatinate of Posen, named Koublin; then to join the prince of Wurtemberg, who might stand in need of his aid; and finally, when the campaign in Pomerania should terminate, to join prince Henry in Saxony.

Platen destroyed the magazine of Koublin, took five thousand waggons, five battalions, forty-two officers, and seven cannon. He thence advanced to Posen, where he ruined all that appertained to the Russians; after which he pursued his march toward Pomerania and Colberg. This expedition hastened the retreat of Butturlin, and made him renounce all ideas which he might have entertained of penetrating into the electoral March. He hastened to cross the Oder (the 17th) and regain Poland. The corps of Czernichef did not accompany him. This amounted to nearly twenty thousand men, and was to remain with Laudon; the empress of Russia being desirous of affording the empress queen this singular mark of friendship.

Had subsistence permitted the army of the king to maintain the camp of Bunzelwitz, the campaign would have passed away in Silesia,  
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and the formidable preparations of the enemy would have produced no remarkable event. But the magazine of Schweidnitz, which had supplied the army with provisions during a great part of the campaign, began to be exhausted : the provisions that there remained would not suffice for more than a month. The king durst not further enfeeble the army, by new detachments, after the departure of Platen : his grand deposits were at Breslau, and less than ten thousand men might not safely escort convoys from that city to the camp. These reasons, maturely weighed, made him resolve to approach Neiss with the army, where provisions and forage were found in abundance, and whence the enemy might be inspired with apprehensions, as well for the county of Glatz as for Moravia ; which might draw Laudon to that side, and thus remove the Russians and Austrians from Schweidnitz. In consequence of this arrangement, the army took the camp of Pulzen, where it remained some days. The king left five complete battalions in Schweidnitz, with the convalescent men of the army, and a hundred dragoons. The governor, Zastrow, was enjoined to use every precaution and vigilance, that might frustrate those attempts which the enemy should form in the absence of the Prussian army.

On the 20th, the king assumed the camp of Siegroth, and, on the 29th, that of Nossen, near Munsterberg; where he stopped that he might judge, by the manœuvring of the enemy, what part would be taken. Laudon immediately sent detachments to reinforce the posts of Silberberg and Wartha; but his army, strengthened by Czernichef, was so numerous that the want of twenty or thirty thousand men would not impede his acting in what manner he should think proper.

At Nossen, on the first of October, the king received intelligence that the Austrians had taken Schweidnitz, by a coup de main. However incredible this news might appear it was not the less true. The attack had been concerted and executed in the following manner.

There were about five hundred prisoners in the place, among whom one of the most considerable was a major Roca, a partisan officer, and an Italian by birth. This major conceived the project of surrendering the place in which he was imprisoned to the Austrians. With this view, he had the address to insinuate himself so highly into the favour of the governor that the latter granted him more freedom than it was proper to grant a prisoner, especially when the town in which he is detained is surrounded by enemies.

enemies. Roca walked round the works; knew the situation of all the guards, and all the detachments; observed the various negligences that were committed in the service of the garrison; lived openly with every body, and often was in company with the Austrian soldiers, his fellow prisoners: he further intrigued in the town, spared no bribes, and gave exact information to Laudon of all he had seen, heard, and had himself invented, to secure him the town of Schweidnitz.

Laudon formed his project of surprise according to the intelligence sent by this major; and, on the night of the last of September, he executed this project in the manner we are going to relate. Twenty battalions were distributed for four attacks; one to be made on the gate of Breslau, another on the gate of Striegau, a third on the fort of Böckendorf, and the fourth on the fort of Eau. Zastrow had been at a ball; yet, as he had some suspicions, he ordered the garrison to arms in the evening, and stationed it in the works: but he committed the errors of not giving the officers instructions how they were to act; of not sending his cavalry on the scout, to a certain distance; of not throwing fire balls to give light in the country; and

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in fine, of being too negligent in all parts of his duty.

The Austrians advanced, and arrived at the very palisades before they were discovered. In the whole defence there were not above twelve vollies \* from the artillery, and the fire of the small arms was so feeble, that the enemy might act as he pleased. The guard of the gate of Striegau was surprised: from that they penetrated into the works. Amid the confusion, the Austrian prisoners rose, seized on the inner gate of the town, and opened it to the first troops of the enemy that approached. In less than an hour the Austrians were wholly masters of the place. De Beville, who commanded at the redoubt of the Eau, was the only officer who stood firm, till all resource was lost, and every means of defence fled. A powder magazine, having been blown up by accident, in the fort of Böckendorf, occasioned the Austrians to suffer some loss; which excepted, the place was taken without cost.

A misfortune so unforeseen deranged every measure of the king; his projects must be abandoned, his plans changed, and for the rest of the campaign he had but to endeavour to pre-

\* *Douze coups de canon.* It should mean, there were only twelve shot fired, yet the circumstance appears strange. T.  
serve

serve what fortresses and ground he could, against so great a superiority of opponents. The army marched to Strehlen, where it fixed its abode, that it might equally cover Neiß, Brieg, and Breslau. The king had taken the precaution of entrenching a camp near Breslau. His first intention had been to employ this for those detachments that might occasionally approach the capital, where they might maintain themselves against the enemy, till the arrival of the royal army. Under the king's present circumstances, this camp might be employed for the army itself; and to obtain it the Prussians had one march less than the enemy.

From this time the king found himself restrained rigorously to the defensive; but it was necessary Laudon should not suspect his design, for the secret known would have given him the advantage over the Prussians. The better to disguise his intentions, the king issued orders to the army to prepare for battle; to reload the muskets and sharpen their sword-blades, and that sufficient ammunition should be distributed to the artillery. Grand preparations and grand projects were spoken of, and the known Austrian spies, that were in the army, immediately departed to carry the intelligence to Laudon. It perhaps may appear incredible to posterity

that this army of Austrians and Russians, encamped on the hills of Kunzendorf, three days march from the Prussians, passed eight nights under arms, in momentary expectation of an attack.

Czernichef strongly pressed the Austrian general to march for Breslau. Reasons of war and politics required he should act thus; for Laudon, by leading his grand army into the plain, would have outwinged the Prussians on every side, must have overwhelmed them, and have acquired the glory of terminating the war. His excuse to Czernichef was, that he could not advance so far into the country, because his subsistence would fail; as also would his draught-horses. Laudon concealed the true reason that impeded activity: he dreaded exposing himself on the plain, because that the Austrians had there so often been beaten; beside, as he had no support, no protectors, at the court of Vienna, he would run no risks. He was satisfied with the fame he had acquired by the capture of Schweidnitz, and continued on the mountains perfectly inactive.

Toward the close of October, affairs were so greatly on the decline, in Pomerania, that the king could not avoid sending new succours. Schenkendorf departed (November) with six  
battalions

battalions and ten squadrons. The use made of this detachment will presently be seen.

The king maintained his position of Strehlen till the tenth of December, when the troops entered into winter quarters. Laudon had already sent back the detachment of O'Donnel into Saxony, and cantoned his troops among the mountains. The Russians had entered the county of Glatz. The Prussians, on their part, had thrown the regiment of Bernburg into Neiss. Wied wintered in the vicinage of Grotkau, with ten battalions and as many squadrons. The environs of Breslau were occupied by twenty battalions and forty squadrons; and Zeunert marched to Glogau; that the place, during winter at least, might be free from insult. Schmettau departed with some cavalry for Guben, in order to ascertain the communication between Berlin and the army in Saxony.

After having uninterruptedly narrated what passed this year in Silesia, we shall now take a retrospect of such events as happened in Pomerania. The prince of Wurtemberg had entered the camp of Colberg, on the 4th of June, where he was joined, on the 7th of the same month, by Thadden. The Prussians, by their position, surrounded Colberg in such a manner that the two wings of the

entrenchment extended to the Baltic. The river of Persante covered the right of the camp; and the centre, which was the most easy of approach, was defended by good entrenchments. Werner had been detached to Cöslin, from which he retired at the approach of Romanzow, who advanced at the head of twelve thousand Russians, and who chose his first position at the Gollenberg.

All remained quiet till the 20th of August, when the Russian and Swedish combined fleets appeared before Colberg, approached the port, and warmly cannonaded the batteries of the Prussians, by whom the port and the shore were defended. Romanzow (September 4th) took this opportunity to approach the prince of Wurtemberg, and encamped at the distance of a quarter of a league from the Prussians. The prince had hitherto nothing to fear; but, instead of storing his magazines as abundantly as had been recommended to him, he spared even the environs of his camp, where he knew the Russians were to arrive; and, in general, the little attention that had been paid to subsistence was the cause of all the misfortunes that happened in Pomerania. The first consequence of this was that he detached Werner to husband his provisions; and perhaps likewise because they could



not agree. Werner marched to Treptow, and had the imprudence to canton his men. They were surpris'd by the Ruffians; he was made prifoner, and nearly five hundred horfe of his corps had the fame ill fortune.

Encouraged by fuccefs, the Ruffians, on the night of the 17th of September, endeavour'd to carry a free battalion, which was pofted in the front of the left of the Pruffians, in a redoubt fo diftant from the camp that it was even beyond cannon-shot. The enemy paffed a marfh which had been fupposed impracticable, becaufe it had not been examined, attacked the redoubt through the ftrait, and took the two hundred men placed there for its defence. Still more inflated by thefe fmall advantages, Romanzow imagined it depended only on himfelf to carry the Pruffian intrenchments, whenever he fhould think proper to make the attempt. He approached the green redoubt, which was erected toward the centre of the prince of Wurtemberg, opened his trenches, eftablifhed batteries, as at a regular fievege, made a formal attack, on the 19th, and carried the redoubt. Scarcely had he fixed himfelf there before colonel Kleift, at the head of the grenadiers, diflodged him with the lofs of eleven hundred men. This redoubt was

placed, contrary to rule, three thousand paces distant from the intrenchment, from which it was separated by a ravin ; but, though it stood thus apart and defenceless, the Russians disturbed it no more, discouraged by the loss they had already suffered.

Platen (October) after having taken the magazine of Koublin, then traversed the new March, whence he inclined immediately toward Cörlin, and took a detachment of three hundred Russians; but this made no impression on Romanzow, who remained quiet in his camp. The prince of Wurtemberg required Platen to come on the rear of the enemy, while he should attack him in front ; but, by a fatality common to all armies, the opinions of the two generals corresponded in no instance. Platen marched toward Spie, and encamped on the right of the prince, on the Kauzenberg. Their approach did but increase their misunderstanding.

Platen however had been closely followed by generals Fermor and Berg; the latter, with ten thousand Cossacks and dragoons, posted himself at Greiffenberg. On the other part, the approach of winter would not permit the combined fleets of the Swedes and Russians any longer to keep the sea. Each retired toward its own ports, and two frigates only were left in the  
road

road of Colberg, to block up the harbour. These were sufficient to keep off the transports, the entrance of which into the harbour was become an urgent necessity. Unable to procure subsistence by sea, the prince of Wurtemberg wished to convey it by land, from Stettin; and to this effect he detached Platen, in order to escort the convoys. The general directed his route through Treptow and Stuchow to Gollnow; in this camp he had a defile before him, which he passed with a regiment of hussars and two battalions. These were immediately attacked by Fermor, who was there with his whole division, and they were beaten and made prisoners. After this misfortune, Platen retired to Damm; and the enemy destroyed the convoy he was sent to protect.

Not knowing what had passed at Gollnow, the prince of Wurtemberg again detached Knobloch to Treptow, with three battalions and five hundred horse, to escort the convoy which he supposed was to arrive there, but which was already taken. Scarcely had Knobloch arrived at his place of destination before he was surrounded by nine thousand Russians, and taken for want of ammunition and subsistence, after he had bravely defended himself for three days.

Profit-

Profiting by the faults and misfortunes of the Prussians, the foe next blockaded the prince of Wurtemberg in such a manner that Platen, who could not join him, retired on the side of Stargard, and was followed by general Berg.

Informed of the deplorable state of affairs in Pomerania, the king, as we have before said, sent thither Schenkendorf and Anhalt. It was no longer possible to revictual the magazines of Colberg. The last convoy the Russians had taken contained all the horses the provinces were able to supply. The Russians, beside, were so superior in numbers, and had detached so many troops, between Colberg and Stettin, that it was morally impossible a convoy should pass. It was therefore necessary to regard the place as lost, and to save the troops of the prince of Wurtemberg; because, under the present gloomy aspect of affairs, nothing better could be effected.

No diligence of Schenkendorf could bring him up with Platen sooner than the 10th of November, on which day the generals joined between Pyritz and Arenswalde, whence they marched to Greiffenberg, where they found themselves in the presence of Jacobles, who had been detached from the grand army. While Platen held him in awe, the prince of Wurtemberg

berg quitted his camp, on the night of the 14th; and, marching along the shore of the Baltic, arrived at Treptow, without meeting an enemy on his route. The prince joined the corps by which he had been released; and, after their union, they attempted once more to dislodge the Russians from the neighbourhood of Colberg, by coming upon their rear. Having observed they could not effect their purpose by this manœuvre, they advanced, on the 12th of December, toward Spie; attacked the redoubt of Drenow, carried it, and took the troops by which it was defended. They would have obtained further advantages, had not the whole Russian army presented itself in the very camp the Prussians had occupied. As they knew the impossibility of carrying the intrenchments of the enemy, they fell back to Greiffenberg; whence, having heard that famine had obliged the garrison of Colberg to surrender, they retired to Stettin. The prince of Wurtemberg drew a line behind the Oder, to cover Stettin; Thadden departed for Lusatia, Platen for Saxony, and the prince took the road of Mecklenbourg.

We have been engaged by objects so important that we have made no mention of the Swedish army, or of Belling, who made head against  
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it with fifteen hundred hussars and two battalions. Ehrenschwerd with the Swedes had passed the Peene, on the 19th of July. Belling, who was at Malchin, being informed that a corps of Swedes encamped at Bartow, attacked it, and took a hundred men, and three cannon. (August 5th) He next fell on Hefenstein, who was at Röpenack, where he captured six hundred men, and six cannon. The same commander was another time beaten, and lost three hundred men.

These petty advantages did not prevent the Swedish army from advancing into the Uckerane march. A corps of six thousand Swedes, coming from Treptow, on the Tollenfee, approached to attack Belling; but he put himself in ambuscade, fell unexpectedly on the foe, and took near six hundred men. The prince of Bevern, who saw the advance of the Swedes, in despite of the vigorous resistance of Belling, sent him a reinforcement of three battalions; and at the same time he was joined by Stutterheim, and some troops from the army of prince Henry. With this additional strength, Belling attacked a corps of Swedes, posted at Rebelow, and made some prisoners. Ehrenschwerd, that he might take his revenge, marched on the  
morrow

morrow to Gollnow. Belling, who was there, having received intelligence of the enemy's intent, once more, by the aid of an ambuscade, attacked, threw him into disorder, and retreated to Rebelow; whence he inclined to Kuhblanck, and the Swedes to Friedland. Belling marched to meet them, engaged the cavalry of Sprengport, which constituted the van-guard of the corps, and was victorious. (September 9th) He then turned toward Löckenitz, where this indefatigable general fell on the Swedes, intrenched at Friedland. His want of infantry and artillery would not permit him to attack the intrenchment; and he remained satisfied with carrying off the grand guard of forty dragoons. We seem to be writing the history of Amadis de Gaul, speaking of the progress of Belling, who was for ever fighting, and never to be found in the same place. His infantry was at Pafewalk, and he had posted himself at Ferdinandshof. The Swedes advanced, the Prussian drove their van-guard upon the infantry, forced them to retire, and on the morrow engaged in a new combat, in which the enemy lost five hundred men. (October)

The prince of Bevern, obliged to send convoys to Colberg, then withdrew the battalions he had sent to Belling. This general himself

received orders to approach Berlin, which was threatened by a corps of Austrians that was in Lusatia. He departed, it is true (November) but, as he found that the rumour had no foundation in truth, he marched back to meet the Swedes, where he waited to gather new laurels. The campaign in these parts was dragged on to the sixth of December, when Ehrenschwerd quitted Demmin, and approached Stralsund. Nothing happened on the banks of the Peene, except some trifling skirmishes.

When the prince of Wurtemberg marched toward Mecklenbourg, Belling led the van. At Malchin he found a garrison, which he kept blockaded till the prince of Wurtemberg came up. The place might have been carried sword in hand, but the troops were in a shattered state, the regiments half melted away, and overwhelmed with fatigue; and it was beside necessary to preserve the men for better occasions. For these reasons the town was only cannonaded; though it would have been taken, had not Ehrenschwerd, informed of the danger of his troops, speeded to their relief with his whole army (January the 3d). He withdrew the garrison of Malchin, and again took the route to Stralsund. The troops on each part went into winter quarters; the Swedes near Stralsund, and  
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the Prussians in the duchy of Mecklenbourg, in the environs of Schwerin and Rostock.

We have said that general Platen was on the full march for Saxony, and it is now proper to relate what passed this year in the army of prince Henry. We left his royal highness in the camp of Meissen and Katzenhæuser; marshal Daun at his camps of the Windberg and Dippoldiswalda; and the army of the circles between Hof and Plauen. The prince, who was to observe the marshal, and follow him should he march into Silesia, proposed not to quit the banks of the Elbe, that he might pass the river at the same time with the enemy. Meantime, to keep the Austrians in breath, and to reduce them in some manner to the defensive, the prince harassed or attacked every detachment Daun sent from his army, however trifling the distance. Among others, Kleist dislodged four regiments of Saxon dragoons, near Freyberg, who gave indications of intending to take post there. After having pursued them toward Dippoldiswalda, he profited by the opportunity, and suddenly fell on the corps of Törrek, at Marienberg, whom he obliged to take refuge in Bohemia. Seidlitz, on his part, pursued Ried; who abandoned his position of Kesselsdorf, and hastily retreated to the camp of the Windberg.

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The Austrians tranquilly endured these petty bravadoes, and treated them as trifles; not troubling themselves to take any revenge.

Daun remained inactive till the opening of the campaign in Silesia, confining his efforts to cut off all immediate communication between the two Prussian armies. To this effect he detached Laschy (July 16th) who passed the Elbe, and took post at the village of Dobberitz, near Grossenhayn. By this the marshal obliged the Prussian couriers to take circuits, that their dispatches might arrive in safety. This inconvenience, at that time, was of little consequence; but another more considerable one might result; which was that, should Daun undertake to march into Silesia, the prince must be obliged to pass the Elbe lower down, by which he would at least lose a march, and would have found Laschy in his road, which might have rendered the traversing of Lusatia difficult. He however imagined the marshal had another meaning, and that the motion of Laschy was that a junction might be formed with the Russians, or that some new incursion might be made into the electoral march.

It was impossible his highness should oppose so many attempts at once; and he contented himself with sending Röbel, with a troop of hussars,



huffars, to Torgau, that he might there observe the motions of Lascy, and make his report. To prevent any expedition of the enemy against the capital, he cantoned a part of his troops between Strehla and Leimbach, by which he gained a march, should he find it necessary to cover Berlin. These troops, concealed from Daun, might aid in sending detachments unsuspected, of which it would be difficult for the enemy to obtain information. An occasion like this soon presented itself. Kleefeld, with a corps of the circles, had advanced to Penig. The prince sent Kleist to oblige him to quit this post. Scarcely was he repulsed before he returned, only to be repulsed a second time.

The king was so occupied between the Austrians and Russians that it was with difficulty he could, with all his troops, make any head against the superiority of his foes. The prince, his brother, imagined Belling had need of succour, that he might more successfully oppose such enterprises as the Swedes might form in future. From his army only could troops be detached into those parts, for Daun had hitherto remained tranquil. The prince therefore sent the younger Stutterheim, with four battalions, to join Belling. We have lately seen the use that was made of these

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troops.

troops. The reason that principally determined his highness to make this detachment was, that there might be troops ready for the defence of the capital, should that be necessary, against any incursion of small corps, because that the garrison of Berlin only then consisted of two feeble battalions of militia.

(August 29th) A war of skirmishes still continued in Saxony to be carried on by the Prussians. Kleist a second time beat a corps of the enemy, near Freyberg, and Seidlitz defeated a large body of cavalry, near Pretschendorf. In the interim, the troops of the circles began to move. Serbelloni, their commander, had advanced to Romburg; and, as he might thence turn the flank of the Prussians with facility, prince Henry sent Seidlitz against him, with five battalions and fifteen squadrons. This general manœuvred with so much art and capacity, and inspired Serbelloni with so many fears for the army under his command, that the latter thought it his duty to retire toward Hof in the empire.

The French army at this time made some progress. The corps of the count de Lutace had penetrated through Einbeck, into the electorate of Hanover, and menaced the town of Wolfenbüttel. As the feebleness of the garri-  
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son made it apprehended that vigorous defence was impossible, his royal highness sent colonel Bohlen thither, with fifteen hundred men. The colonel would have thrown himself into the place; but the governor, Stammer, who commanded there for the duke, would not permit him to enter. Bohlen consequently retired, and two days after it was taken.

When the Saxons had thus captured Wolfenbittel, Serbelloni sent general Luzinsky to join them, with six thousand men, who took post toward the Saale, and seized on Halle. (October 11th) The prince sent Seidlitz to oppose him; who, passing through Dessau and Bernburg, endeavoured there to prohibit the foe entering the dutchy of Magdebourg. But the count de Lusace had already evacuated Wolfenbittel, and retreated into Hesse; and Luzinsky had fallen back to the army of the circles; so that Seidlitz, finding himself useless in those parts, returned to rejoin prince Henry.

Scarcely were affairs re-established on the side of Lower Saxony before the departure of Buturlin, out of Silesia, caused it to be feared he would march immediately to Berlin, as the Russians had done during the preceding campaign. To observe the motions of this army, the prince detached Podewils for Furstenwalde,

with eight hundred horse; but the expedition of Platen to Koublin would not suffer the Russians to pursue this plan, if they ever had it in contemplation, and the capital was relieved from its fears.

(October 16th) The Austrians at length awoke from their slumbers. Marshal Daun confined his operations to the extending his troops over that chain of hills in Saxony which are on the confines of Bohemia. This was to remain satisfied with a village, when a kingdom might be obtained. Haddick departed with a considerable corps from Dippoldiswalda, and took post at Freyberg; while the marshal gave the alarm to all the Prussian posts on the Tripsche, that his highness might be prevented from making any powerful attempt on Haddick. The late motion of the Austrians brought them immediately on the right flank of the camp, which occupied the Katzenhæuser. To obviate this inconvenience, the prince changed his position, and prepared an intrenched camp at the Peterberg, the command of which he conferred on Seidlitz.

(November) The operations of the Austrians ended in Silesia, as we have already said, by the capture of Schweidnitz. Laudon, feeling himself sufficiently in force, by the aid of the Russians

fians under Czernichef, who were at his command, sent Campitelli into Saxony with a corps which O'Donnel had brought him from Lusatia. This general passed the bridge of Dresden, on the first of November; whence he was sent to Freyberg, to reinforce Haddick among the mountains. Daun on this, quitted his camp (the 5th) of the Windberg, and advanced, in full force, on the front of the Prussian army. The day was passed in a reciprocal cannonade, and some skirmishes between corps of infantry belonging to the two armies. The Prussians repulsed the enemy who wished to dislodge them from the passage of the Tripsche, which they defended. While the marshal alarmed the Prussians, Haddick advanced on the banks of the Mulde, where he established himself from Nossen and Döbeln to Rosswein.

These posts behind the Mulde, which the Austrians occupied, are very difficult of access. There are continued heights over the whole extent of the ground; and the bed of the river, by being hollowed in the rock, prevents any passage except over stone bridges, which are to be found at three places. Prince Henry, not being sufficiently in force to dislodge an enemy superior in numbers from a position so advantageous, satisfied himself with intrenching the



posts his army occupied, that he might maintain himself there during winter. The Prussians had the art to make themselves so much respected, by the enemy, that all the detachments sent by Haddick, beyond the Mulde, were repulsed or beaten.

The king had flattered himself that the campaign of the Russians in Pomerania would neither be long nor dangerous, and had destined Platen for Saxony. But affairs, as we have said, took an ill turn; and the general could not join the army of his highness before the 11th of January. Scarcely had he arrived at Altenburg and Naumburg, there to take up his quarters, before the army of the circles advanced to put themselves in possession of the same places. Platen ceded the ground he could not defend. On retiring, colonel Stojentin, of the regiment of young Brunswick, was attacked by four thousand men; and he defended himself so well that he gained Meuschwitz, without suffering any other loss than that of the sick, whom he could not bring off from Altenburg.

The Prussians maintained their position during the whole winter. They suffered frequent alarms from the vicinity of the two armies; but, happen what might, it was so important to preserve Saxony, under the desperate circumstances  
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of the Prussian affairs, at this time, that his royal highness, to effect that purpose, ran every risk. He owed his success less to the strength of his army than to his excellent dispositions, constancy, and fortitude.

To finish the picture of the year, we still have to relate the operations that happened between the army of the allies and that of France. We left prince Ferdinand at Paderborn; the hereditary prince at Munster; prince de Soubise on the Lower Rhine; marshal de Broglio at Cassel; and the count de Lutace in the vicinity of Eisenach. The prince de Soubise opened the campaign, by inclining toward Dortmund, while de Broglio assembled different corps, that menaced the Dimel. Prince Ferdinand left Spörcken on the Dimel, with orders to retire to Lippstadt, should the enemy come upon him in full force, and the army of the allies advanced toward the prince de Soubise.

This army of the Lower Rhine had marched for Unna. The hereditary prince approached Hamm; and prince Ferdinand, receiving news that de Soubise had sent a corps forward, under the command of the prince de Condé, called in the hereditary prince, attacked this van-guard, and obliged it to fall back to the main army. The prince found the French (July the 2d) too well intrenched to hazard an attack, and

marched for Dortmund to turn their camp. On the evening, arriving at the bridge of Kurle, he was there attacked by the French, whom he repulsed with loss. The new position of the allies would have given inquietude to the prince de Soubise, for his subsistence, had not de Broglie come to his succour, from the Dimel. On the approach of the French, Spörken retired, with some loss; but instead of marching to Lippstadt, according to orders, he fell back on Hamm. The prince de Soubise then joined de Broglie with all speed; and the two armies met at Paderborn. Prince Ferdinand pursued de Soubise, and there were some skirmishes with the rear-guard, but nothing happened decisively. De Broglie left the count de Lutace at Paderborn, to cover the magazines he had formed there, and the two French armies encamped at Söft.

While these armies and that of the allies were in motion, a partisan, appertaining to the latter, named Freytag, carried off three convoys of flour, destined for the enemy, between Cassel and Warburg. This loss so far distressed the French that they were obliged to employ ten days in bringing up subsistence, and in re-establishing order in the administration of their provisions.

Prince

Prince Ferdinand profited by this inactivity to fix his camp securely between the Afpe and the Lippe; and at the same time provided for the security of Lippstadt, by sending Wangenheim thither, at the head of six battalions, where he was soon after joined by Spörken. On the 15th of July the two French marshals advanced upon prince Ferdinand. Their army, forming a semicircle, embraced the whole circumference of his camp; for they had their two wings on the Lippe. De Broglio immediately forced the post of Nellen, defended by English grenadiers; and, inflated with his success, he attacked a small wood, before the village of Villinghausen, which was occupied by the British legion, who supported their post with too much bravery to suffer themselves to be dislodged. Toward six in the evening, the battle appeared as if it would become general; and would so have become had it not been prevented by the darkness of the night.

The fire recommenced on the morrow, as soon as light appeared. De Soubise attacked the part where the hereditary prince commanded, and endeavoured to force a village; but was impeded by the vigorous defence of a redoubt. De Broglio, on his side, made his efforts against prince Ferdinand. These efforts were feeble,  
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and the prince, perceiving during the contest some fluctuation in the French infantry which denoted incertitude and discouragement, profiting by this like a great general, and having been joined by Wangenheim, left his post with sixteen battalions, who audaciously charged the troops of de Broglio, broke them, and compelled them to take to flight. This unexpected blow obliged the two marshals to desist. The French lost six thousand men: the loss of the allies did not exceed two thousand, because that they were well posted, and victorious.

After the battle, de Soubise separated from de Broglio, and approached the Rhur; while the latter inclined toward Paderborn. The hereditary prince followed de Soubise, marching for the Harstrang, that he might prevent the latter passing the Rhur; and prince Ferdinand accompanied de Broglio. This French army extended, behind the Weser, from Paderborn to Hameln, and began to fortify itself at Höxter, where it formed a magazine of provisions and ammunition, and gave it to be suspected that there was a design to besiege Hameln. Prince Ferdinand therefore detached Luckner thither; and, as he could not prevent the siege but by giving de Broglio inquietude elsewhere, he sent Wangenheim and Wuthenow to penetrate



trate into the country of Waldeck; where they defeated a detachment of the foe, near Stadtberg. De Broglie was obliged by this expedition to weaken his centre; for which prince Ferdinand only waited, that he might march through Dalbrück and Detmold to Reilkirchen.

Surprised by a manœuvre so unexpected, the French put themselves in motion, and arrived at the foot of the heights of Reilkirchen, so celebrated by the defeat of Varus. Here they found the Germans too secure to be assaulted with impunity, and retired for Neheim and Steinheim. Luckner then marched into the district of Solling, where he attacked and beat a corps under the command of de Belfunce, between Göttingen and Höxter.

Prince Ferdinand, desirous of coming to action, and not finding himself sufficiently strong in his present position, called in the hereditary prince. This prince came upon the rear of the French army, and obliged marshal de Broglie to send de Stainville to oppose his attempts. The French, to disengage themselves from the allies, by whom they were surrounded, attacked the small town of Horn, before the right of prince Ferdinand; but some English brigades, advancing to maintain this post, made them abandon their project. Discouraged by ill success,

cess, and disgusted by the obstacles he had every where to encounter, de Broglio renounced the siege of Hameln, and only thought of transporting his provisions from Höxter, where he passed the Weser, over three bridges. The allies followed, but could obtain no advantage.

The junction of the hereditary prince with the army of the allies, while it favoured the affairs of Lower Saxony, was injurious to those of the Lower Rhine. Here his presence became necessary, and hither he was obliged to return. On his march, he forced the prince de Condé to raise the siege of Hamm. The French retired to Munster, where they joined de Soubise, who blockaded that town. The hereditary prince, that he might relieve Munster, suddenly invested the town of Dorsten, and captured the garrison, who laid down their arms. By this acquisition, the prince, being in the neighbourhood of Wesel, could prevent the arrival of convoys to the French army. This expedition threw so many difficulties in the way of the prince de Soubise that he determined to raise the blockade of Munster, and retire through Dulmen for Halteren.

After the departure of the hereditary prince for Lower Saxony, de Broglio, finding himself more at his ease, advanced on Eimbeck, and  
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the Leine ; which occasioned prince Ferdinand to divide his army. The half of this he left on the Weser ; and with the other half he inclined to the Dimel, that he might thence fall on the corps of de Stainville. The general foresaw the intentions of the prince, hastily retired, and threw himself into the intrenched camp that had been prepared near Caffel. The attempt having failed, through the activity of de Stainville, prince Ferdinand made arrangements to seize on Munden ; by which de Broglio was so much terrified that he hastened thither with the half of his army. The allies at his approach fell back for Geismar, and de Broglio, finding his men useless at Munden, sent some reinforcements to de Stainville (October) and returned with the remainder of his troops to Eimbeck. There was no longer any fear that de Soubise would besiege Munster, because the season was too much advanced ; and, as the detachment of the hereditary prince was become more necessary in Lower Saxony than in Westphalia, prince Ferdinand sent him orders to join his army on the Dimel. On his arrival, the allies advanced toward de Stainville, who again retired ; and de Broglio a second time hastened to his succour, with a part of his troops ; for he had left his main army in the district of Solling, extending

tending from Holzmunden to Lamforde. Perceiving their plan disconcerted, the allies entered the principality of Waldeck, which might supply them more amply with subsistence than Hesse. De Broglie, having observed that the manœuvres of the allies consisted only in diversions, that they might impede his plans, determined to make a diversion himself; and sent the count de Lusace, with eight or nine thousand Saxons, into the dutchy of Brunswick, to besiege Wolfenbittel. The town having surrendered without any great resistance, the count de Lusace turned toward Brunswick, which he invested. Luckner, who had been sent by prince Ferdinand to succour Wolfenbittel, arrived too late; but, having been joined by prince Frederic of Brunswick, this youthful prince, inspired with a noble ambition, and ardent in the cause of honour, made his first essay by forcing the post which the enemy held at the village of Oelper; then threw himself into Brunswick, occasioned the siege to be raised, and hastened the evacuation of Wolfenbittel. Thus Alexander, while yet a boy, in the army of his father Philip, vanquished the Athenians, with the wing of cavalry under his command.

Detachments however did not impede the grand armies from continuing their activity.

Marshal

Marshal de Broglie had fortified the post of Duderstadt (November) had ordered de Stainville to incline to Jessen, had placed some brigades to guard Eimbeck, and had sent de Chabot to occupy the defiles of Eschershausen, with a detachment of ten thousand men. Had prince Ferdinand permitted the enemy to maintain this position, during the winter, his advantages, at the commencement of the next campaign, would have been too evident. This determined him to pierce through the centre of the ground occupied by the French army. For this purpose, the hereditary prince and lord Granby (the 5th) passed the Leine, and took post near a height, in the vicinage of Eimbeck, named the Huve. Prince Ferdinand on his part passed the Weser, on the 4th, at Tundern, and advanced upon M. de Chabot, who had the good fortune to escape. The enemy was warmly attacked on all sides. De Broglie imagined all was lost, when he perceived the hereditary prince opposite the Huve. The day was passed in a mutual cannonade; but, the French being reinforced on the morrow, it was no longer proper to hazard an attack. This gave occasion to the motion that the whole corps of the allies made to their right. The French understood their march as a retreat, and wished to



harass the Germans; but they were every where repulsed and beaten.

Prince Ferdinand, by this wheel, gained the heights of Wangelftedt; from which he assumed the position of the Huve in the rear. This completely disconcerted de Broglie; who, unable any longer to maintain his position, was obliged to evacuate Eimbeck, and retire into Hesse. With this very able manœuvre, prince Ferdinand concluded a campaign which was to him highly glorious, and the armies on both sides went into winter quarters.

By what we have related of the events of the campaign, prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, of all the allies, was the only one who terminated it without loss. The Prussians were generally unfortunate in all the countries where they made war. Prince Henry had lost all the mountains of Saxony; and was so pressed, on the ground that remained, that it was with difficulty he could draw daily subsistence for his troops. The superiority of the enemy had given the latter the means of occupying the most advantageous posts; and there was cause to apprehend the worst of consequences for the winter and the approaching campaign.

But, bad as might be the situation of his royal highness, it by no means equalled that of  
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the army of the king. The loss of Schweidnitz included that of the hills and the half of Silesia. His majesty retained only the fortresses of Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, Neiss, and Cosel. He was master of the course of the Oder, and of the principalities situated on the opposite shore, which had been ravaged by the Russians, at the commencement of the campaign, and from which subsistence no longer could be drawn; nor was any to be obtained from Poland, because that fifteen thousand Russians, who had drawn a line on the frontiers, interdicted all passage. The army was obliged to defend its front against the Austrians, and its rear against the Russians. The communication between Berlin and Breslau was but precarious; and what rendered this situation completely desperate was the loss of Colberg. Nothing might prevent the Russians from laying siege to Stettin, in the spring, or even from seizing on Berlin, and the whole electorate of Brandenburg. The king had only thirty thousand men in Silesia; prince Henry was but little stronger; and the troops that had served in Pomerania, against the Russians, were so ruined that scarcely the shadow of them remained. Most of the provinces were invaded or overwhelmed; no one knew where recruits

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might be obtained; whence horses and stores might be drawn; where subsistence could be found; nor how ammunition might be safely brought to the army.

We shall see however that the state, though apparently, was not in reality, ruined; that industry re-established the army; and that a fortunate accident repaired every loss. This will serve as an example to prove how deceitful are appearances; and that, in great affairs, perseverance will enable men to surmount every threatening peril.

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## C H A P. XV.

### *The Winter of 1761 to 1762.*

**B**Y the recital of what happened during the preceding campaign, we have exposed the miseries under which Prussia at present groaned, and those by which she was still further menaced. In times the most critical, and when the fate of arms seemed to be the most averse, still were there some rays of hope which betokened resources, though with incertitude. In the month of October, after the loss of Schweidnitz, when  
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the army of the king was at Strehlen, and the Russians, in Pomerania, were besieging the town of Colberg and the corps of the prince of Wurtemberg, the king received an embassy from the khan of the Tartars. The ambassador was his master's barber. This will appear strange to minds prejudiced concerning court ceremonies, and to those who only judge of distant nations by comparing them with the manners of Europeans. But such incidents are not uncommon among the eastern people, where nobility is unknown, and where those are supposed to be the most dignified who approach nearest the person of the sovereign.

This barber, or this ambassador, presented his credentials, written in a ridiculous style, though very different from that of the style of the German chancery. The object of his embassy was to propose an alliance between Prussia and Tartary, and to offer an aid of sixteen thousand auxiliaries, for which a certain stipulated subsidy was to be granted. Such a proposition was not to be rejected, in the present situation of affairs. It was not only accepted, but, further to gain time, the barber was sent back with projects of treaties of alliance and subsidies. Presents were heaped upon him, for himself and his master; and he was accompanied on his re-

turn by the young von Goltz, in order to press the execution of these engagements, and to lead a corps of auxiliaries into Hungary, where they were wished to be employed to make a diversion into the states of the empress queen. The sieur Boscamp, the king's emissary at Bactcheferay, was at the same time charged to exert all his assiduity to dispose the khan to make an incursion into Russia; for, after hostilities had once been committed, the Porte would find itself under the constraint of supporting the khan. This was the only means of drawing the Turks into those measures for which they had hitherto testified so much repugnance. Should the project succeed, Pomerania would be freed from the Russians, and the electoral March preserved from the perils to which it was exposed.

With respect to the irruption of the sixteen thousand Tartars into Hungary, this must no doubt be supported by a corps of regular troops; but, as the empress queen must be obliged to detach twice the number, she would, of necessity, enfeeble the army that, in the spring, was to oppose the Prussians. All the intelligence received at this time, from Constantinople, made a prompt conclusion of the defensive treaty of alliance, which the king negotiated at the  
Porte,



Porte, to be hoped. But the distance between hope and accomplishment was great. The vizir was a man advanced in years, no soldier, and feared to begin a trade he did not understand. He particularly apprehended exposing a fortune already well established to the hazards of war. For this reason, he was intimately connected with the mufti, that they might in concert counteract the violent opinions of those who wished to break with the house of Austria, and to represent to them that the truce between the Porte and the Imperialists, not having yet expired, might not be violated, without transgressing the law of Mahomet.

Still however, in consequence of those contradictions to which the human mind is so liable, the Porte sent large detachments of janissaries toward Hungary. The Ottoman forces, assembled in the environs of Belgrade, amounted to a hundred and ten thousand men. The bashaws made these troops advance, and form a line on the frontiers of the provinces of the empress queen. This was much for the Porte, but little for Prussia, which stood in need of more effectual aid. However, as there were no hopes to be obtained in Europe, except from this power, the king attempted by all imagina-

ble means, as well at Constantinople as at Bactheferay, to produce vigorous resolutions.

During the winter, a new emissary arrived from the khan at Breslau, who confirmed all the promises the barber had made the king in his master's name, and assured him the khan would assemble a corps of forty thousand men, in the spring, which affirmation was verified; and that these should afterward act according to his majesty's desires; which was not verified. We soon shall see that the revolutions, which happened in Russia, made so strong an impression on these eastern people that they delayed the measures they were on the point of taking, and suspended all their plans.

The emissary of the khan, however, was sent back with presents, as well for himself as for his master; for among these people every thing is purchased. The Tartar had set a price on his actions and services; so much was to be paid him for a favourable answer, so much for assembling his troops, so much for preparing to act, and so much for a letter which he was prevailed upon to write to the grand seignior. The only difference, between the interested spirit of the Orientalists and that of other nations, seems to me to be that the first yield to this infamous passion, and dishonour themselves, without a blush;

blush; and that the Europeans at least affect some shame.

While these endeavours were made to raise commotions in the East, affairs were more and more embroiled in England. France had sent de Buffly into that kingdom, to negotiate peace; but his presence did not lull the British minister so entirely as had been hoped by the court of Versailles. Perhaps there was less ardour displayed in their naval armaments. The English nevertheless took the island and fortrefs of Belle-isle, during these negotiations; and seized on Pondicherry in the East Indies, where they ruined the important establishments possessed by the French East India company. Thus the negotiation of de Buffly made little progress at London. The duke de Choiseul, that he might allure the English, gave Mr. Stanley the most flattering hopes, which were immediately abjured by the interpretations made by de Buffly. This political skirmish continued till toward the end of the year 1761, when conferences were resumed with greater ardour. France, intending to dupe England, saw she could not succeed. She wished to sustain no loss, but to make a more advantageous peace than she was intitled to by the fortune of war; and, as the arts of negotiation were insufficient to effect

these purposes, she cast her eyes toward Spain; which de Choiseul had the address to engage in her interests. This alliance might awe the English; or, should it not, the assistance of that power might push the war with greater vigour and success.

The methods employed by de Choiseul to dispose the king of Spain to embrace the interests of France would not every where have been equally efficacious. These were contained in the famous project of the family compact, which, far from uniting the crowns, ought on the contrary for ever to have prevented all treaty between Spain and France. We shall content ourselves with enumerating the principal points. This compact says——

“ That the two branches of the house of Bourbon were henceforward to be considered as one  
“ and the same; that the subjects of the two  
“ crowns were mutually to enjoy the same advantages; that they were at all times to have but  
“ one common cause; consequently that the  
“ king of Spain was to declare war on England,  
“ should that power refuse to redress certain  
“ griefs, such as the cutting of logwood, and  
“ the piracies committed by the English privateers; that Spain, at the same time, should  
“ attack the king of Portugal; and (what is  
“ most

“ most extraordinary) that the two branches of  
 “ the house of Bourbon being considered but  
 “ as the same, their conquests and their losses  
 “ should be in common; so that the ad-  
 “ vantages of the one should compensate the  
 “ losses of the other.”

How might this treaty be explained? Might not the French, with equal propriety, at once have said to the Spaniards—“ Do you make  
 “ war because that will be to our interest. We  
 “ have suffered very considerable losses in our  
 “ war with the English; and, as there is every  
 “ probability that you will make some con-  
 “ quests, and that you will take Portugal, you  
 “ will restore that country to its possessors, in  
 “ order to oblige the English to make restora-  
 “ tion of the provinces they have wrested from  
 “ us, and which we ourselves are unable to  
 “ recover?”

And why attack the king of Portugal, who had offended no power, and on whose kingdom neither France nor Spain had any claims? It was to ruin the lucrative commerce that England maintained with Portugal, which induced France to commit this act. She was beside persuaded the English would restore the greatest part of their conquests, that the king of Portugal might be reinstated in his kingdom. But

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is that a reason for attacking a sovereign who gives no legitimate cause of attack? How vain, how insignificant, is the study of the law of nations! In fine the treaty, fantastical as it was, was signed by the two crowns.

Of this France immediately made use; and de Buffly had orders to demand, in the name of the king of Spain, restitution of some ships which the English had taken from that power; and particularly that they should forbear to cut logwood. This proposition was the apple of discord, which totally divided the British ministry. Two men were at that time at the head of government, different in character and opposite in all things. The one was Pitt, who had an elevated mind, capacious and grand in his projects, firm in their execution, and inflexible in his opinions, because he believed them advantageous to his country, which he loved.

The other was Bute, who had been the governor of the king. Rather ambitious than able, he wished to rule under the shadow of sovereign authority. With him it was a principle that a statesman's web of honour ought to be of a coarse texture. He supposed that, by procuring peace for his nation, he should himself become the nation's idol. He deceived himself, and was held in detestation.

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These two Englishmen beheld the proposal of Spain with very different eyes. Pitt, convinced she was desirous of war, and consequently that war was inevitable, wished to take her unprovided. For the preparations of the Spaniards were not yet completed; and it was his opinion hostilities should be begun, since the question related to fighting, and not to negotiating. Bute, fearing an increase of enemies would but render peace more difficult of conclusion, remonstrated that, should his adversary's advice be followed, the government would be burthened by exorbitant expences, and new dangers would be incurred, the conclusion of which might not be foreseen; adding that he opposed the opinion of Pitt more especially because that, under present circumstances, it was more easy for England to negotiate, at Madrid, than to find new funds, for the continuance of the war, at London.

The opinion of Bute prevailed, in the council, over that of his antagonist. This Pitt resented so highly that, full of indignation, he gave up all his posts; and his example was soon after followed by the dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire, who likewise went out of office. Bute profited by their spoils, assumed the place which best pleased himself, and formed a new  
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administration composed of lords Hallifax, Egremont, and Grenville; who were named the triumvirate, but of whom Bute was the soul.

Events soon after proved that Pitt had judged of the intentions of Spain like a statesman; for Bute lost his time in negotiating, yet was obliged to have recourse to arms, and to assist the king of Portugal with English troops. For the advantages which the British fleets gained by sea the nation was indebted to Pitt, the expeditions of which had been planned during his administration. Scarcely was lord Bute in office before the coldness that began to take place between Prussia and England considerably increased. Bute refused the subsidies which the English till then had paid the king, by which he flattered himself this prince would be reduced to the necessity of consenting to those propositions of peace which the British ministry should think proper to prescribe. He imagined that money accomplishes every thing, and that there was no money out of England.

But what is this world! What are the projects of man!—The empress of Russia died. Her death deceived all the politicians of Europe, and overthrew an infinite number of plans, carefully arranged and laboriously combined. This princess, whose health had been infirm for  
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some years, was suddenly carried off, by a spitting of blood, on the 8th of January 1762. After her death the crown devolved to the grand duke her nephew, who reigned under the name of Peter III. The king had cultivated the friendship of this prince, at the time that he was only duke of Holstein; and, in consequence of a sensibility, uncommon among men, and still more among sovereigns, he preserved a grateful heart. Of this he had given proofs during the war. It was he who most contributed to the retreat of marshal Apraxin, in the year 1757, when, after having beaten marshal Lehwald, he retreated into Poland. During all these troubles he had even abstained from going to the council, in which he had a seat, that he might not participate in the measures which the empress took against Prussia, and which he disapproved.

The king wrote a letter of congratulation on his accession to the throne, in which, without disguise, he testified the desire he had to live in harmony with him, and the esteem in which he should ever hold his person. Mr. Keith, the English ambassador at the court of Russia, delayed not to inform the king of the hopes which he might well entertain, concerning the kind intentions of this new monarch. Soon after

Goudowitz, the favourite of the emperor, was sent into Germany, under pretence of complimenting his brother-in-law, the prince of Zerbst; but his secret instructions were to take Breslau in his return, where the king had fixed his quarters, and to assure him of the sentiments of esteem and friendship that were entertained by the emperor. The opportunity was too fortunate to be missed. The king explained himself with cordiality to Goudowitz, and easily proved to him there was no real subject of war between the two crowns; that the present troubles were only the consequences of the arts of the court of Vienna, which did but labour for its proper interests; and that nothing was more easy than to re-establish harmony by a solid peace. He added at the same time, as if by accident, that he promised himself, from the equity of the emperor, no condition contrary to the glory of the sovereign would be exacted; for to such the king never could subscribe. As the conjuncture was favourable to secure whatever might be obtained from the good disposition of the emperor, the king said, as if it had escaped him, that, far from preserving the least resentment of the past, there was nothing he more eagerly desired than to form the most perfect union with the emperor.



This declaration was accompanied by a letter to the emperor, conceived in nearly the same terms; that he might add the more force to what should be related by Goudowitz, concerning the sentiments of the king in his favour. Scarcely was Goudowitz departed for Petersburg before he was followed by Goltz, in quality of envoy extraordinary, to compliment the emperor on his accession to the throne; and especially to press the negotiation of peace, and hasten its conclusion, previous to the opening of the campaign.

Still might apprehensions be entertained. For, on what foundation could it be supposed that the negotiation at Petersburg would take a happy turn? The courts of Versailles and Vienna had guarantied the kingdom of Prussia to the deceased empress: of this the Russians were in peaceable possession. Would a young monarch on his ascending the throne relinquish conquest, guarantied by his allies? Would he not be restrained by that lustre which interest, or the glory of acquisition, sheds over a crown newly acquired? For whom? Wherefore? What motive should he have to make such a renunciation?

All these questions, difficult to resolve, filled every mind with incertitude, concerning  
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the future. The event was more fortunate than might be hoped. So difficult is it to unravel secondary causes, and to understand the different motives that actuate the will of man! Peter III. happened to possess an excellent heart, and sentiments more noble and more elevated than are usually found among sovereigns. Complying with every wish of the king, he even went further than might have been expected, and recalled Czernichef with his corps from the Austrian army of his own proper motion. He exacted no cession whatever from the king, although he was so authorised to exact, without risk. He hastened the negotiation for peace, and in return only asked the friendship and alliance of the king. A proceeding so uncommon, so generous, so noble, not only ought to be transmitted to posterity, but to be written in letters of gold, in the cabinets of kings.

The views of the emperor, at that time, were particularly extended to Denmark. He felt the wrongs her kings had done his ancestors; he had beside acts of personal injustice to revenge; for, during the life of the empress Elizabeth, the Danes had several times attempted to despoil him of that part of Holstein which he still possessed, and which he continually opposed with fortitude. His mind being embittered

tered by so many offences, he meditated ample vengeance ; and, while he terminated the war with Prussia, it was but that war might recommence, with increasing vigour, against Denmark.

The king did not act with the emperor as between sovereign and sovereign, but with that cordiality which friendship requires, and in which the charms of friendship consist. The virtues of Peter III. formed an exception to political rules, and of these virtues he deserved a return. The king endeavoured to anticipate his desires, in every thing that could give him pleasure ; and, as he appeared to wish to see the count von Schwerin, aide de camp to the king, who, having been taken by the Russians at the battle of Zorndorf, had fortunately merited his favour, the count immediately undertook this journey ; and did not a little contribute, during his abode in Russia, to the conclusion of the treaties of peace and alliance.

Lord Bute, who, in contempt for other nations, was ignorant of what passed in Europe, and still more of the manner of thinking of the new emperor of Russia, full of the ideas of general peace, which he was determined should be accomplished, charged prince Gallitzin, the Russian ambassador at London, to inform his

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court that, whatever cessions the emperor should exact, from Prussia, England would take care he should obtain, provided he was not too much in haste, and should continue to keep the king of Prussia in check, by permitting the corps of Czernichef to remain with the Austrians. Offended by such propositions, the emperor answered as if he himself had been a Prussian minister, and sent a copy of the dispatches of prince Gallitzin to the king, that he might know how fully he was betrayed by England. Nor was this the sole perfidy of which the English minister was guilty to the king. Not satisfied with attempting to injure the affairs of Prussia at Petersburg, Bute, at the same time, negotiated at the court of Vienna, and wished to make peace with the house of Austria, unknown to the king. Liberal of the Prussian provinces, sacrificing without scruple the interests of the king, he offered spoils to the empress queen, as if such had been at his disposal.

Chance on this occasion was more serviceable to the king than the most subtle art could have been. Count Kaunitz misunderstood these overtures, suspected that it was the intention of the English to sow discord between the courts of Vienna and Versailles, and replied to lord Bute with all the surly haughtiness of an Austrian minister.

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He disdainfully rejected propositions which he believed to be deceitful, adding that the empress queen was sufficiently puissant to enforce her own pretensions; and that she would act contrary to her personal dignity by accepting peace on any terms, should England be the mediatrix. Thus did the project become abortive, to the shame of him by whom it had been conceived. Notwithstanding so many fortunate events, and so many intrigues discovered, the king was not exempt from fear. Letters from Petersburg made him tremble for the person of the emperor. They all announced that the seeds of conspiracy were ready to burst forth. The persons suspected of being parties in the plot were the least guilty; its true authors worked in the dark, and carefully concealed themselves from the public view. Scarcely was the emperor seated on the throne before he made continual innovations on the government. He appropriated to himself the lands of the clergy, according to the project of Peter I.; but was far from being as firm on the throne, or as much respected by the nation, as this his predecessor had been. The clergy were the more powerful in that empire because that the people were rude, and grovelling in the most profound ignorance. To attack these Archimandrites, these

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popes, was to create to himself irreconcilable enemies ; for every priest is more attached to his living than to his opinions. The emperor should no doubt have waited a proper time for this reform, and even then ought to have touched with a delicate hand. Exclusive of clerical grievances, he was accused of keeping the guards, Ismailof and Preobrazinsky, under too severe discipline, and of wishing to make war on Denmark, which was very repugnant to the Russians ; since they openly averred it was a war in which the nation was not interested. Ill-meaning people propagated these complaints in public, to render the person of the emperor odious. Friendship, gratitude, and the esteem in which the king held the excellent qualities of Peter III. induced the former to write to him concerning this perilous situation of affairs. The correspondence was to be managed with that extreme delicacy sovereigns require, who usually wish it should be believed their authority is undoubted ; and, with respect to Denmark, it was necessary the king should explain himself with infinite reserve. That he might dissuade the emperor from immediately entering into war with the Danes, the king explained all the reasons which should induce him to defer that enterprise to the following year.

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He particularly insisted on the necessity that there was for the emperor to be crowned at Moscow, before he should leave his states, and engage in a foreign war; that, by this ceremony, his person might be rendered more inviolable in the eyes of the nation, agreeable to the example of his predecessors. He next mentioned the revolutions that had happened in Russia during the absence of Peter I. but he touched lightly on that subject; and concluded by conjuring the emperor, in the most affectionate manner, not to neglect precautions essentially necessary for his personal safety; protesting that the sincere interest he took in his preservation was his sole motive for writing.

His letter made little impression on the emperor, who replied——“ My glory requires I  
 “ should obtain justice of the Danes, for all  
 “ the outrages they have committed against me,  
 “ and more especially against my ancestors. It  
 “ never shall be said that the Russians make war  
 “ in my behalf, and that I am not personally at  
 “ their head. The ceremony of coronation is too  
 “ expensive; the money will be better employed  
 “ against the Danes. With respect to the inter-  
 “ rest which you take in my preservation, let me  
 “ intreat you not to have any apprehensions.  
 “ The soldiers call me their father; and say  
 “ they would rather be governed by a man than

“ a woman. I walk unattended in the streets  
 “ of Petersburg : had any one wished to do me  
 “ an injury, he would long ere this have  
 “ executed his intentions. But I do good to all  
 “ the world, and I confide myself solely to the  
 “ protection of God, under whose guidance I  
 “ have nothing to fear.”

This answer did not prevent the king from continuing his endeavours to inform the emperor of the threatening dangers. Goltz and Schwerin received orders to speak on this topic, in the familiar conversations they had with the monarch. It was in vain they repeated that, in a country where the manners are in a state so rude as are those of Russia, a monarch cannot take sufficient precautions for his personal safety. He replied, at last, “ You are my friends ;  
 “ never mention the subject more ; it is a hateful one.” Silence was imposed, and the poor emperor was obliged to be abandoned to that security which effected his destruction.

*Et, si fata Deum, si mens non læva fuisset,  
 Impulerat ferro Argolicas fœdare latebras :  
 Trojaque nunc stares, Priamique arx alta maneres.*

And had not heaven the fall of Troy design'd,  
 Or had not men been fated to be blind,  
 Enough was said, and done, t'inspire a better mind.

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These things did not prevent the negotiations for peace and alliance from proceeding with all dispatch. At the beginning of June, the emperor sent count Schwerin to the king, with a treaty signed, and an order to count Czernichef, who was at Glatz, to march immediately, and join the army of the king; and, in conjunction with him, to make war on the Austrians. The Swedes, after this reverse of system, finding themselves deprived of their greatest support, were obliged to make peace from the dread of the evil which might happen, should they longer delay. The king received a formal letter from the queen, his sister, dictated by the senate at Stockholm, to which he replied according to her wishes, and expressed the pleasure he felt at seeing an end to a war between relations so dear; adding that his friendship for the queen, his sister, induced him to forget the irregular and strange proceedings of the Swedish nation, and to discard all resentment; that, though he made peace, it was only out of respect to her, and on condition that all things should be restored exactly to the state in which they were, before the commencement of these troubles. The Swedes, goaded by fear, hastily terminated the negotiation. The plenipotentiaries of the two courts assembled at Hamburg, and the preliminaries were signed before the end of June.

The emperor of Russia warmly pursued his project against Denmark; however, that he might preserve all the formalities of justice, in this rupture, and that it might appear that the obstinacy of the Danes had obliged him to break with them, he proposed to assemble a congress at Berlin, where the ministers of the two powers might endeavour to accommodate their disputes, under the mediation of Prussia. The plenipotentiary of the emperor, Saldern, was ordered to demand restitution of all Holstein from Denmark, as it had anciently appertained to the progenitors of his Imperial majesty. Peter III. was persuaded the Danes never would consent to conditions so disgraceful; and this was the pretence he wished for that he might declare war. An army of sixty thousand Russians, which was to be joined by six thousand Prussians, was destined for this expedition. The king of Denmark, who saw the storm ready to descend, had given the command of his forces to an officer of reputation, M. de St. Germain, who had lately quitted the service of France, on some cause of discontent given him by the marshal de Broglio. St. Germain found himself at the head of an undisciplined army, in want of general officers capable of commanding, engineers, gunners, magazines, in a word, in want of every thing.



thing. All these wants he himself supplied. As the military chest was ill provided, he obliged the city of Hamburg to pay a ransom, which supplied the sums of which he had need. The Danish ministry excused this strange procedure by the law of necessity. St. Germain afterward approached Lubeck, on which he intended to seize, whenever war should be declared; and, that he might remove the seat of war from the frontiers of his sovereign, he advanced into Mecklenbourg, with a part of his troops, and encamped between marshes and ponds, in an advantageous post, where probably he might, for a time, have disputed the entrance of the Russians into Holstein. Here we shall leave him, in the midst of these preparations of which it would be superfluous to make any further mention, because that the war which Denmark had so much cause to dread never took place. A new revolution soon changed the aspect of affairs at Petersburg.

Of all the European powers, the court of Vienna was thrown into the greatest consternation, by the events which had lately happened in Russia. The empress queen had never had more elevated hopes than at the close of the last campaign. Every thing presaged the subjugation of Prussia, the conquest of Silesia, and the accomplishment

plishment of all her projects. So strong was her persuasion, and her security so entire, that, imagining she might conclude the war with a part of her troops, she was guilty of ill-timed œconomy, by commanding twenty thousand men to be disbanded. The empress of Russia died: the corps under Czernichef soon after quitted the army of Laudon, to retire into Poland. The court of Vienna would then, but too late, have again assembled the twenty thousand men that had been disbanded, but who were dispersed, and whom there was not time to replace. To this succeeded the news of peace concluded between Russia and Prussia; presently that of a treaty of alliance signed between the two crowns; next the junction of the Russians, under Czernichef, with the army of the king; and, to crown this reverse of fortune, an epidemic malady made great ravages in the army of Laudon. It was a kind of leprosy, the progress of which was so rapid that it thinned his camp, and peopled his hospitals.

On making an abstract of these events, we shall find twenty thousand men dismissed by the Austrians; twenty thousand Russians subtracted; and the same twenty thousand Russians added to the army of the king. The difference of the result will be sixty thousand men in favour of Prussia.

Prussia. Had the king successively gained three grand battles, they would not have procured him superior advantages.

The death of the empress of Russia, and the new combinations of politics which this produced in Europe, made a very different impression upon the Porte. Revolutions so prompt, and hatred so bitter between states, which suddenly changed into the closest connections between their sovereigns, appeared inconceivable to oriental politics, and filled the Turks with astonishment and distrust. It must be confessed they had some reason for their surprise. After having been importuned by the pressing solicitations of the Prussian ambassador to break with Russia, this ambassador suddenly changes his language, tenders the good offices of the king his master to appease certain disputes, relative to the limits of the empires, with the court of Petersburg, and persisted only in inciting them to break the truce which they still kept with the empress queen. This gave occasion to the Turks thus to reason. Prussia certainly is the most inconstant and fickle nation on earth : yesterday they wished to embroil us with Russia ; to-day they endeavour to effect an accommodation ; and, though they now incite us to declare war against the queen of Hungary, who can say that  
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in six months time they shall not be in alliance with her, as they are at present with the Russians? Let us beware how we enter too hastily into the measures they propose, lest our compliance should render us the sport of their inconstancy, and the scorn of the European nations.

Their reflections did not end here; and as they had conceived some umbrage at the alliance which the king had concluded with Russia, to dispel these suspicions his majesty, by his interposition, effected a termination of the differences which subsisted, between the khan of the Tartars and the Russians, relative to the fort of St Ann. He further prevailed on the emperor Peter III. to declare, by his ambassador at Constantinople, that he would in no manner interfere in any disputes which the Porte might have with the house of Austria; and that, should the Turks declare war against the empress queen, the latter should receive no succour on his part. This formal declaration produced a great effect on the Turks, and on the grand Seignior himself; who, according to all appearances, would have acted decisively, had not new revolutions, which we shall relate in their proper order, renewed their uncertainty, and awakened their diffidence.

The summary of the events we have related will present to our view Prussia on the brink of ruin,

ruin, at the end of the last campaign; past recovery, in the judgment of all politicians, yet one woman only dies, and the nation revives; nay is sustained by that power which had been the most eager to seek her destruction. Thus Mrs. Masham, by her intrigues against the dutchess of Marlborough, saved France in the war of the succession. What dependance may be placed on human affairs, if the veriest trifles can influence, can change, the fate of empires? Such are the sports of fortune, who, laughing at the vain prudence of mortals, of some excites the hopes, and of others pulls down the high-raised expectations.

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## C H A P. XVI.

### *The Campaign of 1762.*

THE preceding campaign, as we have shewn, had been generally destructive to the Prussian arms. Prince Henry had lost the mountains of Saxony; the prince of Wurtemberg the town of Colberg; and the king that of Schweidnitz. The position of the Prussian troops in Silesia was precarious. A bad trench-



trenchment, at the suburb of Breslau, which might contain twelve battalions, constituted their principal defence. They had two posts of information, to guard them against surprise from the enemy; the one at Canth, under the command of Dallwich; the other at Rothenfirben, under that of Prittwitz. Wied occupied the environs of Grotkau, whence he had detached Möring to Strehlen. Möring reconnoitred toward Frankenstein, Prittwitz toward Reichenbach, and Dallwich toward the hill of Zobten, and of the Pitschenberg. Glogau was covered by six battalions, under Zeunert; and Thadden occupied Guben (February 5th) and with the cavalry of Schmettau formed a line as far as Lubben, by which he guarded the communication of Berlin, whence the army drew its provisions.

The Austrian line began at Jægerndorf, whence it extended to Neustadt, Weidenau, Johanneberg, Wartha, Silberberg, Böckendorf, the hill of Zobten, Striegau, and Hohenfriedberg. The main body of their infantry was cantoned among the mountains, and the quarters of the Russians were in the county of Glatz. Some incursions happened during winter, but not of any consequence. Colonel Altone (the 16th) who passed the winter at Reichenbach,

attempted to surprize the quarters of Prittwitz, at Rothenfirben. Of this the latter gained intimation, placed himself in ambush on the road by which the Austrian was to pass, beat him, and took a hundred men.

The revolution of Russia, and the favourable dispositions of Peter III. occasioned the separation of Czernichef and the Imperial army. (March the 21st) This general quitted the county of Glatz, passed the Oder, at Auras, and returned into Poland. The same revolution gave place to the negotiations for peace with Sweden; and, as the fortunate issue of this was foreseen, the king was enabled to recal all the troops he had employed against that power. Belling, with twenty squadrons, and Billerbeck, with six battalions, were destined to reinforce the army of Saxony. The princes of Bevern and Wurtemberg, and general Werner, received orders to join the army of Silesia, as soon as circumstances would permit them to quit Pomerania.

The king proposed to open the campaign by a diversion into Hungary; according to which project Werner was to join the Tartars, toward Buda, and support the incursions they should make in these countries, and into Austria itself. Thus would the operations of the king in Silesia :  
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be facilitated, where he had to recover Schweidnitz; and, the siege over, he might reinforce the army of prince Henry, that every effort might be made to retake Dresden.

These intentions were afterward changed, because of the treaty of alliance that was concluded with Russia. From the 15th of March it was meant to assemble the various corps that were to compose the army. To this effect Schenkendorf quitted Saxony (April) and relieved Schmettau and Thadden at Guben. He was followed by the corps of Platen, which at that time was under the command of Krockow. All these detachments arrived successively at Breslau; that is to say Schmettau, Thadden, and Zeunert, on the 15th of April; Krockow, with twenty-five battalions and thirty-five squadrons, on the 6th of May; and Lossow, who had covered Upper Silesia against the Cossacks, with his hussars and troops of Bosnia, relieved Dallwich at Canth: the prince of Wurtemberg joined the army, on the 12th of May, with five battalions and six squadrons.

It will no doubt appear surprising that the Austrians should, with so much phlegm, suffer the junction of all these Prussian corps, without the least let or hindrance. But their consternation and discouragement was excessive; as

well because of the départure of the Ruffians, on whom they had greatly depended, as of the reduction of the army, made by the court of Vienna, fo very mal a-propos, during the winter. The leprosy we have mentioned likewise disabled half their regiments. The officers gave every thing over as loft. The command of the army of Silefia had befide been conferred on marshal Daun; and Laudon, finding himself on the point of refigning his ftaff, fhewed no eagerness in labouring for his fucceffor, nor in rifing his fame for a man whom, in his heart, he detefted. Thefe different reasons attentively confidered, it will be found lefs furprifing that the king was fuffered to reunite his forces with fo little opposition on the part of the enemy.

While the army affembled in the vicinity of Breslau, the emperor of Ruffia fent to inform the king that he had given orders to Czernichef to quit Thorn, and to march into Silefia to join the Pruffian forces. This happy incident, which had fo great an influence on the plan of the campaign, occafioned it in part to be changed. It was determined that a large body fhould affemble at Cofel, either to join the Tartars in Hungary, fhould they come thither, or to difturb the frontiers of Moravia, to which Daun

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might

might be obliged to send large detachments. This was an essential point to obtain the proposed end; for, with eighty thousand men, the marshal might so exactly garnish the hills, and the post of Kunzendorf, that it would have been impossible either to attack or turn him. Seventy thousand men were actually under his command, distributed to that effect; ten thousand were in garrison at Schweidnitz, and eight thousand destined to garnish the passes of Silberberg and Wartha. It was therefore requisite to deprive him of fifteen thousand more, for the greater certitude, and to be able to turn all the posts he might assume in the mountains; consequently to be able to make a fortunate and glorious campaign.

The army of the king amounted to sixty-six thousand. Czernichef brought him twenty thousand Russians; and thus he might detach the latter number into Upper Silesia, and still remain superior to the Imperialists. Every manœuvre, which the king should project for this campaign, must tend to turn the enemy in his posts; and his utmost attention must be to effect this without his knowledge. Such conduct being essentially necessary, the detachments of cavalry were strengthened that they might be superior to those of the Austrians; and, by frequently



quently beating them, might intimidate and prevent them from adventuring on reconnoitring parties, or passing beyond their grand guards.

It was on the 12th of May that marshal Daun arrived in Silesia. Scarcely had he taken the command of the army before he caused it to encamp. He supported his right on the hill of Zobten; his line inclined toward Domanz; and he posted Ellerichhausen at the Pitschenberg, to which his left extended. The king, not thinking proper to encamp with his army in the presence of the enemy, narrowed the cantonments of his troops, on the banks of the Lohe, and established his head quarters at Betlern. Twelve battalions and twenty squadrons occupied the intrenchments of Breslau. Reitzenstein was detached with fifteen hundred horse to Neumarck, to cover the road of Glogau, and to observe the vicinage of Striegau and Jauer. The corps at Canth, under Loffow, was so strengthened that, beside a thousand of the Courbière volunteers, it amounted to five thousand four hundred horse. That under Lentulus and Prittwitz, which encamped on the Ohlau, not far from Borau, amounted to four thousand five hundred horse, and a thousand volunteers.

This position of the Prussian army may appear hazardous to those who shall only examine

it superficially; but so it was not in effect. For these heavy detachments of cavalry, advancing toward the enemy, formed a kind of circumvallation round the Imperial army; the posts of the Prussians were so near to this army that none of their motions could escape the knowledge of the king. Marshal Daun had beside two marches to make before he could arrive at the Lohe; and the king only required six hours to assemble his army. What indeed might the project be that the Austrians could form? What attack might they meditate? There was no position taken. The king was at liberty to form his army on this or on that side the Lohe; and he might fall unexpectedly on the camp of the enemy, at the moment he should be least expected. To this we may add, the Austrians feared the plain. They knew that, should they venture to descend, the return to the hills might become difficult, so that, in effect, the Prussian army was at ease, and in safety.

(The 20th) During these cantonments it was that Schwerin returned from Petersburg, with the treaties of peace and alliance concluded with Russia. Peace was solemnly proclaimed, and there was no mystery made of the alliance to the Austrians. The king however retarded the

the operations of the grand army, till the arrival of Czernichef; but that did not prevent him filing his troops off toward Upper Silesia. Werner already was at Cosel, with above ten thousand men. He was informed of the plan laid to draw the Imperial forces into Upper Silesia, and to inspire the enemy with inquietude. He approached Ratibor, whence he ordered Hordt to advance to Teschen, with twelve hundred men. The latter took a detachment of a captain and sixty men, and dispersed his hussars as far as the passage of the Jablunka.

No sooner was Daun informed of this incursion than, that he might oppose the enterprises of the Prussians, he ordered Beck to march, who advanced as far as Ratibor. This was exactly correspondent to the wishes of the king. Werner immediately withdrew his troops beyond the Oder, (June the 6th) and returned to Cosel. About this time the prince of Bevern arrived at Breslau, and brought with him four battalions and a thousand provincial hussars. The hussars of Möring and ten squadrons of dragoons (the 21st) were added to his infantry, and with these he departed for Cosel, where he assembled his small corps.

The detachments sent into Upper Silesia did

not prevent the cavalry of the king from beginning to gain an ascendancy over that of the enemy. Prittwitz (the 11th) surprised an Austrian detachment, near Panthenau, at the Johannesberg, and took a hundred men. Reitzenstein (the 14th) who was at Neumarck, beat general Gurcy, who attempted to surprise him, and took three officers and seventy dragoons. Soon after the thousand provincial hussars, brought by the prince of Bevern, that were posted before Neifs at Heydersdorf, were attacked by Draskowitz; who, being at Patschkau, and there receiving information of their arrival, attempted a surprise. The execution did not correspond with his hopes; his detachment was ill treated, and he was himself taken prisoner, with a hundred and seventy of his men, as well dragoons as hussars. These accidents following each other began to render the Imperial cavalry circumspect, and it soon became timid.

The van-guard of Czernichef consisted of two thousand Cossacks, and it joined the army of the king some days sooner than the Russians. The king divided these two pulks between generals Loffow and Reitzenstein. The latter advanced from Neumarck to the foot of the Pitschenberg, where the army of marshal Daun  
was

was in a manner blockaded. He durst not send his cavalry in advance, and his rear was left open because there was no wish to discover the designs that were forming. However, after the arrival of the Cossacks, scarcely a day passed that some grand guard was not carried, from the enemy, in the face of the whole camp. At length he sent no more men on the scout; none were sufficiently brave to reconnoitre before the chain of horse patrols; and the cavalry, remaining at the piquet, no more ventured to shew itself in the plain.

We shall, for a moment, here leave the affairs of Silesia, to relate what passed in Saxony, because that prince Henry this year was the first who opened the campaign. We shall pass thence into Westphalia, and to the Lower Rhine, to render an account of the operations of prince Ferdinand of Brunswick; after which we may without interruption pursue the narrative of what happened in Silesia.

The command of the Imperial army, in Saxony, had this year been conferred on Serbelloni. He not only occupied the bottom of Plauen, the Windberg, and Dippoldiswalda, but he further extended over all the hills, which go from Freyberg, by Chemnitz, to Waldheim. Having carefully entrenched all the passages of



the Mulde in his front, he confided in these precautions, and persuaded himself there was no possibility of dislodging him from a position so strong, and so well defended. These difficulties did not impede prince Henry, who resolved to penetrate his line at the centre; as well to gain ground as to inspire him with fears for Bohemia; for Dresden might only be recovered by drawing the main army of the Austrians into Bohemia.

The prince suspended the execution of his plan, till the arrival of brigadier Billerbeck, who was coming to join him from Pomerania. That he might the better deprive the enemy of all suspicion of his meditated designs, the prince made various motions with his troops, and some demonstrations toward the dutchy of Altenburg, and on the side of Penig, to persuade the enemy he projected some enterprise in that part of Saxony. Billerbeck, in the mean time, joined the younger Stutterheim at Lommatzsch. This was the signal on which all the troops put themselves in motion, to make the passage of the Mulde. On the 11th in the evening they assembled, each corps marching to the place assigned. The force of the whole body, destined for this expedition, consisted in twenty-one battalions and thirty-five squadrons. They were  
divided

divided into four detachments. That of Seidlitz assembled behind Mockewitz; that of Canitz behind the village of Zernitz; and the elder Stutterheim, who had encamped at the Peterberg, advanced to Zocherwitz; while the hussars and light troops of Kleist were formed between Zwenig and Hafflau.

(May) These four columns, by a covert march, approached the banks of the Mulde by night, and lay in ambush behind a ravin, which concealed their approach and their purposes from the enemy. His royal highness had selected places for erecting batteries, the cannon had been brought, and had been masked by bushes, and on the first signal it was ready to play upon the Imperial redoubts. The detachment of the enemy which the prince proposed to attack was commanded by Zettwitz, an Austrian general, who might receive succour from the troops that cantoned at Freyberg, Chemnitz, and Waldheim. His corps was four thousand strong. He had garnished the redoubts of the defiles and the mountains with infantry and artillery, under the protection of which he had dispersed his croats and pandours, in several detachments, beside the Mulde. These troops regularly passed the night under arms. It had been observed that they returned to their tents every morning at  
day-

day-break, about four o'clock; in consequence of which the prince had determined that the attack should not commence before seven. The Prussian chasseurs, that were posted at Zeschnitz, whether it were the effect of chance or impatience, began to skirmish before the appointed time; and, though it then was but six in the morning, his highness determined immediately to begin the attack. Four columns, in consequence, passed the Mulde, at the signal given, under the protection of forty pieces of artillery. Seidlitz, who led the cavalry over the ford of Technitz, met with croats in his road, at the village of Masterau, who escaped into a neighbouring redoubt. Kleist, who passed the Mulde lower down, at the same time took the enemy in rear; while the columns of infantry gained the height. These intricate motions astonished the Imperialists, and they abandoned their forts. Kleist, mean time, with his hussars, fell on the cuirassiers of de Ville, and put them to flight. Having pursued them, this pursuit brought him beyond the infantry of the enemy, that was on the full retreat. He attacked in front, while the Prussian infantry was at the heels of the Austrians; so that, being thrown into confusion, no part of his corps escaped, except those who had early had the prudence to fly to Waldheim.

Zettwitz, and two thousand men of his detachment, fell into the hands of the victor.

His royal highness, on the same day, marked out the camp for his troops, at the village of Keffelsdorf; and ordered Hulsen and Forcade to advance, who took the position of Schlettau and the Katzenhæuser. On the 13th, the army of the prince marched for Oedern. On their march they perceived, at some distance, Imperialists who came from Waldheim, that had been joined by the fugitives of the preceding day. Kleist charged their rear-guard, which was put to the rout, and afterward fell on the regiment of Luzani, and took five hundred men.

Maquire, who commanded at Freyberg, hearing of what had happened at Rosswein, would not expose himself to a similar misfortune; but evacuated the Zinnewald, Nossen, and Freyberg, and retired to Dippoldiswalda. His highness immediately took the camp of Freyberg (the 14th) and sent his van-guard forward to Bobrich; while Seidlitz cleared all the banks of the Wilde-Weisritz. On the 16th the prince took the camp of Pretschendorf, whence he sent a detachment to Reichstädt, and established posts from Sabischdorf to Frauenstein, to guard all the passes through which the enemy might form any attack upon his troops. Hul-  
sen

sen and Forcade advanced, at the same time, with the prince, and took post between Harte and Constapel. They garnished the villages of Braunsdorf, Harte, and Weisdrup with light troops, in order to ascertain the communication of the camp of Landsberg with that of Pretschendorf.

While the Prussians thus were pursuing their advantages against the Imperialists, the army of the circles, under the command of the prince of Stolberg, advanced toward Tschopa. His highness, who might not suffer an enemy so close on his rear, saw himself obliged to send some detachments on that side, and opposed Bandemer to these troops, with a thousand horse, supported by four battalions. Bandemer occupied the banks of the Flöhe, and sent Röder on discovery. This officer was assaulted by the whole cavalry of the army of the empire, from which he would have escaped without any considerable loss, had not Bandemer very imprudently thought proper to pass the defile of the Flöhe, to come to his aid. This troop, by stopping the passage, increased the embarrassment of Röder, who had made dispositions to retire. The Prussians had to combat four times their number; and numbers, for once, triumphed  
over



over valour. They lost four cannon, and about five hundred men, on their retreat.

This accident obliged prince Henry to change his measures, and to send Canitz from Pretschendorf, with fresh troops, who posted himself at Oedern, where he was not more than two miles from the enemy, encamped at Chemnitz. The army of his highness occupied a grand front; and, that he might obviate the inconveniences resulting from the frequent detachments he was obliged to make, he laboured to fortify all the places of which he was in possession. Such as were sufficiently low were overflowed; abatis were thrown up in the forests; and the ground where there was neither marsh, rivulet, nor wood, but which was capable of defence, was entrenched.

(June 1st) Serbelloni, weary of the inactivity and languor in which he had hitherto remained, resolved to execute a project that should crown him with glory. He began by causing Stampach to join him with a corps of seven thousand men, who till then had held the pass of Zittau. With this reinforcement he departed from Dippoldiswalda, to surprise the light troops of prince Henry, encamped at Reichstädt. But, on his approach, Kleist and Egloffstein fell back toward the camp of Pretschendorf. The battalion  
of

of Hordt, newly raised, lost some men, during its retreat. This grand expedition terminated by a cannonade, which continued all the day; and, on the morrow, his highness sent Kleist and Egloffstein again to occupy the same post. However, as the detachment was neither necessary nor essential at Reichstädt, it was withdrawn some days afterward.

Belling, who had hitherto been detained in Mecklenbourg, till the peace had been signed with Sweden, could not join the army in Saxony before the 18th of June. Reinforced by him, prince Henry was capable of attempting something against the army of the circles. It was necessary, and even indispensable, for the army of Saxony to disencumber itself of an enemy lying at its back, and the neighbourhood of which might, in certain critical conjunctures, become fatal. Seidlitz was charged with the conduct of this enterprize, and inclined toward Penig. The prince of Stolberg, who had twenty-one battalions and thirty-one squadrons in his army, fell back for Annaburg. His retreat from Chemnitz gave Canitz liberty to join Seidlitz at Zwickau. The troops of the circles quitted Saxony, and lost many men as they retreated to Bareuth. In the interim, Kleist was active on the side of Marienberg, whence he dislodged

dislodged colonel Törreck, whom he drove into Bohemia, and afterward rejoined the army.

While the prince of Stolberg took refuge in the heart of the empire, Serbelloni meditated a still more important project than was the preceding. He proposed to beat general Hülßen by gliding along the Elbe and turning his position. (The 27th) The better to conceal his design, he one morning gave the alarm to all the advanced posts of the camp of Pretschendorf. A column of seven thousand men presented itself on the right of the village of Hennerdorf, making a pretence to attempt the passage of the Steinbrückenmühle. Another column formed in face of Frauenstein. During these feints, Ried, who commanded a detachment of twelve battalions at Benerich, having been reinforced the night before by sixteen battalions and twenty-five companies of grenadiers, formed, in the morning, in three corps, on the heights of Benerich. The first column was led to the village of Grumbach, whence it dislodged a free battalion, that threw itself into the redoubt of Pfarrholz; but the ardour of the Austrians was tempered by the fire of the batteries of the Landsberg. The second column of the enemy advanced toward Cubach; and the third, which was that of the right, dislodged a Prussian bat-  
talion

talion from the village of Weisdrup. This last column was stopped by the fire of the redoubt of Constapel, that was defended by the battalion of Carlowitz. After a vigorous resistance on the part of the Prussians, the enemy was induced to retire; and the succour sent by his highness from Pretschendorf to the Landsberg did not arrive till the action was over. The foe contented himself with some feeble and ill sustained attacks on this occasion: he ineffectually sacrificed troops that he might have employed to better purpose, had he known how to lead them on with more audacity.

While fortune in Saxony was weighing the destiny of the Prussians and Imperialists, she declared decisively, in the empire, in favour of the allies and prince Ferdinand. The French this year had confined themselves to the maintaining of only one army in Germany, with a reserve to cover the Lower Rhine. This reserve, under the command of the prince de Condé, consisted of forty-six battalions and thirty-eight squadrons; and the army, at the head of which were the prince de Soubise, and marshal d'Estrées, included a hundred and eleven battalions, and a hundred and twenty-one squadrons. These marshals proposed with their forces to penetrate into the electorate of Hanover, while  
prince



prince Ferdinand had conceived very different projects. It was his intention to drive the French out of Hesse. After the example of the French, he divided his army; and detached twenty battalions and twenty-one squadrons, under the hereditary prince (June) to oppose the prince of Condé; reserving to himself sixty-two battalions and sixty-one squadrons, and five thousand light armed troops, for the execution of his plan.

The prince of Condé opened the campaign on the Lower Rhine, which he passed on the 10th of June, assembled his forces at Bockum, and made a feint of inclining toward Dortmund. All the motions of the French and allies, in this part of Germany, were relative to the passage of the Lippe, which the two parties reciprocally disputed. During these preludes, prince Ferdinand assembled his army on the height of Brackel, whence he inclined toward the Dimel (the 18th) and took the castle of Sabbaburg. He at the same time occupied the woods of Geismar and Liebenau, that he might be master of the passes of the Dimel.

The French army, that had assembled at Cassel, marched, on the 22d, for Grebenstein; whence the count de Lutace was detached toward Göttingen. Luckner was immediately sent by

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prince



prince Ferdinand on the Leine, to observe the motions of the Saxons. The prince on this resolved to attack the French, that he might, from the commencement of the campaign, reduce them to act on the defensive. To this effect Luckner was obliged to return from Sabbaburg, with a part of his corps, he being to attack the enemy. Lord Granby had orders to fall on the left, and prince Ferdinand proposed to present himself, with the main army, in the front of the marshals. The allies passed the Dimel, on the 24th, to form these different attacks. The French understood this manœuvre as a general forage, and gave no signs of disquietude. The corps of de Castries, which protected the right of the prince de Soubise, was immediately overthrown; and the allies assaulted the very camp. Seeing himself attacked in front, in flank, and in rear, de Soubise resolved on a retreat. M. de Stainville, with the flower of the French troops, threw himself into the wood of Wilhelmsthal, to favour the retreat, and here a battle was fought between him and lord Granby, which decided the fate of the day. The whole corps of de Stainville was surrounded and defeated. The generals Spörken and Luckner however gave the prince de Soubise an opportunity of retiring to Hochkirch, by which the attempt

tempt which prince Ferdinand meditated on Caffel was rendered abortive.

The same night the enemy passed the Fulda, and placed his camp on the heights that go from Munden to Caffel. The allies encamped opposite the French, and by different detachments seized on some castles, which were to their advantage. De Soubise, having some fears for Ziegenhain, sent de Guerchy and de Rochambeau to march between that place and Melfungen, and to detach parties on the rear of the allies. Prince Ferdinand opposed lord Granby to them; by whom they were beaten near the castle of Hornburg. In proportion as the allies extended their right, the French extended their left. The two marshals however, perceiving their position enfeebled, recalled the count de Lutace from Göttingen, to fill up the intervals of their encampments, and placed him with his corps at Lutterberg.

The prince, observing that the Saxons were left almost without support in this post, sent Gilse to attack them there, who at the head of sixteen battalions forded the Fulda. The Saxons, at the commencement of the action, defended themselves; but, when they saw one of their redoubts carried, they gave ground, and fled routed. Marshal d'Estrées came up to their

succour, and prevented them from being totally defeated. (July) Gilse prudently repassèd the Fulda, that he might not be entangled by foes, the number of whom momentarily increased.

These various attempts gave prince Ferdinand to suppose, that the most easy and certain method of vanquishing the French was to oblige them to extend still further; and, full of this project, he detached Luckner on the side of Hirschfeld. The partisan took Fulda, Amöneburg, and a number of small castles, situated on the high road from Cassel to Frankfort. This expedition, performed with promptitude, had very vexatious effects on the French marshals, who were by this means straitened in their subsistence, which they in a great part drew from the Maine. The prince de Soubise flattered himself he might re-establish his affairs, by sending forty battalions, on the Eder, to occupy the post of Schwalm. But Luckner, supported by lord Granby, induced this corps to repass the Fulda. De Soubise, on this, arrived himself, passèd the Eder, and posted himself at the Heiligenberg. As the French might not be attacked in this position, prince Ferdinand left lord Granby at the Falkenberg, and led his army to the confluence of the Eder and the Fulda. In the embarrassment which the French generals found

found themselves, by this manœuvre, they could imagine no better resource than to call in their reserve from the Lower Rhine. The prince of Condé, in consequence of orders sent him by the marshals, left le Voyer with a detachment on the Lower Lippe; and having ineffectually attempted on his march to take Hamm, he crossed Wetteravia, and marched by Gießen, on the Ohm. His purpose was to incline to the Upper Eder; there again to attempt that plan in the execution of which de Soubise had failed.

The hereditary prince, who thus far had observed the prince of Condé, departed with equal speed; and having left some troops to observe le Voyer, he traversed the principality of Waldeck, and gained the banks of the Ohm, before the reserve of the French from the Lower Rhine could come up.

While these motions were made by the reserves, prince Ferdinand was desirous of attacking the French, before they should be joined by the prince de Condé. He intended to alarm the enemy in front, but to make his grand efforts against de Guerchy, who was encamped beyond the Fulda, near Melsungen. Prince Frederic of Brunswick was detached, with six battalions and twelve squadrons, to make the circuit of the Werra, and to seize on Wanfried and Eschwege,

from which he might fall on the rear of the foe. Dispositions were made for the general attack on the 8th of August; but a heavy rain fell, swelled the waters of the Fulda, and prevented the troops from fording the river, and from marching to their destined posts, at the time fixed. The enterprize ended in a cannonade, which continued three days.

The prince of Condé, in the interim, took the castle of Ulrichstein. After having attempted the passage of the Ohm various times, and always in vain, he endeavoured to send a detachment forward to Hirschfeld, that he might aid the two marshals who commanded the French army. The prince de Soubise, in order to second the intentions of the prince de Condé, commanded de Stainville to bombard the castle of Friedewalde. Having been successful in this, the communication between the French army and the Maine, which had been interrupted, was again free. This army was at that time so posted, in Hesse, that it formed a grand semicircle; one end of which, passing by Marbourg and Gießen, ended at the Lahn, and the other, including Hirschfeld, Melsungen, Cassel, and Münden, terminated at the Fulda.

Prince Ferdinand most ardently was desirous of acting decisively: he wished to strike a stroke  
by



by which his superiority over the French, for the remainder of the campaign, should be indisputable. To this effect he reinforced the hereditary prince, with fifteen battalions and twenty squadrons. His project was to carry the corps of de Lévi. The hereditary prince would have succeeded had Luckner come up in time. (the 24th) Few however of the French escaped.

After this expedition, he drove the prince de Condé from the banks of the Ohm, beyond Gießen, to an old Roman intrenchment, called the Polgraben; but this ended in a cannonade. Still the prince de Soubise could not longer maintain himself in Hesse without being exposed to great danger. He therefore evacuated Göttingen, threw fourteen battalions into Cassel, and retired through Hirschfeld for Fulda. Prince Ferdinand nearly kept pace with him; and, in the mean time, detached prince Frederic of Brunswick, in the rear, to blockade Cassel. The French fell back to the Maine; because their grand army could no otherwise than by this march rejoin the reserve under the prince de Condé. The latter, who retreated through Butzbach and Friedberg for Frankfort, was closely followed by the hereditary prince.

The army of the allies having fixed its camp at Schotten on the Nidda, the hereditary prince

received orders to occupy Fritzlar. He was on his march (the 30th) for Affenheim; when, having been informed, by Luckner, that the heights of Nauenheim were occupied by the enemy, he speeded thither, attacked, and dislodged the French. It was not long before he perceived that, instead of a detachment, he was engaged with the van-guard of the army of de Soubise. The French advanced in several columns, and attacked in turn. The prince defended himself bravely, but had the misfortune to be dangerously wounded, and his troops giving way could no more be brought to rally. This disaster obliged prince Ferdinand to change his plan, and his position. He removed his camp to Orlof, opposite Friedberg, and there remained till the 7th of September.

Receiving intelligence that the French were secretly filing off toward Butzbach, he judged that in order to execute his grand design, which was to recover Cassel, he must at all events prevent the enemy from entering, through Upper Hesse and the county of Waldeck, the Lower Hesse. For this purpose he put his army in motion, that he might gain the heights which rise behind the Ohm and the Lahn. The French generals harassed him on his march, that they might give the prince de Condé time to pass the  
the

the Lahn at Marbourg, and to gain the heights of Wetter. Yet, notwithstanding the rains and frequent skirmishes of the rear-guard, prince Ferdinand first attained Wetter; and the prince de Condé, perceiving this impediment, avoided any engagement, and repassed the Lahn.

Here the allies established themselves; and extended their left, by Kirchheim, toward Homburg on the Ohm. The prince de Soubise, wishing to relieve Ziegenhain and Cassel, attempted to open the road that leads to Ziegenhain. To effect this, he engaged in an action at the Bruckenmuhle, which became obstinate, and in which he lost many men, having been several times vigorously repulsed. The two armies continued in the same position during the rest of the campaign.

While this inactivity continued, prince Frederic of Brunswick opened his trenches before Cassel. The siege commenced on the 15th of October, and continued to the 7th of November, when it surrendered by capitulation. Such was the glorious conclusion of the campaign of the allies; during which prince Ferdinand had occasion to display all his abilities, and to prove that a good general at the head of an army is more powerful than a host of combatants.

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We have hastened over and abridged the relation of the operations of the allied army; and with the more reason because that, during this year, the war of Germany having been at a distance from the confines of Saxony, and the states of the king, the motions of prince Ferdinand had no connexion with those of the Prussian arms. At present we shall resume the narrative of the campaign of Silesia, and the chain of events will necessarily conduct us into Saxony, where we shall terminate the history of the acts of this campaign by a recital of those of his royal highness prince Henry.

(June) The endeavours that had been made to intimidate the Imperial cavalry will no doubt be recollected, and how successful those endeavours had been. It was one of the points first necessary for the campaign. Another equally essential was not neglected. The prince of Bevern had already advanced to Troppau, whence he ordered general Werner to advance to Grätz, who there took a hundred and fifty prisoners. This obliged Beck to pass the Mora, and to retire to Freudenthal.

We shall break off at this diversion that we may come to the Russians; who passed the Oder on the 30th of June, and, on the same day, arrived at Lissa. The king had detached  
Wied

Wied in advance, with twenty-four battalions, beyond the rivulet of Schweidnitz, under the pretence of covering the march of the Russians, but in reality that he might have a corps on the other side of the rivulet, which was necessary for the execution of the project the king had formed against his foes. These troops kept in cantonments that were extremely close, that the Imperialists might not take umbrage.

The army of the king began its operations on the first of July. The grand army came and encamped at Sagßchutz, while Wied kept pace with it by night, and advanced on the other side of the rivulet, in close cantonments. He had nothing to fear from the Austrians, nor could he by them be discovered; because Reitzenstein was in his front, with four thousand horse, and blockaded Ellerichhausen, at the Pitschenberg. Had Daun persisted but little in guarding his camp of Domanz, it must have been turned by Wied, who would have passed the rivulet of Striegau at Peterwitz, and marched along the Nonnenbusch, whence he would have gained the camp of Kunzendorf, and have come upon the back of the marshal. This would have obliged him to repass Bögendorf, and to fall back among the mountains; whether it should be toward Hohengiersdorf, or Leutmannsdorf. But

Daun,



Daun, too prudent to wait for this extremity, quitted the hill of Zobten and the Pittschenberg, on the very same night, and placed his camp on the hills between Bögendorf, Kunzendorf, and the Zeiskenberg.

(The 3d) The army of the king closely followed, and recovered its former position of Bunzelwitz. The light troops approached within pistol-shot of the Imperial grand guards. Reitzenstein occupied the heights of Striegau, and Wied, whom he covered, cantoned his troops in that town, and in the nearest villages. The situation Daun had assumed rendered an attack in front impracticable; yet he might be turned either on the right or on the left. As too much must have been left to chance should it be attempted to turn him between Silberberg and Bögendorf, because that Haddick was at Wartha, and because the mountains on this side are more rugged and difficult; it was preferred to manœuvre on the left, and to take him in the rear by Hohenfriedberg, Reichenau, and the Engelsberg. This project was executed in the following manner. Ziethen garnished the camp of Bunzelwitz, with the second line; and, to hold the enemy in awe, kept all the cuirassiers of the army there, that would have been useless in the mountains (the 6th) while  
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the king began his march, in the evening, with his first line, and joined Reitzenstein and Wied, who formed his van-guard. By break of day, the van-guard arrived near Reichenau, where it fell on the advanced posts of Brentano; these were hotly pursued to the foot of the Engelsberg, where their general encamped. Brentano had posted his infantry on the summit of three rocks covered by a strong defile. Wied full of ardour attacked him, perhaps too hotly. The rocks were found too difficult of access for the troops to climb. The Prussians made vain attempts, were repulsed, and lost, in killed, wounded, and taken, twelve hundred men. The main body of the troops encamped at Reichenau; but Wied continued his march through the defiles of Landshut. The end of this expedition was to carry the grand magazine at Braunau, which Brentano suspecting quitted the Engelsberg, and departed full speed on the same night for Friedland.

Daun, deprived of this detachment, which covered his rear, feared the Prussians would come upon his back. He therefore forsook his position of Kunzendorf, and retired to Dittmannsdorf, whence his left extended to Beerfeldorf. He further placed a corps at Tannhausen, which covered his flank; and another on his  
right

right at Burkersdorf, by the aid of which he maintained his communication with the fortress of Schweidnitz.

Ziethen immediately followed the foe (the 7th) and occupied the heights of Kunzendorf and Furstenstein. The corps that the king had led among the mountains joined him and was posted from Seitendorf to Bögendorf, in the camp marshal Daun had occupied in the year 1760. Detachments were placed in the defiles of Waldenburg and Gottsberg, and Manteufel took post, with six thousand men, on the eminence of Hohengierdorf, at the foot of which, beside the valley of Schweidnitz, Knobloch encamped with his brigade.

Wied, who pursued his march, encountered the corps of Brentano at Friedland, and received it with a warm cannonade, after which Reitzenstein attacked the enemy. The Finck dragoons had, on this occasion, the honour of beating three regiments of Imperial cuirassiers, from whom they took a hundred and eighty prisoners. Brentano escaped into Bohemia, and posted himself between Dittersbach and Hauptmannsdorf, in a camp that the enemy had previously fortified, to secure a deposit for provisions. Wied on the morrow was reinforced by four battalions and three regiments of cavalry; but,

but, had the whole army marched against Braunau, it could have undertaken nothing, because the defiles of the rocks are impregnable, if they are defended with only a few men; and because they cannot be turned. Marshal Daun had sent Haddick thither, from Wartha, with ten thousand men.

The hills, thus occupied by the enemy, being secure from attack, Wied directed his march for Trautenau, whence he let loose his Cossacks on Bohemia, and supported them with some dragoons. Terror was presently spread through the kingdom. On the second day after they had entered it, one of their parties appeared at the gates of Prague. The panic their presence inspired was so great that Serbelloni was on the point of quitting Saxony, with his army, personally to oppose the disorders the Cossacks committed. True it is their procedure was cruel; they sacked, pillaged, and burned every place they found on their route.

This irruption would not have been unfruitful, might it have been prolonged; but these troops, incapable of discipline, were wholly employed in collecting and securing booty; whence it happened that, retiring in parties, without the order of their commander, they escaped with what they had captured, to sell it in Poland:

land: so that in a week Bohemia saw itself delivered, without drawing a sword. They might have been employed in a second incursion, had not the face of affairs suddenly changed. Wied, who covered their retreat, secured at the same time his communication with the grand army. His detachments, distributed in gradation, guarded the defiles of the mountains. Gablenz occupied, in his rear, the pass of Schazlar; the prince of Bernburg, still nearer the army, that of Liebau; whence he communicated at Conradswalde with Salenmon, who there held an intermediate post. These various detachments had the less to fear, on the part of the enemy, because the attention of the latter was wholly absorbed by their apprehensions for the magazine of Braunau; which, for the greater safety, they transported to Scharfeneck, in the county of Glatz.

We have seen that the diversion of the Cossacks into Bohemia was productive of nothing real. Any attempts on the magazine of Braunau, now removed by the Imperialists, were no longer to be made, so that the whole left of the enemy ceased to present a field fruitful in expeditions. As the principal object of the campaign was to recover Schweidnitz, the king proposed to act on the right of the Austrians,



and to dislodge their detachments from Burkersdorf and Leutmannsdorf, that he might totally cut off their communication with Schweidnitz.

This design, which had every degree of probability sufficient to make it imagined infallible, the next day became incertain, and almost chimerical, by one of those sudden and unexpected events which overthrow the measures of man. A revolution had been effected, and the face of Russia was changed. Czernichef first brought the news to the king. He came to inform him Peter III. had been dethroned by the empress his wife, and that he had received orders from the senate for him and his corps to take the oath of fidelity to the new sovereign, and incessantly to quit the Prussian army, and retire into Poland. In the present situation of the king, amid the operations of a campaign the plans of which were conceived according to the aid the Russians might afford, this intelligence was a thunder-bolt. Severe as it was, still he must act; the evil was without remedy; he must recur to his proper resources, since foreign aid failed. The information brought from Prussia, or Pomerania, farther affirmed that the Russian troops were preparing to recommence hostilities. An ukase (or edict) appeared, in which

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the king was treated as the hereditary and irreconcilable foe of Russia. The commissaries of the empress again seized on the revenues of Prussia royal. In fine, according to all appearance, his majesty was on the eve of a new rupture. But appearances are often deceitful.

The proceedings of the empress went on false suppositions. She apprehended that the king, hearing of the imprisonment of Peter III. would oblige the corps of Czernichef to declare for the emperor, and should he refuse that he would disarm the troops. Not to be without reprisal, she seized on Prussia as a guarantee for the conduct of the king, and gave orders to her generals to hold themselves in readiness again to commence war, the moment she should so think proper. But the ideas she had conceived were erroneous: the king did not oppose the departure of Czernichef; the only complaisance he exacted was that he should defer his march for three days, to which the general with a good grace yielded.

These three days were most precious: by these it was necessary to profit, and to strike some decisive blow. The Austrians were awed by the presence of the Russians; and were ignorant of the revolution that had happened. Schweidnitz must be recovered, or it must be determined

determined to cede all quarters except those beside the Oder, as during the past year. Should this campaign glide unprofitably away, every effort lately taken for the recovery of the half of Silesia would be lost, and all appearances of peace would totally vanish. Such reasons determined the king to commit something to chance. He acted with more daring temerity than he would have done under more favourable circumstances.

The enterprize which the Prussians might attempt related to the attack of two difficult and formidable posts. That of Burkersdorf defended the defile which leads through the mountains from Königsberg, and ends on the plain at Oehmsdorf. On each side of this defile, steep and rugged hills arise, which were fortified by casemated redoubts, and palisadoes, and surrounded by abatis. Three of those nearest Hohengiersdorf communicated by an intrenchment. Another intrenchment then began, which closed the bottom of the strait; and, proceeding upward, ended on the summit of a mountain, situated toward Leutmannsdorf. O'Kelly defended these works with four thousand men. The post of Leutmannsdorf, though less fortified by art, presented a front difficult of access, full of and intersected by ravins and hollow ways, and

supplying every obstacle which rude nature can produce for the defence of ground. This post was in like manner guarded by four thousand Austrians.

(The 18th.) That the army might be in a condition to attack these posts, it was first necessary the troops should all change their position. Gablenz took the camp of Trautlieberdorf, in order to mask the departure of Wied for Bohemia. Knobloch quitted the camp of Seiten-dorf, and followed the route of Wied. They both descended the hills into the plain at Freyburg, and made the tour of Schweidnitz, which was blockaded by the cavalry of the king. Wied marched by night to Faulbruck, where he cantoned his troops. He was covered by Röhl, whom the king, during the whole campaign, had placed, with a thousand horse, in that part, to observe the enemy; so that the Austrians had no knowledge of the approach of the Prussians. Knobloch, who passed by night through Bunzelwitz and Creyffau, marched on the morrow morning on the left of Polnisch Weistritz; while Möllendorf, who came with his brigade, and ten battalions from the foot of the hills of Hohen-gierdorf, inclined on the right of the village. By the junction of these two generals, the king cut off the corps of Burkerdorf, and  
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consequently the Austrian army, from its communication with Schweidnitz. The corps of Wied was destined to the attack of Leutmannsdorf; those of Knobloch and Möllendorf to that of Burkersdorf.

That no precaution might be omitted which this plan required, we shall remark that Mantufel had been previously posted on the eminence of Hohengiersdorf, where the heavy batteries that had been there erected were employed to take the intrenchments, occupied by O'Kelly, that were nearest this post in the rear. The prince of Wurtemberg, for still further security, was detached with twenty squadrons, that during the action he might observe the posts of the Austrians of Silberberg and Wartha, and that the enemy might not, from these, come on the back of Wied, while he should attack the enemy at Leutmannsdorf.

Precautions concerning marshal Daun were also necessary. He must be employed during the attack and impeded from sending succour to the posts that were to be carried. With this view Gablenz was ordered to make some demonstrations toward Braunau, that he might attract the attention of the Imperialists, and Ramin had orders to skirmish with the enemy's posts toward Tannhausen. The grand



army was to strike its tents, and to put itself in order of battle, and Manteufel had it in charge to harass the pandours that were between his camp and the right of the Austrians. These various objects, by which Daun should be occupied, would prevent him from penetrating the intents of the Prussians, and would facilitate their execution.

With respect to the attacks themselves, it was necessary the assault made by Wied should precede that of Möllendorf; because that this general, in turning his position of Burkersdorf, must necessarily present his flank to the Austrians, posted at Leutmannsdorf; and should Wied have the misfortune to be repulsed, the corps of Möllendorf would then be exposed to total destruction.

On the night of the 20th, Möllendorf seized on the castle of Oehmsdorf, where he took fifty prisoners. There was need of this castle, the nearer to approach the foot of the mountains; where, on that very night, trenches were opened. Batteries were here constructed for forty howitzers and twelve twelve-pounders. The howitzers were to be employed to bombard the redoubts, and the artillery to sweep the defile, through which O'Kelly might receive succour from the Imperial army. This general imagined himself in an impregnable post, and was in the utmost security.

security. He attributed the motions of the Prussians entirely to their intention of besieging Schweidnitz, and imagined every step they was a preparatory approach to that siege.

On the 21st, at break of day, Wied lodged himself on a small hill, opposite and near to the post of Leutmannsdorf. Here he erected a battery of thirty pieces of heavy artillery, sustained by a line of fourteen battalions. Under the protection of this fire, Lottum with his brigade glided through a hollow way on the right, which led to the back of the enemy. This was seconded by a similar manœuvre on the left. The march of the prince of Bernburg was covered by ravins and bushes, and was directed to the right flank of the Imperialists. The enemy, taken in flank and rear by the Prussians, made but a feeble resistance. Wied at the same time advanced on their front, and the intrenchment was carried at the first effort. The victors from thence drove the vanquished immediately as far as Henrichau, Heidelberg, and Hausdorf. Brentano, whom Daun, in despite of all the appearances that had been given him, still had sent to succour this post; Brentano, I repeat, arrived too late, and was carried away among the fugitive Austrians, who had just then been beaten at Leutmannsdorf.

No sooner was Wied master of the heights than the Prussian batteries of Oehmsdorf began to play upon the enemy. Fifteen hundred dragoons whom O'Kelly had placed before his infantry, in a bottom, who expected nothing less than an attack, and who had dismounted, finding themselves suddenly played upon from batteries which they had not perceived, overwhelmed their own infantry, threw it into disorder, and hurried it with them, pell-mell, quite to the Imperial army.

By the flight of these troops, the redoubts of this post remained but feebly garnished. Möllendorf immediately on his left threw himself into the wood which communicates with the woods of Leutmannsdorf; and, turning O'Kelly from the hills, dislodged the enemy, after some resistance. The Prussian infantry set fire to the palisadoes of a redoubt which the Austrians continued to hold, and which they were thus constrained at length to abandon. O'Kelly, notwithstanding this attack, maintained himself on the eminence which is on the right of the road from Polnisch Weistritz to Königsberg. To oblige him to quit this remaining part of his position, Möllendorf erected a battery on the hill that he had carried, and the forty howitzers were brought up near the foot of the mountain, whence

whence the enemy was not yet dislodged. Manteufel, at the same time, came on the back of the intrenchments that were near his post of Hohengiersdorf. These cannonades, in front, in flank, and in rear, forced the enemy at length to retire.

The Prussians by their various attacks took two thousand prisoners. The garrison of Schweidnitz indeed made a sally during the action; but the cavalry by which it was opposed, and some volleys of artillery, induced it to re-enter the place in tolerable haste.

In consequence of the manœuvre that had been executed by Wied, who now was near Heidelberg, the Imperial army was in some manner cut off from the county of Glatz. Marshal Daun, convinced of the necessity of changing his position, decamped the same night. He supported his right on the Eule, the highest mountain of the vicinity, whence his front extended by Wusten-Waltersdorf, and Tannhausen, to Jauernick. The reserve of that army, under the command of Laudon, covered the left, and took its position between Wusten-Giersdorf and Braunau.

Wied assumed a camp opposite the right of the Imperialists, and occupied that chain of hills that extends from Taschendorf to Heidelberg.

Manteufel

Manteufel with his corps was made to advance to Beersdorf, where he joined Wied by his left, and Ramin by his right. The latter continued with his brigade to remain motionless on the mountain of Seitendorf. Exclusive of these various camps, the army still held its post at Gottsberg, and at Waldenburg; and Salenmon, who had a post of information, occupied the defiles of Landshut, to observe the motions the enemy might make in that quarter.

These various corps, though encamped on steep heights, had orders to intrench themselves. The earth was thrown up, the works were palisadoed, and abatis were made, in convenient places; in fine, they were so well secured that not one of the detachments that occupied the mountains had either to fear attack or surprise, on the part of the foe. Such precautions, though under other circumstances they would have been superfluous, were now requisite; because the king was obliged to weaken himself by twenty-four battalions that were to undertake the siege of Schweidnitz, and because he saw that he soon must be under the necessity of making frequent detachments, which he could not have done without risk to the army, had not his position been first rendered impregnable. What was singular, during this operation, was that



that the very day marshal Daun quitted his camp of Dittmansdorf, to take post on the Eule and at Wusten-Waltersdorf, the Russians quitted the Prussians, and departed for Poland, without the Imperialists receiving the least intimation of their march.

The twenty-four battalions and thirty squadrons, that were destined for the siege of Schweidnitz, assembled at the foot of the heights of Kunzendorf. The greatest part of the cavalry, which neither could be employed among the mountains nor at the siege, was sent to the prince of Wurtemberg, who still was at Kletschberg, and serious preparations were made to attack a place defended by a garrison of eleven thousand men, and one of the first engineers in Europe.

No more hopes were to be entertained of a diversion on the part of the Tartar. The khan of the Crimea, indeed, marched with five or six thousand men to the frontiers of Poland; but the sudden changes that had happened in Russia had so bewildered both Turks and Tartars that they knew not how to decide, or what part they ought to take. These reasons further determined the king to recal the prince of Bevern from Moravia, where he still was, that he might, in some manner, secure the capture of Schweidnitz. It was necessary that every thing should  
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concur to promote this plan. The king had not a man too much for the enterprize ; and, as soon as this should be accomplished, it would then be in his power to employ his troops elsewhere.

To be convinced of the necessity of the reunion of the army, we need but enumerate the different corps against which the Prussians had to make head. That is to say, the army of marshal Daun, the corps of Laudon, of Haddick, of Brentano, of Beck, and of Ellerichhausen ; beside the detachments of Silberberg and Wartha ; the whole amounting to seventy thousand men. Although the army of the king was nearly equal in strength, still we must deduct the troops drafted off for the siege of Schweidnitz ; and we must especially reflect on the extent of ground, infinitely more great than that of the enemy, which the Prussians occupied. The king might also well expect efforts would be made by the Imperialists for the relief of Schweidnitz, and these it was necessary he should be able to oppose with promptitude. Thus, notwithstanding Warner had obtained various advantages over Beck in Moravia, he was commanded to retire, and join the prince of Wurtemberg, on the 1st of August, in the camp of Peterwalde. The prince of Bevern, who followed, arrived at  
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Neifs, at the same time, where he covered the convoy of ammunition, that was collected for the siege of Schweidnitz.

Tauenzien, to whom the direction of this siege was confided, then departed with a similar convoy from Breslau, to march to the environs of Schweidnitz. He invested the town, on the 4th of August; and the trenches were opened the 7th. They began at the brick-kiln, and inclined toward Wurben, to include the polygon of Jauernick, toward which the attack was directed. The governor made a sally on the same day, but which did not answer his expectation. Reitzenstein with his dragoons fell on the Austrian infantry, and repulsed it to the town barriers.

From this time it was the opinion of the king that, should Daun attempt to succour the fortresses, he would no doubt march by Silberberg, Wartha, and Langen-Bielau. This was the most convenient road; for, should he take the route of Landshut, he would have every kind of inconvenience to encounter. He had withdrawn his magazine from Braunau, which would render the transport of provisions difficult, in that part; that road is beside the longest, and on which his attempts might be most easily prevented: add to which, by marching past Silberberg, he  
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would at the same time cover Glatz, might employ the detachments that occupied the defiles, and would be, at all times, certain of a retreat, because he would have two well-fortified posts in his rear.

Convinced by this reasoning, the king removed his head quarters to Peterfwalde, where he was joined by the brigade of Möllendorf. The camp which the king assumed touched, as we may say, the left of Wied. The brigade of Nimschewsky was placed on a hill of the defiles of Steinseiffersdorf, by which it covered the brigade of Knobloch, which formed the extremity of the camp of Taschendorf. The infantry of the king extended behind the ravin of Peterfwalde, and his cavalry occupied the ground which, in the front of Peiskersdorf, goes toward Faulbruck. The prince of Bevern arrived, on the morrow, from Neifs, by a forced march, and a camp was assigned him beyond Reichenbach, on the heights of Mittelpelle, toward Gnadenfrey. The position of this small army made a kind of angle; one line of which, descending from Steinseiffersdorf, was prolonged in the direction of Reichenbach; where the other, turning by the hills of Peila, ended at a considerable escarpment. The town of Reichenbach, situated

between these two camps, was the precise angular point.

The above position had every advantage that could be wished: it covered Wied by the camp at Peterfwalde, who without that precaution might have been turned by the enemy; and the corps of the prince of Bevern prevented the Austrians, on leaving the mountains, from inclining to the hill of Zobten, whence they might support Schweidnitz, and consequently cause the siege to be raised. Thus the enemy, on that side, was reduced either to make a circuit through Nimptsch, which would give the Prussians sufficient time to prevent their attempts at Pfaffendorf, or to attack the post of Peila, which was good, and where the prince of Bevern might honourably maintain himself. Beside, let it be supposed that the Imperialists should take the route of Landshut, to succour Schweidnitz, still they could not descend into the plain till they had first made two long marches; instead of which the troops of the king might remove in six hours from Peterfwalde to Freyburg, where a camp had been prepared to cover, should it be found necessary, the siege of Schweidnitz, on that side. The reason why the king did not occupy the heights of the Hutberg, and of the Kletschberg, was that neither of the situations corresponded

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to his two principal objects; that is to say they did not cover the flank of Wied, and the siege. The Hutberg and Kletschberg are before the defile of Biela, where the enemy had a fortified post, and which, extending to the Eule, would give him an opportunity of coming on the rear of the position assumed with the whole army. This might occasion the worst of consequences. As these hills, beside, were too distant from the position of the Prussians to injure them, it was certain that the Austrians, by occupying them, could gain no kind of advantage.

Scarcely had the prince of Bevern joined the corps of the king before Beck, who followed and observed him, appeared on the Kletschberg. He did not however think proper to remain there long, and retired to Silberberg. The hussars of Möring fell upon his rear-guard, and took a lieutenant-colonel, with some men and baggage. We have already said the Austrians had an intrenched post, in the defile of the mountains, which opens at the village of Langen-Bielau. Two thirds of this village were occupied by the Prussians, garnished by the volunteers of Hordt, and served as a post of information. Detachments of hussars had been sent beyond on the Hutberg and the Spitzberg: it was however foreseen that the enemy, leaving the mountains, would

would chuse this ground for his camp ; and, as it had been determined to suffer him to remain there, only light detachments had been sent, that were in readiness to retire on the first signal.

It so happened that every thing which had been predicted came to pass. On the 16th of August marshal Daun entered these vallies, with his different columns. His van-guard skirmished with a detachment of Langen-Bielau, which retired in good order to the royal army. The marshal, at the head of forty battalions and as many squadrons, assumed his camp, which he extended from the Hutberg toward Heiderisdorf. Beck, at the same time, occupied the Kletschberg, with twelve battalions and twenty squadrons. As the Imperialists had considerably disgarnished their posts on the mountains, to assemble this army, there was no risk in doing the like ; for which reason the king called in the brigades of Ramin and Saldern, strengthened by which his corps, including that of the prince of Bevern, consisted of twenty-eight battalions and eighty squadrons. Truth however demands we should add that these brigades did not come up till the evening, when the action was over.

The king had previously made dispositions for the reciprocal defence of his two camps, and

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had agreed with the prince of Bevern that they should mutually fend each other aid. The roads had been enlarged, and communications prepared. The arrangement was that, whichever of the two corps should be assaulted by the foe, that corps should be confined to the simple defence of its camp, while the other should hasten to its succour, and act offensively. The ground was most happily adapted to this manœuvre; for supposing the corps of Peterfwalde to be attacked, the prince of Bevern naturally marched on the right flank and the rear of the foe; and if, on the contrary, the corps of Peila were assaulted, the king made a similar motion with his troops on the left of the Imperialists.

Toward noon it was perceived that the design of the marshal was to attack the prince of Bevern. His whole forces inclined to the right, opposite the camp of Peila; and, had he intended to come to action with the corps of Peterfwalde, he ought to have strengthened his left, and extended his troops to the passes of the mountains. There was no infantry on that side. All that appeared on the right of the king only consisted in some squadrons of hussars, which could not attract any attention.

Certain that on the very day, or the following night, here would be a combat with the enemy,  
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the king kept his infantry under arms, his horses ready saddled and bridled, and his light artillery near the cavalry. He went to reconnoitre the advanced posts. Scarcely had he arrived before he saw the tents of the prince of Bevern struck; and his cannon was heard. Major Ostin, who was there ready with a detachment of five hundred hussars, was instantly sent to join the corps of Peila; and the prince of Wurtemberg put himself at the head of five regiments of cavalry, with a brigade of light artillery. Möllendorf had orders to march there with his brigade. The king took with him the regiment of Werner, that he might with the greater expedition arrive on the field of battle. Ziethen, in the mean time, assumed the command of the corps of Peterstal, to prevent any misfortune from happening on that side. When the king had passed Reichenbach, he discovered the whole position in which the enemy attacked the prince of Bevern. Laschy had passed the village of Peila, with six battalions, kept concealed behind a hill on which he had erected a battery of twenty pieces of artillery. Other battalions presented themselves on the side of Gnadenfrey; and they in like manner had formed a grand battery in their front. Their design was to draw the attention of the prince of Bevern that way,

that he might not perceive the manœuvre of Beck, who was gliding through the woods to fall on his rear. O'Donnel had, at the same time, marched with forty squadrons, from the village of Peila, to cover the left flank of Laschy. The cavalry of Lentulus, which belonged to the corps of the prince of Bevern, and the hussars of Ostin, had already three times repulsed the Imperial cuirassiers in this village. The prince of Wurtemberg in the interim came up, and incontinently formed on the flank of the foe. O'Donnel had no good position to take. If he presented his front to the prince of Bevern, the prince of Wurtemberg would fall upon his flank; and if he faced the corps of the latter, Lentulus would come upon his right; add to which, he had the artillery of the prince of Bevern in his rear.

While he was under this difficulty, of which his cuirassiers were very sensible, O'Donnel received a volley from fifteen six-pounders of the light artillery, of which a battery had hastily been formed. This completely confused his men. The regiment of Werner, supported by that of Czetteritz, at the same time charged the Imperial cavalry; and after a hot contest drove it beyond the village of Peila. The flight of the horse weakened the flank of Laschy, who then  
had



had fears for his infantry, and hastened to make his retreat. Beck, who was engaged with the prince of Bevern, gave ground. The brigade of Möllendorf came up, but too late, for the enemy was retreating on all sides.

This affair cost the Austrians fifteen hundred horse. The Prussians only lost four hundred men, of the regiment of the margrave Henry, which signalized itself on that day, having singly made head against the whole corps of Beck.

Marshal Daun, dissatisfied with the failure of his attempt, did not think proper to remain any longer on the Hutberg; having apprehensions perhaps for his posts of the mountains, which he had weakened. On the morrow evening, the 17th, he retired by Wartha and Glatz to Scharfeneck, where he remained till the close of the campaign, without affording the least symptom of life.

The king pursued the Austrians; but, as this hilly country, abounding in passes and rivulets, is little proper for pursuit, he did them no injury. His majesty contented himself with ordering Werner to advance to Habensdorf, that he might there observe the posts of Silberberg and Wartha.

These various motions had been injurious to

the siege of Schweidnitz, which was not so far advanced as it ought to have been. The governor, Gualco, however began to augur ill concerning defence, after the check so lately received by marshal Daun. He therefore made an attempt to obtain an advantageous capitulation, and the freedom of his garrison. During this negotiation, Laudon had adroitly caused his emissaries to fall into the hands of the Prussians, who were charged with letters for the governor, containing all the grand projects which the Imperial army was to execute for his deliverance. But, however desirous the king was of speedily recovering the town, two reasons prevented him from consenting to the capitulation the governor offered. The first was founded on what Laudon had written, the year before, in positive terms, to the margrave Charles, to whom the correspondence of the army was committed, relative to the execution of the cartel, when he affirmed that his court held itself under no obligation of keeping its word, or fulfilling its engagements, with the king of Prussia, either relative to the exchange of prisoners, or any other object. This was urged in answer to Gualco; who was told that his promised word, for himself and garrison, not to serve for one year against the troops of his majesty, could not be accepted, after

after the formal declaration made by the court of Vienna, and contained in the letter of Laudon. The real reason, but which was not alleged, was that it would have been a capital fault to have suffered ten thousand men to leave a town which soon must be taken; for, by restoring this garrison to the Imperialists, their army would have acquired an additional ten thousand men; while that of the king must have been enfeebled, by at least four thousand, who must have been left to garrison the place; so that the Prussian army would, in the whole, have been rendered fourteen thousand men inferior to that of the Austrian.

Negotiation was interrupted and the siege continued. Hither the king came in person, on the 20th of September, that the operations might be carried on with the greater vigour. Le Fevre acted as chief engineer to the Prussians. He was opposed by one of the first engineers of his time, named Griboval, who defended the place. Le Fevre attempted to burst the mines of the besieged by employing the new invented globe of compression. Griboval burst two of these, and Le Fevre knew not how to proceed. The king was obliged to interfere in the direction of the siege, and the minutiae of labour. The third parallel was immediately prolonged;

a battery was there erected in breach; ricochet batteries were raised at the brick-kiln; and another battery thrown up on the Kuhberg, which played on the back of the works. Some breaches of the mines of the besieged were blown up. The garrison made two sallies, and dislodged the Prussians from a crowned funnel, from which they wished to extend new breaches. This contest prolonged the siege, for it was here necessary to make subterranean war. Most of the artillery however of the town was either damaged or dismounted; provisions began to be scarce; and the enemy would, for that reason, have surrendered, had not a bomb fallen before the powder magazine of the fort of Jauernick (October the 8th) the door of which by chance was open, which set fire to the powder, blew up a part of the fort, and killed three hundred of the Austrian grenadiers. This accident, which opened the town, obliged the governor to beat the chamade.

Schweidnitz capitulated on the 9th. Guaasco and his garrison, nine thousand strong, surrendered prisoners of war, and were sent into Prussia. Knobloch was entrusted with the government of the place; and Wied departed for Saxony, with a heavy detachment, to reinforce prince Henry.

Thus

Thus ended the campaign of Silesia, not so fortunately as at the commencement might have been presumed, but better than could have been hoped, after the late revolution in Russia. The king gave the command of the troops in Silesia to the prince of Bevern; and sent Ramin, Möllendorf, and Lentulus, with their brigades into Lusatia, to occupy the environs of Görlitz, and to give the Austrians apprehensions for Zittau, and Bohemia, in order to facilitate the operations of prince Henry. The army of Silesia entered into cantonments, near the intrenched camp that it had held all the campaign, and which during winter the king was satisfied with guarding by detachments, that were relieved weekly, after which his majesty personally repaired to Saxony.

While Wied is occupied in traversing Lusatia, we shall recommence the narrative of the campaign of prince Henry, which we shall continue till the arrival of this succour.

We left the prince employed in deranging the projects of Serbelloni; and Seidlitz engaged with the troops of the circles, whom he drove from Vogtland, as far as the margraviate of Bareuth. His highness wished to take satisfaction (June) for the insults the enemy had attempted to give his posts. But, as he might not venture



to dare them in the formidable positions in which they had fixed themselves, he proposed to take his revenge, by making diversions into Bohemia. With this view Kleist marched over the Basberg, and spread terror through the circle of Saatz. The alarm presently reached Serbelloni, who sent Blonquet, at the head of four thousand men, to the relief of Bohemia. This general caused the road of Einsiedel to be intrenched, where he placed some men, and fixed himself at Dux, with the main body of his detachment.

The army of the circles, on the other part, had approached Oelsnitz; whence it took the road for Schneeberg, and marched along the frontiers of Saxony, with intent to join Blonquet. Kleist, who scarcely had returned out of Bohemia, was obliged to march back, that he might render this project abortive. He assembled the detachment that was to serve under him, near Porschenstein, forced the intrenchment of Einsiedel (July) and took four hundred men, and one field-piece. He thence fell on the dragoons of Bathyani, that had come to the aid of the troops he had beaten, and put them to the rout; after which he pursued Blonquet; who, on his approach, retired from Dux to Töplitz. Here he left him; and marched full speed toward the Basberg, where he fell on the  
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flank of the army of the circles, which immediately retreated for Annaberg, afterward to Hof, and finally toward Bareuth.

Prince Henry, hearing this, resolved to send a more considerable corps into Bohemia, and to profit by the absence of the troops of the circles, to effect something of consequence. His intention was to chase the enemy from Töplitz, and take Altenberg; that he might by this means turn the post of Dippoldiswalda, which must have necessarily then been abandoned by the Imperialists. Seidlitz, to whom the execution of this plan was committed, thought proper when he departed only to leave Schulenburg with five hundred horse, in presence of the prince of Stolberg, and the army of the empire as a corps of observation, and entered Bohemia with his detachment. After a forced march, he arrived, on the 31st, at Commotau. Kleist penetrated to this place, on the 1st of August, by the village of Gorck. All the posts of information of the enemy were put to flight. Seidlitz, on the same day, reconnoitred the camp of Töplitz, which he made preparations to attack. On the morrow he intended to occupy a height which the Imperialists had neglected to seize. By an unexpected singularity, it happened that the Prussians were climbing this hill, on one side,  
and

and the Austrians on the other. The enemy having occupied it first, by this means gained the advantage of ground; and Löwenstein, who commanded the Austrians, having received reinforcements during the action, the Prussians were repulsed with the loss of four hundred men, and two field-pieces. Seidlitz had only sent four battalions to the attack; the foe had twelve: numbers were of necessity victorious. This corps, which could not afterward accomplish its purpose, retired into Saxony, and intrenched itself at Porschenstein. Though the attempt of prince Henry was not fortunate, his successive enterprises, during the month of August, prevented the junction of the army of the empire and that of the Austrians.

The prince of Stolberg, having only five hundred horse to oppose, not finding in these any obstacle to impede his acting, marched his army from Bareuth to Caden, where he was joined by colonel Törreck. The Prussian army of Saxony had in like manner been joined by Belling, who was immediately sent to act in Vogtland; whence this general, profiting by the absence of the prince of Stolberg, made an incursion into Bohemia, with an intent to call him back. Coming suddenly before the gates of Egra, he made some discharges from his  
artillery

artillery on the town ; and the feeble garrison, by which it was defended, was on the point of surrendering to his hussars. But prince Henry had need of his corps in another place ; he was obliged to march into Lusatia, to oppose Lutzinsky, who was hovering with a detachment on the side of Elsterwerda and Senftenberg, and to whom grand designs were attributed.

However little the progress of the Prussians hitherto had been, this progress had not failed to irritate the court of Vienna ; which, supremely dissatisfied with the incursions they had made into Bohemia, threw the whole blame on the Imperial generals. The empress queen was particularly angry that Serbelloni effected nothing, with the numerous forces under his command. He was accused for not having possessed either capacity or vigilance sufficient to cover the kingdom of Bohemia. This discontent occasioned his recall ; and the court sent general Haddick, as his substitute, who had been brought into favour by marshal Daun.

The prince of Stolberg, who during this time still continued his march, passed by Toplitz and Gieshubel, and joined the Imperial army not far from Dresden, nearly about the time that Haddick assumed the command. The new commander wished to signalize his arrival

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by some effective stroke; and, on the 27th of September, ordered a general attack to be made on all the detached posts of the camp of Pretschendorf. Butler, in effect, forced some intrenched posts in the wood of the Tharand, that were defended by free battalions; while the prince of Löwenstein, whose corps had arrived from Bohemia, obliged Kleist to retreat for Seyda. On the morrow, prince Henry drove Butler from the posts he had conquered; and Seidlitz forced three thousand Austrians to quit the bottom of Frauenstein, where they had lodged themselves the day before.

(September) The advantages gained on this side did not prevent Löwenstein from repulsing still farther the troops under Kleist, nor from establishing himself at Seyda. The position he assumed here exposed the Prussian ovens of Freyberg to be taken; and prince Henry, at the same time, was encumbered by an enemy on his rear. The ground the prince had to defend was beside so extensive that, let the enemy attack on which side he would, in full force, he must have been superior. These motives induced his highness to quit the vicinage of Pretschendorf, and to encamp at Freyberg, behind the Mulde; which he executed on the 31st of September. Generals Forcade and Hulsén,



on the same day, again took the camp of Meissen and the Katzenhæuser. Belling (October) who had been recalled from Lusatia was detached with Kleist to the village of Hartmannsdorf; whence he advanced to Groß-Schirna, to defend the ford against Löwenstein, who had taken post behind the rivulet and the village of Chemnitz.

The camp of Freyberg, which prince Henry had taken, had still the defect of being too extensive; or, more properly speaking, the army had that of not being sufficiently numerous. All the fords of the Mulde were to be defended, and particularly the right flank, which faced the village of Brandt, and looked toward the Rathsheide. Beside the defence of this vast space, the communication between the corps of the Katzenhæuser and Meissen was to be ascertained by occupying the post of Nossen. Hulsen and Forcade had not more than fourteen battalions to maintain the banks of the Tripsche; so that we may affirm a single man might not be detached without totally disgarnishing the army. The prince had resolved to intrench his camp, but he could neither collect sufficient workmen, nor tools enough for a labour so great; so that the works that had been planned were scarcely begun.

Such

Such was the situation of affairs when, on the morning of the 14th, Ried appeared with fifteen battalions opposite Hulsen, on the heights of Seligenstedt. The centre of the army of Haddick inclined, at the same time, for Niederschöne; the troops of the circles encamped at the village of Chemnitz; Campitelli formed at the village of Weissenborn. On the extremity of the right of his royal highness, and exclusive of the corps we have just mentioned, Klefeld marched with five thousand horse against Belling, to dislodge him from Hartmannsdorf. Belling made a feigned retreat; but, suddenly facing about, he charged the enemy with such fury that he put him to flight, and recovered his post. The two armies passed the night under arms.

The enemy, on the morrow, made a serious attack on all the passes of the Mulde, and was repulsed on every side by the Prussians. Immediately after the assailants had retired, prince Henry repaired to his right. It was evening, and began to be dark; but how great was his surprise to perceive the confusion which reigned there! Belling had been driven from his post. The prince of Stolberg had profited by the moment to occupy the Rathswald, by which he came on the flank and rear of the Prussians. This very considerable derangement obliged his

his highness to abandon his position, which under such circumstances was no longer tenable. At midnight he departed, and marched his army in three columns to gain the Cellische-Wald, without inciting suspicion in the enemy, who testified no desire to disturb his retreat. The troops were barracked in the forest (the 16th) to preserve them from the cold. On the morrow, they took a more advantageous position, between Reichberg and Voigtsberg. Haddick, with the main army, remained on the Landberg, and the troops of the circles, reinforced by Campitelli, intrenched themselves round Freyberg, where they soon were to be joined by Maquire.

On the other side, Wied was on the full march. He approached Bautzen, and was to occupy the heights of Weiffig, to advance on the White Stag, where he would come on the back of the post of Bockberg, and might bombard the new city of Dresden. This diversion had been given him in command, that he might oblige Haddick to send a strong detachment beyond the Elbe, in order that prince Henry might have time to breathe, and to re-establish his affairs. But marshal Daun, having perfectly divined the intention of the king, had sent prince Albert of Saxony, with a detachment of twelve

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battalions

battalions and fifteen squadrons, to keep pace with Wied, that Haddick might still preserve his superiority in Saxony. Prince Albert traversed Zittau, and gained the heights of Weißig before the Prussians. Wied, having thus failed in his attempt, fell back for Radeberg, whence he turned for Groß-Dobritz, that he might approach the Elbe, and join the army of his royal highness, after having passed the river.

While these things happened in Lusatia, the prince meditated an attack by which he promised to revenge himself on his foe. It was necessary to drive the Imperialists and the troops of the circles from the hills of Saxony, as well because they were needful for the subsistence of his troops, during winter, as because it was important not to lose ground when peace was expected. Was it not also necessary to avenge the honour of the Prussian arms? And might he not reasonably fear that, should he give the prince of Stolberg time to receive succour, this prince himself would undertake some expedition against Prussia? Prudence, honour, interest, politics, all united to induce him to anticipate the enemy; and his highness was not tardy in the execution of his project.

The prince began his march on the 28th of October. His right passed the villages of Braunsdorf

dorf and Hennerdorf. His left, after leaving the defile of Grune, divided into two corps; one of which halted at Hennerdorf, and the other at Groß-Schirna. These troops were again in motion on the 29th. The extremity of the left, which was to attract the attention of the enemy, was formed by Forcade, on the height of Groß-Schirna. Belling drove the Imperialists from the wood of the Struht, and established himself there with two battalions and ten squadrons. This position gave the elder Stutterheim the means of erecting batteries; against the redoubts that the army of the circles had near Walterdorf. The right of the Prussians continued its march, and left this battery and the wood of the Struht on the left. Kleist, with his van-guard, was obliged to rid himself of two abatis, maintained by croats, and to dislodge these troops that he might open himself a road to the column of his highness.

The prince of Stolberg and Campitelli had formed in order of battle round Freyberg. Their right was supported at Tutendorf; their left, which extended behind the defile of Walterdorf, proceeded to the Spittlewald. They had beside constructed redoubts on the heights of Curbitz, which they had surrounded with abatis. The march of prince Henry led directly on the



back of this position, which the prince of Stolberg no sooner perceived than he employed his second line to fill the void, that remained between his left and the height of the Drey-Creutzer. Three thousand paces from this army, between the Brandt and Erbsdorf, another corps was perceived, consisting of about six thousand men, which presented itself on these heights, commanded by one general Mayer.

The Prussians already were at the Spittlewald. Their attack was vigorous, and they took a whole Imperial battalion of Wied. Duringhofen and Manstein were posted at this wood, between the village of St. Michael and the Spittlewald, with four battalions and six squadrons, to keep the corps of this general Mayer in check. These precautions taken, the Prussian grenadiers passed the part of the wood that lies nearest to the village of St. Michael, and formed in order of battle, opposite the height of the Drey-Creutzer. The grenadiers, supported by cuirassiers and dragoons, attacked the foe; and, after a fire that continued nearly an hour and a half, they were victorious. Seidlitz with his cavalry then fell on the fugitives, whom he continued to capture to the very gates of Freyberg.

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The troops of the circles now abandoned the redoubts on the side of Waltersdorf. Stutterheim seized the moment to pass this defile, and let loose his cavalry on the routed; by which the confusion and flight of the vanquished were augmented. Butler, who had not passed the Mulde, having hitherto remained a spectator of the battle, wished to gain honour on the field; and sent, but too late, the regiment of Joseph-Esterhazy, to succour the troops of the circles. The whole regiment was taken. At length the prince of Stolberg, Campitelli, Mayer, and Butler himself, all fled to Frauenstein, where they scarcely thought themselves in safety.

The enemy in this battle lost thirty pieces of artillery, sixty-six officers, and near eight thousand men; four thousand of whom were taken by his royal highness. The loss of the Prussians did not amount to a thousand, because they met with no very obstinate resistance. They were only twenty-nine battalions and sixty squadrons strong. The enemy they had to combat, exclusive of the advantage of ground, had he known how to defend this advantage, had forty-nine battalions and seventy-eight squadrons. But military success depends more on the capacity of the general than on the number of his troops. It would be superfluous here to write the pane-

gyric of prince Henry of Prussia; the best eulogium that can be bestowed on him is the recital of his actions. The intelligent will here easily remark that happy combination of prudence and audacity, so uncommon and so much to be desired, which assembles and unites most of the perfections that nature can accord to form a great captain.

After the victory, the prince cleared the banks of the Wilde-Weistritz of the few enemies that still remained; which gave so hot an alarm to Haddick that he immediately caused the troops of prince Albert to pass the Elbe, and sent a considerable reinforcement to the prince of Stolberg, to enable him to maintain his position of Frauenstein. On the 1st of November, Wied arrived at the camp of Schlettau, to the relief of Hulsen, whose corps joined the army of his royal highness. Platen was made to advance, and passed the Mulde with a corps of nine thousand men. Belling likewise advanced between Saffelbach and Burkersdorf, where he nightly lighted fires, as if his had been a grand army; while Wied sent a detachment to Naukirch to alarm the camp of Plauen. These measures, taken with so much perspicuity, produced the effect that might well have been expected; for the prince of Stolberg retreated the same night for Altenberg, toward the frontiers of Bohemia. Belling on this occu-  
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pied the environs of Frauenstein; and Platen encamped at Porfchenstein, to cover the corps of Kleift, which entered Bohemia by the road of Einfiedel. He ruined a considerable magazine the Imperialists possessed at Saatz, made incursions as far as Leutmeritz, and returned into Saxony by the Basberg.

About this time the king arrived at Meiffen, and ordered Wied to advance toward Keffelsdorf. This general encountered a post of information, appertaining to Ried, at the Landſberg, which Anhalt and Prittwitz attacked, and there took four cannon and five hundred men. This is the Anhalt who most contributed to the success of the action of Langenſalza, and to that of Leutmannsdorf. By this brave combat the campaign was closed. The weather, which began to be very severe, obliged the king to assign quarters of cantonment for the troops.

(November 3d.) Preliminaries of peace had just then been signed between France and England. The English, whose conduct had been so odious since lord Bute had come into the administration, wholly abandoned the interests of the king, during the course of the negotiation; they even consented that the French should remain in possession of the dutchy of Cleves, and of the principality of Guelders.

Their conduct obliged the king to seek the means of reducing the court of Vienna to an equitable peace. The princes of the empire were weary of the war. They saw the French army ready to repass the Rhine. This appeared to be the time to enforce them to neutrality, and consequently to leave the empress queen singly to fight her battles.

It was for this purpose that Kleist was sent into the empire with his corps. He seized on Bamberg, and disturbed Nuremberg. His hussars appeared at the gates of Ratisbon, and the diet, amid its deliberations, was inspired with fears. Several of its deputies, in the moment of terror, took to flight. The duke of Wurtemberg was on the point of escaping into Alsatia. The effects of the incursion were such that the electors of Bavaria, Mayence, and the bishops of Bamberg and Wurzburg, demanded peace, and promised immediately to withdraw their contingents from the army of the circles. The only means of extinguishing the conflagration, in Germany, was to deprive it of the combustibles by which it might be fed. Kleist, after conducting the expedition like an excellent general, returned with his troops into Saxony, at the beginning of January. A line was drawn along the Tripsche and the Mulde, which extended



tended from Seyda to Meissen. Other corps were dispersed, at Chemnitz, Zwickau, and Géra, on the frontiers of Bohemia; and the main army was distributed from Sorau to the confines of Thuringia.

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## C H A P. XVII.

### *Of the Peace.*

SCARCELY had the troops begun their cantonments before M. von Fritsch, counsellor to the king of Poland, came to Meissen, where the head quarters had been fixed. He had estates in the vicinity, so that his arrival had no extraordinary appearance. He demanded an audience of the king, and began by some common-place observations on the miseries of war, and the blessings of peace; after which he spoke more plainly, adding that peace perhaps was not so distant as it might be thought, and that he was even charged with certain messages, which he should deliver without delay, as soon as he first should be certain they would not be ill received.

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The king replied he had been forced into the war by his enemies, and that it was his enemies who hitherto had opposed or had eluded peace, under various pretences; that it was not he who was to be asked whether he wished to see a conclusion to the troubles of Germany, but those by whom they had been fomented, and till now maintained; those whose animosity and rage had increased in proportion to the resistance they had encountered, in the execution of their pernicious designs.

Fritsch presented a letter to the king from the electoral prince, which indicated that this prince, having the tranquillity of Europe at heart, had employed every effort for its re-establishment, and that to this effect he had endeavoured to learn the intentions of the empress queen, which he found were correspondent; that the concurrence of his Prussian majesty was only necessary to terminate the disputes of the belligerent powers, and that he intreated the king to explain himself on the subject.

After reading the letter, the king retraced the conduct of the court of Vienna, during the course of the war; and said that, it being the ancient custom of this court ever to make peace later than its allies, as is abundantly proved by historical example, it was not apparent that the  
present

present intentions were sincere; however, that the king might have nothing to reproach himself with, and not reject overtures which might lead to a conclusion of this fatal war, his majesty, induced by that consideration, declared that, whatever reason he might have to demand indemnification, for the cruelties and ravages that had been committed in the provinces of the Prussian domain, he for the love of peace desisted; but on condition that his enemies should none of them insist on similar indemnifications; being well determined not to lose, by a stroke of the pen, what he had hitherto defended, and what he still should be in a state to defend, by the sword. He added——

“ If the house of Austria really wishes to negotiate with me, in order to prevent all equivocal and ambiguous interpretation, we must previously agree on the principles we shall mutually admit; and I can only perceive three which can promote a desirable conclusion. That is to say—That an equitable peace shall be made, by which not any one of the contracting parties shall be wronged; that the conditions shall be honourable to all those who shall concur; and that it shall be strengthened by measures of such solidity as to render it durable.”

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By the answer of the king, Fritsch comprehended that it was particularly necessary to relieve the mind of his majesty, from the diffidence he entertained relative to the sincerity of the intentions of the court of Vienna. That he might convince him of the good dispositions of the empress queen, with respect to peace, he communicated a narrative which the sieur Saul, the Saxon emissary at the court of Vienna, had sent to the electoral prince. This narrative contained the assurances which count Kaunitz had given the sieur Saul, of the desire of the empress queen to quickly terminate the war; and further affirmed, that count Kaunitz had assured the emissary, the empress queen had twice offered the king of Prussia peace; the first time through the channel of France, and the second through that of England; and that the refusal of the king justified the measures the queen had found herself under the necessity of taking, for the continuation of the war.

These assertions were notoriously false; for never had any overture been made to the king, on the part of the court of Vienna, either through the medium of France, and still less through that of England; and these falsities appeared to be an ill omen. For what hope might be found-  
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ed on negotiation thus begun? Trifles however often obstruct great intentions. Without staying to inquire what count Kaunitz might have said to a Saxon emissary, it was necessary to examine the reasons the empress queen might have to make peace, that conviction might be obtained of their probable force, and of the degree of impression they might make upon her mind.

A hundred thousand Turks on the frontiers of Hungary was an argument capable of inspiring pacific sentiments, in the council of that state which should be most passionate for war. The Russians and the Swedes had both withdrawn their alliance. The former had even made a part of the last campaign with the Prussians; and, though they might not be feared as new enemies, they still were friends, and consequently would not make diversions against Prussia. Might it not be expected that the court of Vienna would pay attention to the separate peace, which the greatest princes of Germany had lately concluded, with Prussia? For, in what did the army of the empire consist? Was it not formed of their troops? On the other side, the preliminaries between France and England were signed; the French had engaged incessantly to withdraw their troops out of Germany. Of all the belligerent powers, the empress queen  
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and the king of Prussia only remained on the field of battle; in some manner like two champions, abandoned by their seconds, and fighting for life or death.

Such were the political reasons. Those which internal government might furnish were not less forcible. The ill success of the last campaign must have been productive of discouragement. The infinite difficulties encountered in amassing the necessary funds for the war expenditure, misintelligence among the generals, quarrels among the ministers, dissensions in the Imperial family, the ill health of the emperor, and the additional consideration that, since the empress queen, aided by all her allies, had not been able to abase and destroy Prussia, there were still less reasons to suppose she ever would succeed in such an attempt, singly and deprived of succour. These might all be supposed to be motives. There were others, that related to the war, not less powerful. The city of Dresden was ill provisioned, the magazines of Bohemia were in part empty, or ruined by the incursion of Kleist. Hence it might naturally be feared, as well at Warsaw as at Vienna, that Dresden would be recovered by the king, at the commencement of the approaching campaign, and that Bohemia would become, if not the theatre of war, at least

of incursion from the Prussian troops. Such were the inducements that might persuade the king the court of Vienna sincerely desired peace should be re-established. After mature reflection he gave the *sieur Fritsch* a favourable answer, and a letter for the electoral prince, in which he thanked him for his endeavours to conciliate the minds of his adversaries; and assured him that, for his own part, he would with pleasure contribute, as far as his glory would permit, to the recovery of peace.

Some few days after, the king departed from Meissen, and made the tour of his line, on the frontiers of Bohemia and the empire; whence he repaired to Leipzig, there to establish his quarters during the winter. A few days after the arrival of the king, *Fritsch* returned, and brought with him the answer of the court of Vienna, relative to the principles his majesty was desirous of fixing, as the basis of negotiation. The memorial was loaded with various emphatical, enigmatical, and obscure expressions, unintelligible to the whole world, count Kaunitz excepted. Fortunately, count Flemming, ambassador from Saxony at Vienna, had commented the text by a long letter, wherein he explained the dark style of the Austrian chancery, and gave strong assurances of the up-  
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right intentions of the empress, and of the consent she would accord to every restitution that might be required of her, in consideration of the deplorable state to which the electorate of Saxony was reduced. He gave notice however, by way of precaution, that some contention and formal circumlocutions must be expected, on the part of the Austrians. The parties were agreed concerning substantials, and peace might be concluded according to the wishes of the king.

The monarch, on his part, had many motives that concurred to make him prefer modest and moderate conditions of peace, to others more advantageous. It was an unseasonable moment to increase his demands, in the present state of affairs, when compensation could only be obtained by victory, and when the army was in a too ruinous and degenerate condition to hope for any remarkable exploits. The number of good generals had diminished: they were wanting even to head detachments. Numerous old officers had perished in the murderous battles they had fought, for their country's defence. The young were of an age when superior services were not to be expected. Those respectable veteran warriors, those chiefs who had first entered the field, no longer existed; and their successors, with whom the army was supplied,  
chiefly

chiefly consisted of deserters, or young feeble men, under eighteen years of age, incapable of supporting the rude fatigues of a severe campaign. Many regiments, ruined on various occasions, had been three times recruited during the war; so that the troops, in their present state, could not attract the confidence of their commanders.

And what succour could the king hope for should he continue the war? He saw himself single, destitute of allies; the sentiments of the empress of Russia, with respect to him, were equivocal; the English acted less like friends than declared foes; the Turks, confounded at the revolutions that had happened in Russia, uncertain how to behave, declined the defensive alliance that had so long been proposed to them; and even the khan of the Tartars had lately obliged the Prussian resident to quit his court. Independent of all these circumstances, it was highly to be feared that the continuation of war would occasion the plague in Saxony, Silesia, and Brandenburg; because that most of the fields lay fallow, provisions were scarce and excessively dear, and the country destitute of man and beast; so that throughout these provinces nothing was beheld but the fearful traces of war,

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and the harbingers of still greater future calamities.

Under circumstances so cruel, nothing could be expected from prolonging the war. Should the approaching campaign be begun, the better conditions would not therefore have been obtained. By an indirect and vicious conduct, and after useless defence, the same terms must have been complied with at last.

The Austrians proposed a congress should be held, and the proposition was immediately accepted by the king. They named the sieur Collenbach as their plenipotentiary; and the king, on his part, appointed his cabinet counsellor, M. von Hertzberg. It was agreed the conferences should be held at Hubertsburg; and, by a public act, this place and its territories were declared neuter. The conferences began on the 31st of December, according to the customary forms.

Thus, in these happy times, did the minds of men, heated as they had been, and irritated by war, suddenly grow calm, from the north to the south of Europe. We have already seen the preliminaries signed between France and England. The French had been determined to make peace in consequence of their ill success, in the Indies and in Europe; for, in the spring of  
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the year, the English had conquered Martinico; and, during the summer, had taken the Havannah, from the Spaniards, whose fleets they had entirely ruined. These misfortunes, added to the vast expences of France, and the impossibility of finding new resources, had inclined the council to a pacificatory system.

The English, on their part, instead of gloriously dictating conditions to their enemies, governed by lord Bute, sacrificed the interests of their allies, and consented that the French should remain in possession, after the peace, of the towns of Wesel and Guelders, and their territories. Not satisfied with trampling upon treaties and contemning good faith, lord Bute caballed at the court of Petersburg, and there sowed the seeds of diffidence and suspicion, against the king; so that the latter, unable to depend on any of the powers of Europe, had every thing to apprehend from new disputes with Russia.

Amid this general agitation, when hasty resolutions were often taken, it happened, no doubt contrary to the intention of the British ministry, that England rendered an important service to Prussia. It was thus. Scarcely were preliminaries signed before this ministry, from a spirit of œconomy, disbanded all the light troops that

had served in the army of prince Ferdinand. Among the number was the British legion, and this corps, of three thousand men, passed into the service of Prussia. It was joined by eight hundred Prussian dragoons of Bauer, and by as many volunteers of Brunswick, whom the king had engaged. This detachment, which included between five and six thousand men, had orders to march incontinently for the frontiers of the dutchy of Cleves, which inspired the French with strange apprehensions. They imagined the king projected a diversion, either into Flanders or Brabant. They communicated their suspicions to the Austrians; who immediately sent ten thousand men, to gain the banks of the Rhine. The Hanoverian ministry likewise supposed that, with a heart rankled at the conduct of the English, the king would take vengeance on the electorate of Hanover. In England it was believed his majesty would make attempts on the bishoprick of Munster, thereby to ascertain the restitution of the dutchies of Cleves and Guelders; and as lord Bute was in a train to give every mark, on every opportunity, of his ill will to the Prussians, he caused the garrison of Munster to be doubled, with an order that no Prussian should be suffered to enter.

Thus

Thus a simple and natural event suddenly heated the imaginations of ministers, and made half Europe guilty of extravagance. This phrenzy, however, was advantageous to the king; he had neither thought of these diversions nor of the city of Munster; his sole design was to surprise the garrison of Wesel, that he might again have it in his possession. The French, strongly impressed with the idea that a new war might be kindled in Flanders, and fearing to be entangled in it, proposed, by the duke de Nivernois, to the Prussian ambassador at London, a treaty of neutrality for Flanders, in return for which they would restore the provinces they had invaded. This proposition was no sooner made than accepted; but the distance of the places, and the difficulty of passing the sea in the winter season, were the causes that the peace of Hubertsburg was signed before the other treaty was brought to maturity. We shall therefore return to the negotiations in Saxony, where all the interests of Prussia, which still remained to be discussed, were efficaciously regulated.

As soon as the plenipotentiaries were assembled at Hubertsburg the sieur von Collenbach dictated a memorial, the substance of which was nearly this.

“ The sieur von Collenbach, to whom full  
“ powers have been imparted, declares that her  
“ majesty the empress queen, to convince the  
“ whole world how sincerely she desires the re-  
“ storation of peace, does not hesitate to make  
“ the first proposals; and as both parties are  
“ agreed that this restoration of peace shall be  
“ on just, honourable, and durable principles,  
“ in order that none of the contracting parties  
“ may suffer any real loss, these three qualities  
“ exact the following conditions.

“ I. That the court of Saxony shall be in-  
“ cluded in this peace, on a proper and reci-  
“ procal footing.

“ II. That just regard shall be paid to the  
“ states of the empire, namely those of Fran-  
“ conia, as well as the duke of Mecklenbourg  
“ and the prince of Zerbst.

“ III. That endeavours shall be made for the  
“ re-establishment of peace in the empire, in a  
“ manner honourable to the emperor.

“ IV. That a general amnesty shall be pub-  
“ lished, in which the holy Roman empire shall  
“ be included.

“ V. In consequence of the convention be-  
“ tween the king and the elector Palatine, rela-  
“ tive to the succession of Juliers and Berg, this  
“ treaty

“ treaty shall be in full force after the peace,  
 “ and restored to its former stability.

“ VI. That, to render the peace durable,  
 “ the county of Glatz, which by its situation  
 “ covers Bohemia, shall remain with the em-  
 “ press queen.

“ VII. That, in order to remove all tempta-  
 “ tions of aggrandisement, and what ever may ex-  
 “ cite new projects of ambition, the empress will  
 “ dispose the emperor to detach Tuscany from  
 “ the primogenial succession of his house, on  
 “ condition that the king will enter into the  
 “ same engagements, respecting the succession  
 “ of the margraviates of Bareuth and Anspach,  
 “ hitherto in the possession of the younger  
 “ branches of his family.

“ VIII. That in return for the provinces which  
 “ the empress shall restore to the king, the latter  
 “ shall give his vote for the election of the arch-  
 “ duke Joseph, in quality of king of the  
 “ Romans.

“ IX. And for the expectative to the feudal  
 “ succession of the dutchy of Modena, in favour  
 “ of the archduke, his second brother, who shall  
 “ espouse the heiress of this dutchy.

“ X. And that, in fine, the treaties of Breslau  
 “ and Dresden shall be renewed, relative to  
 “ the support of the Roman religion, the debts



“ of Silesia, and the mutual guarantees which  
“ the king may amicably extend beyond the  
“ limits of this treaty ; that prisoners of war  
“ shall be mutually restored ; and that all con-  
“ tributions in arrear shall be renounced.”

These proposals, many of which were artful, were examined with all the attention that, from their importance, they merited. The articles which, in meaning and words, were contrary to the fundamental principles that had been agreed on, for the re-establishment of peace, were curtailed. It was, in particular, easy to prove that the cession of a province, however it might be coloured, was a real loss, the nature of which no forced sense, no term interpreted after an equivocal manner, could change. The following article was substituted :

“ That the entire restitution of the states ap-  
“ pertaining to the belligerent powers should  
“ serve as the basis of the treaty it was intended  
“ to make. Consequently it was promised to re-  
“ store to the king of Poland his electorate of  
“ Saxony, and the provinces thereto appertain-  
“ ing, as soon as the provinces that had been  
“ taken from Prussia should be restored.”

An explanation was afterward demanded of certain vague terms, contained in the Austrian memorial ; because that definitions were necessary,

fary, that the propositions might be understood. What was signified by the just regard which was demanded of the king, for the princes of the empire? It was at the same time observed to the Austrians that, the differences of the king with the princes of the empire having ceased, by the peace he had concluded with them, it was superfluous to stipulate any particular condition, with respect to them; at least unless, by the same article, and in perfect reciprocity, it should please the empress queen to contract the same obligations toward the allies of the king, who were named; that is to say, the empress of Russia, the king of England, elector of Hanover, the landgrave of Hesse, and the duke of Brunswick.

In lieu of the third article, an amnesty for the past was proposed; and the renewal of the peace of Westphalia.

The 6th article, containing the cession of the county of Glatz, was wholly rejected, as contrary to the fundamental principles which had been stipulated.

The 7th article was declined by exposing how indecent it would be for a foreign power to interfere concerning the laws and domestic arrangements which another power might abrogate or introduce into its family; and, to give a po-  
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lite turn to the refusal, it was added that the king pretended to have no influence, in the arrangements which the emperor should think proper to make, respecting the succession of his family; consequently, the king flattered himself that neither the emperor nor empress would think of disposing of any heritage which might legitimately, and of right, revert to the elder branch of the house of Brandenburg.

With respect to the election of the archduke Joseph, as king of the Romans, and the feudal succession of the dutchy of Modena, the king, who neither could impede the one nor the other, accorded with a good grace, that he might make a merit of the act, and the article was not at all disputed.

This counter project was sent to Vienna, by the sieur von Collenbach. The answer returned tolerably soon; and the Austrians relaxed on most of the articles: they properly insisted but on two points; the cession of the county of Glatz, and the conclusion of a provisional treaty, which should regulate the succession of the margraviates of Franconia. Arguments already half refuted were again to combat. The Austrians affirmed that the fortress of Glatz was no more than a place of defence, when in their power, and that it became offensive when in the  
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power of the Prussians. They offered indemnification to the king, by ceding that part of the principality of Neifs of which they were in possession, and to pay the residue in ready money, to liquidate the debts mortgaged on Silesia. Their own reasons were retorted upon themselves; and it was proved to them, by the situation of the places, that there are several posts, on that frontier of Bohemia, which forbid entrance to the sovereign who should possess Glatz; as those of Bergicht, Politz, Opatfchna, Nachod, Wiffoka, and Neustadt; without including Königsgrätz; the least of which, well defended, would stop the army of Xerxes, since they well might be called equal to the straits of Thermopylæ; while in Silesia, and below Glatz, in the plains of Frankenstein and Reichenbach, there is no post where an army may dispute the entrance of an enemy. Whence it evidently resulted that Glatz, in the hands of the Austrians, became an offensive place; that it supplied them with three entrances; from Johannesberg, from Wartha, and from Silberberg; by which they might at liberty descend into the Lower Silesia; where, at the very commencement of a quarrel, they might establish war in the heart of that province; and that Glatz, in the power of Prussia, could be no  
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more than a place of defence, not giving free entrance into the kingdom of Bohemia. As this was entirely a military discussion, the king appealed to marshal Daun, who could not but allow the reality of what was here advanced. However, to soften refusal by an obliging compliment, the king added that, did the question relate only to the obtaining the friendship of a princess of such rare merit, as was the empress queen, by the cession of a province, he should not think he could pay too dear in making such a sacrifice; but that a town so important as Glatz could not be ceded, without entirely forgetting all that a sovereign owes to his posterity; especially since the situation of the king did not oblige him to receive law from his enemy, for he had twice as much to surrender as they had to restore.

The other article, which concerned the convention proposed by the Austrians to regulate the succession of the margraviates of Franconia, was too contrary to the interests of the royal house to be accepted. It was eluded by first alleging the same arguments that had been before employed; and again by strengthening them with considerations drawn from example, which prove the inutility of previous treaties, that in execution are never regarded. This was a proposition



position easy to enforce with the Austrians, with whom the memory still was recent of the little validity of the famous Pragmatic sanction, by which the emperor Charles VI. had regulated the succession of his states.

The court of Vienna made new replications to these two articles; and, after having made some attempts to preserve the county of Glatz, they gave up their pretensions, declaring the fortrefs and its artillery should be restored in the state they then actually were. This court in like manner relaxed from its demands, relative to a provisional treaty for the succession of Franconia. The negotiation with Saxony kept pace with that of Austria; it met with no great obstacles, because the king of Poland thought himself too happy once more to recover his electorate, from the king of Prussia. The Saxons only demanded that means should be taken to procure establishments for the children of the king of Poland, and principally for prince Charles, whom the empress of Russia had lately deprived of his duchy of Courland.

Thus ended this cruel war; during which no power, Great Britain excepted, in the least extended the limits of its domains. The peace between France and England was only signed  
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some days sooner than that of Hubertsburg. France, by this treaty, was stripped of her principal possessions in America. England restored Martinico, Guadeloupe, Belle-isle and Pondicherry; and France the island of Minorca.

We cannot forbear adding some reflections on the numerous facts we have related. Does it not seem astonishing that human prudence the most penetrating, added to strength, should so often be the sport of unexpected accident, or the caprices of fortune? And does it not appear there is a certain something, which sports with and contemns the projects of man? Is it not evident that at the commencement of these troubles every sensible man must have been deceived in his judgment, concerning the close of the war? Who could foresee, or imagine, that Prussia, attacked by the powers of Austria, Russia, France, Sweden, and all the holy Roman empire, should withstand a league so formidable, and in a war wherein every thing predicted ruin should lose no one of its possessions? Who could have expected that France, with its intrinsic strength, its grand alliances, and resources so various, should be despoiled of its principal possessions in the East Indies, and fall the victim of that war? In the year 1757, all these facts

must have appeared incredible ; yet, if we take a retrospect of the causes that have produced events so little expected, we shall find that the following reasons impeded the destruction of the Prussians.

1. The want of harmony among the powers of the grand alliance, and their opposite interests, which would not admit them to agree on certain operations ; the little union there was between the Russian and Austrian generals, which rendered them circumspect, when occasion required they should act with vigour to overwhelm Prussia, which in reality they might have effected.

2. The subtilized over-refined politics of the court of Vienna, the principles of which led her to charge her allies with the most hazardous and difficult enterprises, that she might, at the conclusion of the war, preserve her army in a better state, and more complete than that of other powers. Hence it resulted, at various times, that the Austrian generals, by excess of circumspection, neglected to give the expiring blow to the Prussians, when their affairs were the most desperate.

3. The death of the empress of Russia, with whom, in the same tomb, was buried the Austrian alliance ; the seceding of the Russians ;  
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the alliance of Peter III. with the king of Prussia; and finally the succour sent by that emperor into Silesia.

If we further examine the cause of the losses of the French in this war, we shall observe the error they were guilty of in their interference with the troubles of Germany. The kind of war they made with England was maritime; they were circumvented, and neglected this principal object in pursuit of a foreign one, with which they had properly no connexion. At first, they obtained naval advantages against the English; but, when their attention was drawn off by the continental war, as soon as the armies of Germany absorbed all their funds, which should have been employed to augment their fleets, their marine began to want necessities, and the English gained an ascendancy which rendered them victorious in the four quarters of the world. The excessive sums which Louis XV. paid in subsidies, and those that were expended on his armies in Germany, were sent out of the kingdom. This diminished by one half the money that was in circulation, as well at Paris as in the provinces; and, to add to humiliation, the generals chosen by the court for the command of the French armies were guilty of  
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very gross errors, while each imagined himself a Turenne.

Let these examples serve to inform the politician of vast projects that, however extensive the human mind may be, it is never sufficiently so to penetrate the minute combinations that are necessary to be developed, in order to foresee or regulate events, which depend on future contingencies. We can explain past incidents clearly, for their causes are now discovered; but we always deceive ourselves concerning the future, which is concealed, by secondary causes, from our rash and prying inspection. That the expectations of politicians should be disappointed is not a singularity peculiar to the present age; it has ever been the same, during all the ages in which human ambition gave birth to grand projects. To be convinced of this we need but recollect the history of the famous league of Cambray; the invincible armada; the war of Philip II. against the Dutch; the vast designs of Frederic II. at the commencement of the war of thirty years; the different projects of partition, which preceded the war of Succession, and that war itself. All these splendid plans produced conclusions very opposite to the intents of those who were their promoters; and this is because human

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affairs want stability; and because men, their designs, and the events of futurity, are subjected to perpetual vicissitudes.

The belligerent powers, leaving the lists in which they had combated with so much animosity and fury, began to feel their wounds, and the need they had of cure. They all were sufferers, but their pangs were different. We shall here take a review of them, that we may obtain a precise idea of their losses, and their actual state.

Prussia enumerated a hundred and eighty thousand men, whom she had been deprived of, by [the war. Her armies had fought sixteen pitched battles. The enemy had beside almost totally destroyed three large corps; that of the convoy of Olmutz, that of Maxen, and that of Fouquet, at Landshut; exclusive of the garrison of Breslau, two garrisons of Schweidnitz, one of Torgau, and one of Wittenberg, that were taken with these towns. It was further estimated that twenty thousand souls perished in the kingdom of Prussia, by the ravages of the Russians; six thousand in Pomerania; four thousand in the New March; and three thousand in the electorate of Brandenburg.

The Russian troops had fought four grand battles, and it was computed that the war had  
cost

cost them a hundred and twenty thousand men, including part of the recruits that perished, in coming from the frontiers of Persia and China, to join their corps in Germany.

The Austrians had fought ten regular battles. Two garrisons at Schweidnitz, and one at Breslau, had been taken; and they estimated their loss at a hundred and forty thousand men.

The French made their losses amount to two hundred thousand; the English with their allies to a hundred and sixty thousand; the Swedes to twenty-five thousand; and the troops of the circles to twenty-eight thousand.

At the close of the war the house of Austria found itself a hundred millions of crowns in debt. The frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia had suffered, though the traces of ruin or devastation did not seem to remain. In France, the credit of government had been ruined, by the robberies of financiers, and the malversations of those to whom the administration of money had been committed. The payment of the interest of their borrowed capitals had been suspended; the little that was paid was paid irregularly; the people groaned under the weight of the taxes by which they were overwhelmed; and, though no incursion of the enemy had ravaged the pro-

vinces, the state did not suffer the less; for, the commerce of the two Indies being destroyed, the sources of public abundance were dried up. The national debt had accumulated, and amounted to sums so enormous that, after the peace, the extraordinary taxes were prolonged for ten years, in order to pay off the interest, and to create a sinking fund, for the further payment of this interest.

The English, victorious by sea and land, may be said to have purchased their conquests by immense sums, which they had borrowed to carry on the war, and which almost rendered them insolvent. The opulence of individuals exceeded all imagination. The wealth and luxury of the people were the consequences of the considerable prizes that so many private persons had taken, as well from France as from Spain; and of the prodigious increase of trade, of which, during the war, they had almost solely been in possession.

Russia had indeed expended considerable sums; but she had rather made war at the expence of the Prussians and the Poles than at her own. Sweden was on the verge of bankruptcy. She had not only broken in upon the funds of the bank, but, by an unskilful act of her financiers, she had too much multiplied her  
paper

paper currency, which destroys the equilibrium that all well-regulated states ought to keep, between the currency of paper and of coin. Prussia had suffered the most. The Austrians, French, Russians, Swedes, and troops of the circles, descending to the duke of Wurtemberg, had all here committed ravages. The state had expended a hundred and twenty-five millions of crowns, for the support of its armies, and other military disbursements. Pomerania, Silesia, and the New March, required great sums for their restoration. Other provinces, as the duchy of Crossen, the principality of Halberstadt, and that of Hohenstein, in like manner exacted great succours; and efforts were necessary, supported by unrelaxing industry, to restore them to the state in which they were previous to the troubles; because that most of the lands were uncultivated, for want of seed corn, and cattle, while every thing that related to subsistence was in like manner deficient.

To supply so many wants, there were distributed among these provinces, according to a just partition, twenty-five thousand measures of corn and flour, and seventeen thousand of oats; thirty-five thousand horses, drafted from the regiments and from the artillery, and provisions were given to the gentry, and the peasantry. The king  
further

further bestowed on Silesia three millions for its re-establishment; one million four hundred thousand crowns on Pomerania and the New March; seven hundred thousand on the electorate; and one hundred thousand on the dutchy of Cleves. Beside eight hundred thousand which the kingdom of Prussia received, the contributions on the dutchy of Crossen, the countries of Hohenstein, and Halberstadt, were reduced one half: in fine, the people began to take courage, and no longer to despair of their situation; to work, be active, and by industry to repair those evils the state had suffered.

From the general picture which we have sketched, the result is that the governments of Austria, France, and even England, were overwhelmed with debts, and almost destitute of credit; but that the people, not having been sufferers in the war, were only sensible of it from the prodigious taxes which had been exacted by their sovereigns. Whereas, in Prussia, the government was possessed of money, but the provinces were laid waste and desolated, by the rapacity and barbarity of enemies.

The electorate of Saxony was, next to Prussia, the province of Germany that had suffered the most; but this country found resources, in the goodness of its soil and the industry of its inhabitants,



bitants, which are wanting to Prussia throughout her provinces, Silesia excepted. Time, which cures and effaces all ills, will no doubt soon restore the Prussian states to their former abundance, prosperity, and splendor. Other powers will in like manner recover, and other ambitious men will arise, excite new wars, and incur new disasters. Such are the properties of the human mind; no man benefits by example; the follies of the father afford no useful lesson to the son; each generation must have its errors.

We shall add but a word to this work (too long perhaps already, and too diffuse) for the satisfaction of posterity, which doubtless will desire to know how a prince, so little puissant as was the king of Prussia, was able, during seven campaigns, to sustain a ruinous war, against the chief monarchies of Europe. Though the loss of so many provinces laid him under great difficulties, and though he was incessantly obliged to supply enormous sums, still there were resources that rendered the performance possible. The king drew four millions from the provinces that remained; the contributions on Saxony amounted to between six and seven millions; the subsidies of England, which were four millions, were coined into eight; the money that had been farmed, by diminishing its value one  
3 half,

half, afforded seven millions; beside which the payment of civil pensions had been suspended, that every fund might be applied to the expences of the war. The different sums we have indicated, in the total, amounted to twenty-five millions of crowns per annum, of adulterated coin. These were sufficient, by the aid of good œconomy, for the payment and maintenance of the army, and for the extraordinaries which were necessarily renewed each campaign.

May Providence grant (if Providence shall deign to look down on human miseries) that the unalterable and flourishing destiny of these states may raise the monarchs, by whom they are governed, superior to the calamities and plagues Prussia has endured, in these times of trouble and subversion; and that they never may be obliged to have recourse to remedies so violent and fatal, as were then found necessary to be employed, that the country might be preserved against the ambitious hatred of the sovereigns of Europe, who wished to annihilate the house of Brandenburg, and eternally exterminate all who bore the name of Prussian.

BERLIN, *December 17th, 1763.*

END OF THE SEVEN YEARS WAR.



